Introduction

The colonization of most of the free world between the 16th and 21st centuries has brought not only territorial but also epistemic and historiographical violence and domination. The end of formal occupation has not signalled the withdrawal of colonial categories, procedures and technologies of rule, nor has it beheaded Europe as the sovereign subject in deference to which many postcolonial histories and geographies are constructed (Chakrabarty 2000). Whilst Michel Foucault has provided many of the tools that are necessary to unpick the power-knowledge relationships of post-Enlightenment Europe, especially in their spatial groundedness, his silence on the colonial construction of European modernity and the mutual constitution of ‘metropole’ and ‘periphery’ is astounding.

This chapter will begin by examining the haunting presence of colonialism in Foucault’s writings and will then explore how geographers have tried to commune with our discipline’s colonial past and postcolonial present. The use of Foucault in the work of Edward Said and the Subaltern Studies Group will be investigated to suggest a movement towards an analysis of the lived and the governmental that chimes with much existing geographical research into the postcolonial.

The path I tread here is only one of the many routes through a field of study that could span, at least, Alexander the Great to George W. Bush and Tony Blair, and every country on earth whether as a colonized, colonizing, or indirectly influenced nation. Post-colonial forces operate at every scale, from trans-national flows of capital or bodies, global imaginary geographies, national stereotypes, urban re-mappings, to domestic routines and individual psychology. Postcolonial theory itself is a complex mix of theorists, including Homi Bhabha, Jaques Derrida, Franz Fanon and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Moreover, Foucault has been used to analyze post-

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1 I use the term ‘postcolonial’ here to refer to the interaction between colonized and colonizing populations following initial contact, although this need not have been face to face, such as in the mediated contact of trade networks. The term thus encompasses the experiences of both groups during and after the period of formal rule, if there was one. See Gandhi (1998, 3-4) for a discussion of the term.
colonial relations throughout the world, including Latin America (Trigo 2002, Outtes 2003), Africa (Mbembe 2001), ex-settler colonies (Clayton 2000; Dean and Hindess 1998; Henry 2002) and South Asia. The predominance of the latter in postcolonial theory may be a problem in itself, globalizing the experiences of a few colonies into the universal experience of the colonized. Such tendencies can be countered by a continuing commitment to studying the particular and specific instances of colonization and postcolonial experience within globally structuring systems of postcolonial rule.

The Absent Presence of Colonialism in Foucault

Peter A. Jackson (2003) has summarized the many critiques of Foucault that claim that the ‘difference’ he theorizes is that of ‘complexity’, difference within a society, rather than ‘multiplicity’, differences between societies. In his mostly local or national scale of study this is true, a fact compounded by his focusing on Europe in general, and France in particular. There are enough passing references to show that Foucault was aware of the importance of the colonial world, yet the significance of these traces of colonialism is much debated. In 1989 Uta Liebman Schaub suggested that the non-West operated as a counter-discourse or subtext that affected Foucault’s mode of thought; the unspoken ground from which he attacked Western thought. Schaub (1989, 308) even suggested that Foucault, like many of his contemporaries, was influenced by eastern philosophy. However, critical commentary has focused more on how Europe and its colonies were mutually constitutive, and whether this was acknowledged in Foucault’s writings. These constitutions can be separately considered, rhetorically if not historically, as practical, epistemic, and disciplinary.

A Practically Constitutive Outside

A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself. (Foucault 1975–76 [2003], 103)

In a 1976 lecture Foucault admitted that the techniques and weapons Europe transported to its colonies had a ‘boomerang’ effect on the institutions, apparatuses and techniques of power in the West (see above). However, this is one of his few acknowledgements that the compendium of power techniques he assembled regarding Europe had extra-European origins (for further brief comments see Foucault 1972, 210; Foucault 1977, 29, 314; Foucault 1980, 17, 77, and the quotation below from Foucault 1961). In a summary of postcolonial research, Timothy Mitchell showed that the panopticon itself, along with school monitoring, population government and

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2 The ongoing translation of Foucault’s lecture courses promises to add much, however, to postcolonial readings of his work. See references in Psychiatric Power (Foucault [1973–43] 2006, chapter four), and, especially Security, Territory, Population (Foucault forthcoming-b).
its cultural analysis, British liberalism’s imagination, English literature curriculums and colonial medicine all had some of their many origins in the colonies (Mitchell 2000, 3). Driver and Gilbert (1998) have also shown how the material landscape of London was, in various ways, an intensely imperial space. These examples are beyond the more obviously ‘colonial’ techniques of slavery, shipping, and plantations that impacted back on Europe. All of these imperial techniques were topographically re-inscribed in Europe and often failed to reveal their travels and complicity in consolidating the effects of territorial expansion. Despite his brilliance at thinking ‘power-in-spacing’, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988 [2000], 1449–50) justly claims that Foucault’s analysis actually produced a miniature version of colonialism, one that replayed the management of space and peripheral populations through the screen allegories of doctors, prisons, and the insane.

While Edward Said’s eventual rejection of Foucault concerned his broader philosophy, he also criticized Foucault’s Eurocentrism and tendency to universalize from French case studies (Said 1984a, 10). The ethnocentrism of this work clashed with Said’s belief that discipline was used to administer, study and reconstruct, then to occupy, rule and exploit, almost all of the world (Said 1984b, 227). To Said, Foucault’s carceral system was strikingly like the Orientalism he described. The systems were, of course, linked by networks of discursive and practical connections (Lester 1998). But beyond the humanitarian debates sparked by colonialism or the commodities and images consumed in Europe, there were also more fundamental processes of mutual constitution. Colonial environments threatened an intermixing of races, genders and classes that demanded reinforced distinctions of race, sexuality, culture and class (Mitchell 2000, 5). These thematics found their way back to the metropole and relayed a symbolic and material reworking of the European Self.

An Epistemologically Constitutive Outside

Within the universality of Occidental ratio there is to be found the dividing line that is the Orient: the Orient that one imagines to be the origin, the vertiginous point at which nostalgia and the promises of return originate; the Orient that is presented to the expansionist rationality of the Occident but that remains eternally inaccessible because it always remains the limit. (Foucault 1961, iv, translated in Schaub 1989, 308)

Pre-dating Said’s (1978) Orientalism by 17 years, Foucault acknowledged in a previously un-translated passage (although see Foucault 2005, xxx) the formative role of an imagined Orient on European collective memory (see above). While Said famously drew out this imagination, Ann Laura Stoler (1995) has done much to examine how imperial notions of race and sexuality constituted the European bourgeoisie. Drawing on Foucault’s histories of sexuality (1979, 1986a, 1986b) and the Society must be Defended lecture courses (1975–76 [2003]), Stoler showed that discourses of sex were on a ‘circuitious imperial route’ and that bourgeois identity

Here Europe itself is portrayed as a post (Holy Roman) imperial space, while the constitutive nature of the colonial economy is explicitly addressed.
was itself racially coded. Within the complex routings by which biopower sought to regulate national populations, sex became a state target while race discourses became the effect, taking up and re-moulding older forms of racism. While Mitchell (2000, 13) warns that this represents a double overlooking of Empire, negating the colonial origins of 18th–19th century racisms, Stoler acknowledged the paradoxical nature of a colonial biopolitical state that claimed to augment life, yet administered the right to kill. It was the role of race to decide who would live and die, the administration of what Achille Mbembe (2003) has termed ‘necropolitics’. This racialized politics of classification was taken up in Stoler’s (2002) later consideration of the normalizing activities of the state in the colonies themselves. Racism was here shown to thrive upon lines of unclear difference, combining pseudo-scientific symbolics of blood with cultural contagion theory.

As such, Stoler (2002, 142) showed that though Eurocentric, Foucault was not blind to race and its potential imperial connections. She also showed that, given Foucault’s two years spent in Tunisia (1966–68), this Eurocentrism remains intriguing, as does the lack of study of the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1972) that he wrote on the basis of his lectures there. Robert Young (2001, 395–397) has written of Foucault’s experiences and interest in political struggles at this time, but also how he used his distance from home to critically and ethnographically consider France and the West. As against *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault 1967), Foucault (1972) argued against the Other’s separated and silenced existence. Homi Bhabha (1992 [2000], 130) has similarly claimed that within Foucault’s ‘massive forgetting’ there is a metaleptic presence of post-colonialism. In *The Order of Things* (Foucault 1970, 369) anthropology emerges to confront the universalist claims of history, marking it out as the product of a European homeland. Historicist claims are thus exposed as dependent upon the technologies of colonialism, establishing anthropology as the counter-discourse of modernity.

However, such interpretations read much into the silences and cracks of Foucault’s writings. This corpus, Mitchell Dean (1986 [1994], 289) has suggested, saw Foucault pull back from the challenge of deconstructing the ‘West’ as a critical ethnographer and re-colonize his radical insights within an analysis of western modernity that, Mitchell (2000, 16) argues, reproduced the spatialization of modernity. The historical time-scheme of colonizing Europe captured the histories of overseas and returned them to the ordering, historicist logic of the colonial core. Undoing this process, and bias in Foucault’s writings, is not just a task of re-writing history, but of pursuing discourses, and disciplines, that though complicit with colonial states in the past, preserve the potential to mobilize counter-discourses of modernity.

A Discipline Constituted Outside

Felix Driver (1992) used Foucault’s writings to excavate a colonial history of the geographical discipline that paid attention to its institutional, rather than philosophical or scientific, genealogy. He suggested a thoroughly Foucauldian reading that would pay attention to the various types of powers at play within the rise of geography
as a discipline and the internal contradictions and resistances it came across in the consolidatory age of *Geography Militant* (Driver 1999). Stressing the spatiality of the discipline, Daniel Clayton (2001/02) has emphasized the need to trace these resistances in the colonial margins, as well as the imperial metropole.

Derek Gregory (1998) further mapped out the imaginary geographies by which geography as a discipline had imposed its Eurocentric worldview on the territories it surveyed. As with the sovereign Europe Foucault analyzed, the discipline of geography has been one of ‘constitutive exclusions and erasures’ (Gregory 1998, 72), viewing certain things and ignoring others through representational ‘geo-graphs’. For example, the geo-graph of ‘absolutizing time and space’ established Europe as the sovereign centre, but also divided the periphery into those more or less deserving of rights and along axes of alterity, forming a structured yet unstable hierarchy of difference. Other modalities concerned exhibiting the other, normalizing the subject and abstracting culture and nature, which all contributed to the view of the world presented by the geographical discipline to its students and author audiences through its home institutions.

While the implications of geography within the colonial past is increasingly clear, the colonial present requires constant attention. Jennifer Robinson (2003) has focused attention on how to bring about postcolonial geographical practice. Robinson links Chakrabarty’s assertion of Europe as the historical core to the geographical practices that put it there and to the universalizing tendencies of some post-1960s geographical theory. To undermine the epistemic violence of these traditions Robinson suggests: we acknowledge location, and the limits to analysis it poses; that we reincorporate area and development studies in innovative formations; that we engage with regional scholarship that disrupts dominant locations; and that we transform the conditions for the production and circulation of knowledge, regarding publication, sources and readership. These processes must, of course, take place within active research. Geographical research along these lines has been framed within readings of Foucault following Said’s influential interpretation.

**Said: The Presence of Foucault**

There is a certain irony in the discrepancy between the Foucault that Said propounded in his earlier theoretical writings, and the afterlife of Foucault’s analytical categories that were taken up in colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial studies more broadly. While Said initially stressed the worldliness of texts and the materiality of discourse, the various studies that claimed his lineage were often focused on an individual text or the relationships between separate texts, rather than their historical and geographical contingency. Yet, while Said was an early champion of Foucault, it is also the case that he (1993 [2004], 214) rejected Foucault for his political quietism, while also claiming that he had got all he needed from Foucault by the publication of *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977). From this point onwards the distance between Said’s humanism and Foucault’s anti-humanism became more pronounced.
Despite this, Said moved in the 1990s towards a geographically grounded form of analysis which has more in common with Foucault’s post-1978 lectures and writings on government than his earlier linked, but distinct, work on the materiality of discourse. This trajectory, and the positioning of geographical research within it, will now be traced.

The Materiality and Discontinuity of Discourse

In 1972, in the first edition of the journal *Boundary2*, Edward Said advocated the use of Michel Foucault (Said 1972, the article was re-written and published in Said, 1975, 277–343). Against later criticism of Said’s approach being atemporal and textual, he emphasized four particular elements of Foucault’s work. ‘Reversability’ supplanted the search for origins, development, or authors with the primacy of discourse and verbal usage. ‘Discontinuity’ undermined the idea of unlimited, silent, and continuous discourses in favour of the discontinuous practicalities that cross, juxtapose and ignore each other. This emphasis on difference, Said suggested, could be extended to include the differences not just within, but between societies, privileging histories over History (referencing Foucault 1961). As such, the idea of discourse from Foucault (1970, 1972) was one of dispersal and fragmentation that saw any seriality as an internal order within dispersal. The third Foucauldian method was that of ‘specificity’ which saw the boundaries of individual discourses policed by what is deemed wrong or forbidden, while the final method was that of locating ‘exteriority’, the transcendent homelessness of subjectivities incompatible with a discursive norm, whether deemed mad, dangerous or, like the Marquis de Sade, a subject of total desire.

However, it was the idea of discourse presented in 1978’s *Orientalism* which had a longer lasting effect, one which Young (2001, 386) claims is dissimilar to that of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. *Orientalism* depicted the dichotomization and essentialization of Europe’s worldwide geopolitical imagination. The discourse of orientalism could be traced in academic disciplines, a broader ontological and epistemological division between East and West, and finally in the institutions that governed the Orient. While flitting between different writings and institutions, Said focused on certain texts without attendant study of their environments of production. The emphasis on texts written from other texts led to an analysis of stereotypes that were posed as mis-representations, marking a move from a Foucauldian discourse analysis to a more Gramscian investigation of ideological representations. Timothy Brennan (2000) has, indeed, asserted that *Orientalism* is not Foucauldian due to its humanist specializations, sweeping syntheses, aesthetic indulgence and totalizing appetites. The sprawling debate from this tension is summarized in Ashcroft and

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3 Against this, I can find no reference to Said in Foucault’s writings. This is despite a brief correspondence following the publication of *Orientalism* (Salusinszky 1987, 136) and a meeting in 1979 in Foucault’s flat, where Said noticed his *Beginnings* (1975) on the bookshelf (Said 2000a).
Ahluwalia (1999, 76–80), but within this argument the significance is perhaps that without Gramsci’s notion of hegemonic power relations, Said felt that Foucault alone lacked political bite.

**The Spiderless Web**

In 1984 Said marked the beginning of his formal distancing from Foucault. While still favouring Foucault’s political view of language and his geopolitical interest in the control of territory, he launched two critiques based around notions of agency and power. Firstly, he questioned Foucault’s lack of interest in explaining why people or things were distributed as they were (Said 1984b, 220). Without immediacy or intentionality the historical evolutions of power Foucault suggests would have no drive. As Alison Blunt (1994, 54) has suggested, contra Foucault, it *does* matter who is writing; their conditions of authorship, gendered identity, or perception of audience must play a part. Similarly, Alan Lester’s emphasis on trans-imperial networks of discursive connections maintains a focus on the agency of individuals exercised in facilitating flows and constructing networks (Lester 2002, 29). Said later referred to the tension between the anonymity of discourse and the will to power of particular egos as an ‘almost terrifying stalemate’ (Said 1984a, 6) and forcefully rejected the notion that he suggested there was no voice to answer back against resistance (Said 2002, 1).

Said’s criticism of agency fed into the later comments on Foucault’s supposedly passive and sterile view of power, which, he claimed, failed to consider why power was gained and held on to. The existence of class struggle, imperialist war, and resistance show us that power does remain with rulers, monopolies and states: as Said (1984b, 221) put it, you cannot have the web without the spider. As such, Foucault failed to consider the intentionality and effort of history, refused to imagine a future rather than analyze the present, and failed to consider the space of existence beyond the power of the present (Said 1984b, 245–7).

This critical position was maintained throughout Said’s later writings. In his 1984 obituary article for Foucault, Said respectfully emphasized Foucault’s influence and his entangling of power and resistance, yet still decried the pessimism and determinism of his later work (Said 1984a, 3, 6). Said’s (1986) article on ‘Foucault’s imagination of power’ stands as his most vociferous rejection of Foucault’s account of the supposedly unremitting and unstoppable expansion of power. As against Noam Chomsky’s insurgent consideration of what could vanquish power relations, and his utopian postulations of what cannot be imagined, Foucault was claimed to only imagine what one could do with power if one had it, and what one could imagine if one had power. As such, Foucault’s imagination, unlike Gramsci’s, was thought to be with power, rather than against it. Paul Bové (1986 [2001]) approved of Said’s rejection of Foucault, warning of the ‘immoral consequences’ of the latter’s system, which prevented a recognition of resistance, denied the imagination of alternative orders and explained all social phenomenon by the structure of power. Said’s wariness of Foucault’s emphasis on assimilation and acculturation was re-
emphasized in a 1986 interview (Salusinszky 1987, 137) and was unchanged by 1993 when Foucault was portrayed as scribing the victory of power (Said, Beezer and Osbourne 1993 [2004], 214).

Said acknowledged that his *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) was written against the negative effects of Foucault in the book to which it was the sequel, *Orientalism* (Said in Said et al. 1993 [2004]). Against the impression of an orientalism that continued to grow without contestation, a wider geographical scope and an emphasis on the contestation of territory allowed Said to examine people’s counter-will as framed by Raymond Williams’s cultural reading of Gramsci. In the 20 years since his *Boundary2* article, the Foucault of reversibility, discontinuity, specificity and exteriority was lost amongst the more abstract Foucault of power-knowledge relations. This bias fails to do justice to the relevance and utility of Foucault’s earlier and later writings on archaeology, discourse and governmentality that are undergoing a current re-assessment beyond Said’s dismissal.

*Travelling with Foucault*

Said (1984b, 227) famously argued that theories travel, each having points of origin, a distance that is traversed, conditions that are confronted, and transformations that occur along the way. Said took Foucault both to America, institutionally, and to the Orient, theoretically. Between the two, Foucault’s writings seeped into the emergent field of postcolonial studies and were incredibly influential. But theories also travel through time. As has been shown above, Foucault has travelled to places he never envisaged, confronted conditions he didn’t expect, and has been over time, in cases, transformed beyond recognition. Ashcroft and Ahluwalia (1999, 82) admitted that Said only took what he needed from Foucault (also see Gregory 2004b), resulting in an ambivalent privileging of authors and literature which itself contracted the scope for resistance. Indeed, it was Said’s lack of a Foucauldian approach, rather than its presence, which decreased his attention on the non-representational spaces of the everyday in which the subaltern vocabulary of resistance is often located (see Smith 1994, 494). As such, the field of colonial discourse analysis, which played such a key role in establishing postcolonial studies, bore a bias towards the colonial mindset and its representation in textual accounts (see the emphasis on literary sources in, for instance, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1989; Behdad 1994; Lowe 1991; Slemon 1989; Spurr 1993; Suleri 1992).

Driver (1992, 33) suggested that both Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* and Said’s *Orientalism* were similarly misread, downplaying the heterogeneity of modern discourses, the controversies and resistances they contain, and the specificity of discursive regimes. However, Young (2001, 407) suggested that it is Said’s misrepresentation of Foucault that lays his work open to such misreadings. Young showed how Said came to interpret Foucault as dealing with textuality, estranging the Orientalist discourse from its material circumstances and welding it to representations. The effect of this reading, Young (2001, 389) argued, can be traced
through to the common criticisms of colonial discourse analysis. He categorized these as follows:

- **Historicity**: the generalization from a few literary texts that tend to be dehistoricized and un-situated in non-discursive texts.
- **Textuality**: the treatment of texts as historical documents, without accompanying materialist historical inquiry or political understanding.
- **Representation**: if all truth is representation, what was mis-represented? How can the subaltern speak?
- **Homogeneity and determinism**: notions of discourse that override historical and geographical difference and problematize how people become subjects in such discourses.

Young argued that an analysis more loyal to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* would negate many of the criticisms outlined above. The archaeological model of discourse eschews a disembodied study of intertexts, of representations and interpretation, in favour of studying the practical emergence of knowledge at the interface of language and the material world. Discourse analysis should, therefore, be situated at the contact zone of materiality, bodies, objects and practices. As the network which links together statements, objects and subjects, discourses must be fragmented and heterogeneous, yet are unified by particular rules that operate on all individuals. However, these rules lead to multiplicity, not uniformity, of choice and action (as was still asserted in Foucault 1979, 100).

As such, Young argued that Foucault’s conception of discourse is actually antithetical to postcolonial theories that posit a subjective voice of the colonized against an objective, colonizing discourse (also see Brennan 2000). Rather, discourses are unstable and cause the proliferation of subaltern discourses, whether as speaking from outside colonial discourses or mounting counter-discourses in direct confrontation (also see Terdiman 1985). Thus, a Foucauldian colonial discourse analysis would not be so vulnerable to the four criticisms outlined above, focused as it would be around using discourse to study colonial practice in successive administrative regimes (for such a place bound approach see Chatterjee 1995, 24). This brings colonial discourse analysis closer to work both on colonial governmentality and a material geographical analysis.

**Re-materializing Postcolonial Geography**

Most geographers will take Young’s arguments as reaffirmation, rather than revelation. Although not always referencing Foucault directly, but often in Foucauldian terminology, there is an entrenched tradition within the discipline that argues for a material grounding of postcolonial analyses (see Clayton 2004). Neil Smith (1994), in his review of *Culture and Imperialism*, showed that Said’s newfound commitment to resistance was constrained within his textual reading of discourse, thus presenting the struggle for decolonization as a literary affair. Jane
Jacobs (1996, x) attempted to reorient the spatial emphasis in colonial discourse analysis from metaphor to ‘real’ geographies. While not actually dismissing textual representations as unreal, Jacobs traced imperial remains not just in, but also through and about space. It was at the contact zone of materiality and practices that Jacobs sought out the ‘promiscuous geographies of dwelling in place’ that activated imperial pasts in postcolonial presents. While Clive Barnett (1997) reassured those who feared a ‘descent into discourse’, Driver and Gilbert (1998, 14) repeated worries about the textual nature of postcolonial cultural geographical work and argued for an appreciation of the imperial inheritance in different types of urban space, whether architectural, spectacular or lived.

Reading Foucault’s work on the political function of discourses, Alan Lester (1998, 2001, 2002) has been at the forefront of empirical research into not just the material practicalities of colonial rule but also the networking functions of international colonial discourses. His attention to the various sites in which power and knowledge were intertwined has led to a sophisticated understanding of grounded imperial power, with all the tensions and contestations that this involved. James Sidaway (2000, also see Sidaway, Bunnell and Yeoh 2003) repeated calls for a movement beyond discourse and representations to material practices, actual spaces and real politics, although these are all very much central to a Foucauldian understanding of discourse itself. More in line with Foucault’s writings, Cole Harris (2004) has recently argued for an examination of the physical dispossession of the colonized rather than their misrepresentation.

Accompanying these calls for a more material approach, Cheryl McEwan (2003) has criticized the postcolonial tendency to separate discourses from lived experience, its failure to propose solutions, and its privileging of theory and culture over political and ethical responsibilities. In response, she suggested re-materializing postcolonialism, exploring the lived nature of postcoloniality, and advocated tactics for linking the textual with macro-issues. Conjoining the political-economic, the ethical, and the material should create opportunities in the present for, as Jacobs (2001) insisted, postcolonial study has a contemporary effect. Derek Gregory (2004a) has recently demonstrated the capacity of Foucauldian history and cultural geography to disrupt any complacency about the colonial past. In a series of accounts regarding the colonial historico-geographical present in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, Gregory has traced the violent, physical and material manifestations of imaginary geographies bred through decades of colonial administration. These discourses are filled with the intentional voices of perpetrators, commentators and victims, and are scarred with the searing potential of counter-discourses to erupt in the space between the contradictory statements of neo-colonial discourses.

What is most surprising about Said’s work after his rejection of Foucault is not only how much he retains his geographical emphasis, but the degree to which this emphasis becomes not just imaginary but also governmental. Corollaries develop not just with Young’s Foucauldian colonial discourse analysis but also with a colonial application of Foucault’s (1978 [2001]; 1979) later writings on governmentality and biopower. While Orientalism had acknowledged institutions of administration as
Beyond the European Province: Foucault and Postcolonialism

275

the third facet of orientalist discourse, Said (1984b, 219) later expressed his interest in Foucault’s (1980, 77) writing on Geography; the control of territories, their demarcation and the study of armies, campaigns and territories (also see Gregory 1995). Here he also expressed the need to go beyond a purely linguistic discourse not just in the Orientalism tripartite of philology, ontology and institution, but also to the colonial bureaucracy and its virtual power of life and death over the Orient.

This movement was continued in Culture and Imperialism, despite his stubborn textualism (however, for some instances of Said grounding texts in material context see Gregory 1995, 453). Interest was expressed in the ‘actual geographic underpinnings’ beneath social space and the ways in which geographical projections make possible the construction of knowledge (Said 1993, 93). Physical transformations were noted, ranging from ecological imperialism and urban reconstruction down to the micro-physics of organizing everyday interaction (1993, 132). But the geographical element was also essential to anti-imperialism, at first through imagining the recovery of loss, and later the recovery of territory (1993, 271). This was part of Said’s ongoing rethinking of the ‘struggle over geography’ (Said in Said et al. 1994, 21), which was affirmed in his later comments on memory and geography (Said 2000b). Here orientalism itself was stressed to be about the mapping, conquest and annexation of densely inhabited, lived-in places, as part of an unending struggle over territory and memory.

By the late 1990s Said was advocating a form of geographical research that explored the diverse range of governmental tactics used to order space and the various different forms of memory production that negotiated this space. Such writings cannot be considered outside of his committed involvement with the Palestinian cause, which did not always feature in his theoretical work (see Gregory 1995; Said 2000b). The Subaltern Studies Group (SSG) also produced theoretically sophisticated material that remained oriented around the present. Said (1988) had praised the SSG under their editor Ranajit Guha, for their innovative archival work and for searching out non-elite histories not only in elite writings but also in mundane, everyday texts. He later acknowledged this level of research as, perhaps, more important than his preferred level of representations:

Now there is of course a subcultural tradition, for example, as Guha and others have shown, a whole range of colonial writing which is not artistic but is administrative, is investigative, is reportorial, has to do with conditions on the ground, has to do with interactions depending on the native informant. All that exists, there is no question of that. I was trying to adumbrate, perhaps a less important, but to my way of thinking, a larger picture of a certain kind of stability. (Said 2002, 7)

Subaltern Studies: From Gramsci to Governmentality

Ranajit Guha (1982) established the Subaltern Studies publication series in an attempt to grant credit and autonomy to the peasant classes of India as a politicized, active section of the population; the non-elite. While the Gramscian notion of the
subaltern would later be extended from the military or class concept to that of race, sexuality, caste or language, the emphasis remained on detailing the existence of action that could not be teleologized into a colonial, nationalist, or Marxist narrative. In over 20 years the literature by Subaltern Studies authors has converged with certain postcolonial themes, with an increasing use of Said but a decline from heavily Marxist origins to a ‘spirit of Marx’ (Chaturvedi 2000, vii) in later work.

The Spirit of Foucault

Partha Chatterjee has consistently worked to bring the SSG in line with Foucault’s and Said’s writings. While his initial contribution (Chatterjee 1983) dealt with the transition from feudalism to capitalism and Marx’s theories on property, this was presented as an analysis of ‘modes of power’ and ended with an avocation of Foucault’s capillary and embodied understanding of power relations. However, marking the qualified application of western theories to India that would characterize the SSGs work, Chatterjee asserted that modern power in the ‘Third World’ was combined with older modes of control and different state formations to those in Europe (for a reaffirmation of this view see Chatterjee 1995, 8).

Having first read Said in 1980 (Chatterjee 1992, 194), Chatterjee (1984) applied his theories to India in claiming that nationalists operated within orientalist discourses and with orientalist stereotypes themselves. As such, the representational structure of nationalist thinking corresponded at times to the structure of power it tried to repudiate. David Arnold’s work on the Madras police force applied Foucault’s (1977) work to India, looking at the removal of social intermediaries, the surveillance and discipline of the force itself, and political criticism of the police as anti-national during the non-cooperation movement (Arnold 1984). Later work on anti-plague measures showed that attempts to initiate mass state intervention between the 1890s and 1930s was met with a hostile response, not passivity or docility (Arnold, 1987). This reaction was against the latent claim for increased power over the body, as also expressed in dictates on widow immolation, whipping and medicine. Arnold’s (1994) later work also included an investigation of colonial prisons as lived spaces of resistance but also as abstract spaces for the collection of knowledge about Indian bodies.

This usage of Foucault was, I would suggest, forestalled and redirected by a shift that took place in the mid-1980s. This marked a turn to ‘discourse’ as it was increasingly being defined by postcolonial studies, rather than being akin to Foucault’s original notion. The rupture was triggered by a debate over the epistemological validity of the subaltern as an autonomous subject of history. Spivak (1985, 338) argued that the attempt to discover or establish a peasant or subaltern consciousness was positivistic, denoting a single, underlying consciousness. In the place of this romantic quest should be, she claimed, a charting of the subaltern-effect, the knotting of strands, whether political, economic, historical, or linguistic, that gave the effect of the operating subject. The fact that a strategically essentialist concept of the subject might be necessary to tie this knot was accepted as a valid risk
for the political interest of the SSG project. This argument was affirmed by Rosalind O’Hanlon (1988) who criticized the retention of a humanist subject alongside the growing use of anti-humanist, post-structuralist theory. In 1988 Guha’s retirement signalled the increase of post-modern theory within the group and a turn to the discursive construction of the subaltern(-effect).

However, the ‘discourse’ used here was as much influenced by Spivak’s readings of Derrida than that of Foucault. Spivak (1985, 330) had defined the SSG project as being about confrontation and change, but this was a change in sign-systems that classified, for example, crime as insurgency. These were ‘discursive displacements’ that charted people or events as political signifiers. As such, the SSG was claimed to examine the ‘socius’ as a sign-chain in which action marked a breaking of this chain. However, in this approach all attempts at displacement must be failures due to the breadth of colonial organization and the failure of the Indian bourgeoisie to politicize the peasantry. The focus from the fourth Subaltern Studies volume (1985) thus shifted to analyzing the difference of the subaltern that emerged within elite discourses (Prakash 1994). Chatterjee (1986), for example, showed how the agency of the common people was appropriated by the nationalist elite, leaving them as silenced fragments of a strengthening nation (Chatterjee 1993). This historiographical move did produce an innovative reading of sources for subaltern traces and stereotypes, yet the end result that was sought was one of failure. The textualism and political pessimism that resulted from such an approach has recently been challenged, but this has been within an understanding that subaltern studies be framed as a form of postcolonial criticism.

Gyan Prakash (1990) situated subaltern studies as a post-foundational history. He claimed it had overcome the depictions of India in orientalist texts as passive and separate, and in nationalist texts as autonomous and essential. He also criticized the essentialist notions of anthropology and area studies, along with the structural explanations of Marxist and social historians, much to the ire of O’Hanlon and Washbrook (1992). Against these traditions, and inline with Said’s call to reject, not reverse, colonial categories, the SSGs charting of multiple and changing subject positions was claimed to be fully post-foundational, and postcolonial (Prakash 1994).

The SSG has come under constant and sustained attack, from within India and without (Chaturvedi 2000). Perhaps one of the most provocative critiques came from Sumit Sarkar (1996 [2000]), a former contributor to the series and member of the editorial team. Sarkar mourned the decline in the study of underprivileged groups and the attendant increase in studying the power-knowledge relationships of colonialism, which often inserted religious community as the consciousness of the non-West. Sarkar criticized Chatterjee for depriving both the masses and the

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4 This shift can also be attributed to various personal factors. For instance, many of the SSG members acquired familial and institutional commitments that precluded long research trips to the archive in favour of textual analysis, while the previous approach had already occupied some contributors for a decade (Dipesh Chakrabarty, personal communication).
intelligentsia of agency, the latter of whom were just subjects within a derivate discourse of European nationalism and orientalism (for comments on Chatterjee’s pessimistic view of the fate of women in the nationalist movement see Legg 2003). While reviewers had explained any essentialism within the SSG as residual Marxism, Sarkar stressed the ability of socio-economic analysis to fracture essential notions of identity. However, the Subaltern Studies authors have increasingly been returning to Foucault’s work, especially that on government, to seek new ways of framing and searching for subaltern agency. Again, this return to the material and biopolitical has been pre-empted by a seam of postcolonial geographical research.

Spaces of Biopower

Apart from the theoretical calls to re-materialize, geographers have specialized in empirical research that has reinforced postcolonial development and elaboration of Foucault’s theories. For instance, Jonathan Crush (1994) combined theories of panopticism with those of capitalist work-regimes to analyze South African mine compounds. Here architecture was used to increase visibility throughout the delimited space, although cultural forms of resistance proliferated in response through, for example, the production of liquor, hyper-masculine behaviour or the smuggling of banned medicines. James Duncan (2002) has, similarly, examined the attempted production of abstract space and bodies in Ceylonese coffee plantations. However, the workers engaged not only in resistance through insubordination or desertion, but also through exploiting the cracks in abstract space; minimalizing output, feigning sickness, and forging networks of counter-surveillance to indicate when the colonial gaze is untrained on the workers. Jennifer Robinson (2000) also focused on the embodied gaze, in the case of housing managers in 1930s South Africa. Moving away from the masculine vocabulary of many accounts of panopticism, Robinson showed that the surveying gaze took the form of friendly, female enquiry, forging links over racial boundaries. Indeed, in non-institutional cases the form of power seemed more liberal, ruling from a distance and through the powers of freedom.

Foucault’s writings on governmentality have proven appealing to geographers for a variety of reasons. Firstly, they present an analytical programme for investigating modern regimes of government (Foucault 1978 [2001]). This may be through the individual categories of episteme, identity, visuality, techne and ethos (Dean 1999; Rose 1996), or through looking across these categories for evidence of regime change (Legg 2006b; Watts 2003). Secondly, the literature refers to a mode of power that has overcome, though retains features of, the power regimes of sovereignty and discipline with that of regulatory government. Regulation involves gathering information about people and territories, calculating and classifying this knowledge, and exerting power from a distance to normalize and stabilize a specific population.

The first task is what increasingly attracted the attention of Said, the geographies of which have been investigated by Matthew Hannah. In the 1870s the United States government sought to increase its knowledge concerning the Sioux Native American population through a social cycle of control concerning observation, judgement and
enforcement (Hannah 1993). Attempts to fix the Sioux in one place only increased governmental awareness of how little information they had about these people and how problematic census taking would be. The census was one of the main means of establishing power-knowledge grids over opaque territories. Hannah’s (2000) study of the extension of population assessments across the United States illustrates how closely the European colonizing nations shared techniques with internally colonizing postcolonial states.

In the case of British Columbia, Daniel Clayton (2000) has examined the processes of cultural interaction, modes of representation and local power relations during Western encounters with the natives between the 1770s and 1840s. Clayton examines just how Foucault’s Eurocentric ideas can map onto peripheral areas through a genealogical tracing of relations through three phases of encounter structured by relations of science, profit, and imperial geopolitics. Following Clayton’s work, Cole Harris (2004) has shown how natives were allocated reservation spaces, thus allowing development and reorganization outside these areas. While initial dispossession rested on the physical violence of the state as encouraged by capitalist interests, the legitimation of the scheme was cultural while the actual management of the dispossessed was disciplinary, combining the full spectrum of governmental tactics. Bruce Braun (2000) has also used the Canadian context to draw out the links between the physical sciences and the governmentality of the Victorian state.

While at times physically violent or overbearingly disciplinary, colonial and postcolonial states also sought to govern, which was the eventual outcome of many of the processes outlined above. Robinson (1997) has shown that apartheid in South Africa lasted so long because it manipulated populations through ‘locations’ that segregated different sub-groups who could be governed through their representatives. These biopolitical manipulations sought to normalize populations in terms of their behaviour while keeping them in visible and controllable places. However, the identity assumptions of biopolitical regimes in colonial contexts often fit neither into Foucault’s assumptions about modern liberalism, or the genocidal extremes of the Nazi or Stalinist state. Rather, as Gregory (1998, 85–86) suggested, colonized people were often treated as the objects, not subjects, of rule in systems less individualizing than those of Europe (also see Chatterjee 1995, 8, and Vaughan 1991). This led to calculations that often prioritized cost and political threat over welfare, although such calculations were perfect material for critiques not just of colonial violence or intrusion, but of their active mismanagement (Legg 2006a; 2007).

As Stoler argued, sexual politics were central to the colonial state and marked the hub of ‘biopower’, the dovetailing of discipline and government. Exploring these intersections, Mike Kesby (1999) has used Foucault’s writings on sexuality to explore corporeal demarcations of patriarchal space in rural Zimbabwe that influenced who the colonial authorities negotiated with and how. Philip Howell (2004a) has also argued that Foucault can be used in the colonies in terms of his work on biopower, normalization and spatial ordering. All these elements come together in his investigation of the regulation of prostitution in colonial Hong Kong. Here he makes clear that the European models based on self-disciplining subjects were not
applicable, and gave way to the racial objectification and geographical segregation of a reluctantly expansive state (also see Howell 2004b). These themes of discipline, biopolitics, and government have informed a range of work by authors associated with the SSG and others working on South Asia.

Subaltern Negotiations of Governmental Spaces

David Arnold consolidated his work on colonial biopolitics with his *Colonizing the Body* (Arnold 1993), which explored the expansion of European medical practices, their cautious reception by indigenous populations, and how they were signified as representing more than simple health practice. David Scott (1995) has investigated ‘colonial governmentality’ as theory and practice in Ceylon/Sri Lanka. Scott stressed the need to examine the targets of rule, how they are conceived and the means used to conduct them through space, while simultaneously considered the effects of race and religion on these European developed technologies of control.

The most thorough application to date of the colonial governmentality approach has been provided by Gyan Prakash (1999). Prakash analyzed scientific structures and regulations as ‘civilizing’ strategies that targeted the population, yet in the process opened up a sphere of political activity in which nationalists could challenge the government. These processes were traced across a variety of geographical scales, from the institutions of the museum and Asiatic Society to the body, civic works and the imagination of the nation itself. Satish Deshpande (2000) has also adapted Foucault’s work to the Indian nation, analyzing aspirational Hindu communalism as a heterotopia that attempts to mediate the utopic and the real.

The scope of practices within the framework of governmentality proportionally increases the scope across which one can look for resistance. This can operate from the level of societal or economic processes to the level of local technologies and bodies. Spivak (2000) has bridged the international and corporeal in suggesting that the ‘new subaltern’ is positioned by organizations like the World Bank or multinational corporations as intellectual property whether in terms of agri- or herbi-cultural knowledge. Dipesh Chakrabarty and Partha Chatterjee have, however, looked instead to how governmental categories are lived and negotiated by subaltern populations.

Chakrabarty (2002), in his book *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies*, has investigated the governmental roots of modern ethnicity. Noting how the notions of race explicated by Foucault and Stoler tend to be viewed in India as external, Chakrabarty traces the links between internal views of community and caste and the processes of ethnicity and government. The governmentality work is used to examine the structuring of the colonial Indian political imagination and the founding of categories that outlived the administration and contained the seeds of ethnic violence.

Chatterjee (2004) has produced a sophisticated account of the negotiation of population politics by the governed themselves. Here, politics is located not just as the outcome of the universal ideals of civic nationalism, but also as the cultural
uptake of the categories mobilized by governmental rationalities. Against his earlier pessimism, Chatterjee holds up hope against governmental technologies merely being instruments of class rule in a global capitalist order. He claims that ‘(b)y seeking to find real ethical spaces for their operation in heterogeneous time, the incipient resistances to that order may succeed in inventing new terms of political justice’ (Chatterjee 2004, 23). The argument is that most people in India today have tenuous rights and are not part of the elite civil society. This is despite still being within the government’s reach through policies that target the ‘political society’ of the subaltern. Chatterjee suggested these tactics emerged in the 1980s, despite hinting at their colonial origins in an earlier paper (Chatterjee 2001, 175). Within this space, population groups can claim the rights of a community and a voice that arises from the violation of property laws and civic regulations that are so central to governmental order. Mediators are employed to bargain with the state for concessions that are delivered due to the sub-population’s rights, not as citizens, but through their existence as living beings.

Although Chatterjee does not use these terms, I would suggest the subaltern he targets is one that precociously straddles the positions of zoe (the simple fact of living) and of bios (normalized behaviour and individual rights). Georgio Agamben (1998) has drawn on Foucault’s writings to trace the genealogy of homo sacer, the subject so stripped of rights that he (sic, in Agamben’s gendered language) can be sacrificed without penalty; s/he is bare life. Agamben traces the states of exception in which homo sacer have been produced, from ancient Rome to Auschwitz, which Derek Gregory (2004a) extends to Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, in going on to claim the camp as the nomos of modernity, surely Agamben conforms to the pessimism and determinism of which Foucault has been criticized? What other reactions could there be to the state of exception? What if the subjects so paraded there are re-embraced, their exposition demanding the restitution of rights in a state of reception? Chatterjee sees hope in the politics of objectification. The Indian Emergency of the 1970s represented an exceptional biopolitical stripping of the urban poor, denying them the right to biologically reproduce through sterilization. However, the demolitions and deaths at Delhi’s Turkman Gate, Chatterjee (2004, 135) reminds us, led to a nationwide outcry, juridical protection for the poor, and contributed to the downfall of Indira Gandhi’s government.

In a cross-disciplinary collaboration, Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Véron (2005) have brought detail to the politics Chatterjee describes, while carrying his hope against objectification through to an empirical study. They do this through explaining in detail how the rural subaltern see, and negotiate, the state. Taking Foucault’s assertion that governmental techniques make the state as much as they are deployed by it, Corbridge et al. demonstrate how marginal populations meet the state, whether embodied in administrators or the policy initiatives of ‘political society’. Development policies in the 1990s increasingly came to stress ‘participation’ as a means of conducting conduct and facilitating self-help that drew the state into new forms of personal contacts with its population. Here it had to negotiate local power networks, misunderstandings, authority figures, corruption, feedback and
mobilized resistance from local mediators. The case studies show that most people actually experience a limited and capricious state and demand greater assurances and information before engaging with the policies it suggested. This approach rightly posits resistance and agency as central to governmental rationalities that must forge spaces of connection between the central state and marginal populations whilst remaining sensitive to the culture and politics of the locale. It is within such governmental negotiations of the economic, biopolitical and the social that current research is applying Foucauldian theory to the historically conditioned yet urgently contemporary moments of the postcolonial.

Conclusions

Current trends in postcolonial research, both within and without the geographical discipline, are pushing scale-sensitive examinations of material places that open up spaces to consider the activities of the subjectivized and the subaltern. At the non-representational level of the lived it is possible to trace discourses as Foucault described them; as the material and corporeal production of knowledge and practice. As Said suggested in his later work, and his political activism throughout his life, this necessitates an examination of post-colonial work on the ground as well as in imaginary geographies. While his turn to resistance remained locked at the representational level, the Subaltern Studies literature struggled to locate this resistance on the ground, while simultaneously looking at the discursive production of the oppressed. Foucault’s (1975–76 [2003]) Society Must be Defended lectures ended with a discussion of biopolitics after dwelling on race, but actually began with lectures on subjugated knowledges and the power of memory. As he urged towards the end of his life, no doubt in reaction to accusations of his political pessimism, resistance and local configuration had to be acknowledged in all power relations. It as at this level of realization and mobilization that geographical research on the postcolonial has excelled. If, as Chakrabarty suggests, Europe remains the sovereign subject of much postcolonial history, historiographical regicide must be worked towards through a combination of the tactics described above: a sensitive and cosmopolitan scholarly practice; a geography that is attuned to material as well as textual power relations; research of compatible yet different modes of power at a variety of scales; and an awareness of the agency and resistance of the individuals that may be the target government, capitalist, nationalist or communal regimes, but are never wholly constituted by them.

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References


Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. I want firstly to reconsider Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* and related writings on the subject, many of them newly published (Foucault 1980, 1985, 1986; of the recently published texts, the most important for the question of sexuality is Foucault 2003). I want to emphasize his theorization of sexuality as a discourse and to address some of its implications for geography. I consider this particularly important not merely because it is a text largely neglected by geographers, but also because it is generally susceptible to misreadings bordering on caricature. A quarter of a century on, the *History’s* ambiguities and complexities are worth revisiting, most particularly in the light of the ongoing publication of Foucault’s seminars at the *Collège de France*. This is the most unapologetically exegetic section of this chapter, but it is followed by a more empirical discussion of some geographies of sexuality that have been directly inspired by Foucault’s wider discussion of modernity. Here, and secondly, the focus is on the kind of ‘work’ that sexuality accomplishes within modern culture. We shall see that whilst many geographers have found Foucault’s work extraordinarily stimulating, it is all too easy to embed an analysis of sexuality within his discussion of the development of a disciplinary society. By contrast, I will argue, the role of space in sexual normalization and in the ‘tolerance’ of sexual ‘freedoms’, have been far less analyzed. Again, though, the ambiguities in Foucault’s work – some of them productive, some frustrating – are very much to the fore, and I have not tried to gloss over the difficulties in this notion of sexuality as a *dispositif*. Thirdly, I conclude with a discussion of the importance of Foucault’s work for research into the geographies of sexual subjectivity, including its major importance for queer theories and the related political critique of heterosexism and homophobia. Geographers for whom sexual subjectivity is a concern have found in – or perhaps it is more accurate to say after – Foucault a series of resources, theories, formulations and suggestions that have contributed to major developments in our understanding of sexuality and space. In this section, though the distance from Foucault’s writing is the greatest, and his influence the most indirect, I have nevertheless found the most unambiguously to celebrate.
Throughout, I have tried to clarify what I understand Foucault to have actually said and meant, and to trace in this a significance for geography that is as much potential as it is actual. Much of Foucault’s work on sexuality is, sadly, barely acknowledged by geographers, although it is to be hoped that the publication of the lecture series will stimulate a new wave of interest. I cannot however claim that this is a comprehensive survey of either past or potential work; labourers in the small vineyard that the geography of sexuality represents will easily recognize debts, glosses and omissions (if hopefully not too many errors). I have only stressed a small number of topics here, and the phrase ‘for instance’ crops up all too frequently. Nevertheless, my hope is that this chapter is representative of some of the work in geography following Foucault’s lead, and some of the roads that might be taken. I have tried in fact to trace what might be thought of as ‘Foucault effects’ – lines of influence rather than simply derivation, avenues of enquiry for which Foucault is the condition of possibility rather than the origin. This chapter is inevitably partial, in every sense of the word, but I have striven for a balance between criticism and generosity, and with a recognition that the best of this work in geography has been done with and after Foucault rather than simply for or against him.¹

**Geographies in the History of Sexuality**

The first volume of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* is by most accounts his most-read work, at least as far as the English-speaking world is concerned. Powerful, provocative, though perhaps above all, short, the *Introduction* is often used to encapsulate the key elements in Foucault’s philosophy, particularly for new students (Mills 2003, 130). It is treated as an introduction not just to Foucault’s last, protracted, and ultimately unfinished project, but also to his entire philosophical oeuvre. Given this popularity for students of Foucault, it is somewhat surprising that so few geographers have considered it in its specifics – rather than, say, as a relatively accessible summary of Foucault’s analysis of power. Yet even for those who have commented on Foucault’s theorization of sexuality, attention to it, and to the actual texts of the *History of Sexuality* has been notably uneven. Quite apart from the fact that the later volumes in the series, concerned as they are with the ancient and early Christian world, are largely unread by generalists, even the hundred or so pages of the *Introduction* are too often scanned, in conjunction with and confirmation of the various commentaries. Readers will quickly take on board Foucault’s critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’, his argument that ‘sexuality’ is a nineteenth-century discourse to which we are still in thrall, and his suspicion at any suggestion that sex can be ‘liberated’ from power/knowledge. But there are still many elements in this very short book – frustratingly both dense and repetitive – that have been neglected, or distorted. The *Introduction* is actually replete with problems for student and scholar alike. It occupies a more

¹ I would like to add, without burdening them with my errors, that I have particularly benefited from discussing Foucault, over many years at Cambridge, with Jim Duncan, Gerry Kearns, Stephen Legg and Andy Tucker.
than usually transitional place in the development of Foucault’s ideas, and it betrays ambiguities that become ever more obvious when the volume is brought into a comparison with the work that remained unpublished in Foucault’s lifetime. It is hard now not to see it as more than usually provisional, particularly in the complex context of the *History of Sexuality* series. In this regard, a careful account of the relation of the published work to Foucault’s original and subsequent plans for the series can be found in Elden (2005, 23–41). The reasons for the abandonment of the original plans for the *History* have attracted much speculation, which we might call idle if it were not so elaborately and unremittingly hostile; by contrast Elden offers a persuasive if not definitive solution for the reorientation of Foucault’s researches into sexuality.

That said, let me try to summarize the *Introduction* in the following way, taking my cue from Foucault’s threefold interest in types of understanding (the formation of domains of knowledge), forms of normality (the formation of rationalities for the control, manipulation and general government of individuals), and modes of relation to oneself and others (the formation of subjectivities) (Foucault 1985, Preface, reprinted in Rabinow 1991, 333–9, and 1997, 199–205). In the first place, in terms of discourse and domains of knowledge, Foucault wants to insist that sexuality is *produced*. It is not a universal biological fact, something that stands outside individuals and societies to a greater or lesser extent directing or determining them. It is, instead, an historical product – a historically and culturally specific discourse through which a new and insidious form of power, the ‘truth’ of sex, assumes a locus in the body and its pleasures. ‘Desire’, as Thomas Laqueur puts it, ‘is discursively created in order to be the locus of control’ (Laqueur 2003, 271). Secondly, and in terms of these ‘rational and concerted coercions’ of modernity, Foucault claims that the great process of transforming sex into discourse was a product of the early nineteenth century (in Europe), originating with the hegemonic mission of the bourgeoisie; in crude terms, the middle class pioneered the discursive ‘deployment’ of sexuality, first upon themselves, before exporting and generalizing it to cover the entire social body (Foucault, 2003; note that there are severe problems with the translation of *dispositif* as ‘deployment’ [see Halperin 1995, 188–9, note 6, and Elden 2001, 110–11: ‘deployment’ – variously alternatives are ‘apparatus’, ‘construct’, ‘grid of intelligibility’, ‘device’, ‘network’, ‘formation’ – chimes of course rather too readily with a thesis of social control]). Sexuality thus becomes fundamental to the biopolitical order of the modern polity – ‘biopolitics’ meaning here the governmental preoccupation with social welfare and security, the large-scale management of life and death in the interests of the state. Sex – that is as ‘sexuality’ – becomes a proper concern for government; and it is in fact redundant or even oxymoronic to talk about the ‘regulation’ of sexuality. Thirdly, in terms of ethics, politics and the history of the present, Foucault suggests that we have now to abandon the self-congratulatory view of the nineteenth century as a period of sexual repression, and see it instead as characterized by ‘a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse’ (Foucault 1980, 34). In the modern age the loquacious discourse of sexuality proliferated sexual identities, figures and types, with ‘perverse’ sexualities being as central and
fundamental as ‘normal’ and legitimate ones. From the nineteenth century through to our own day, we have witnessed, he says, both ‘the proliferation of specific pleasures and the multiplication of disparate sexualities’ (Foucault 1980, 49). This is a phenomenon that cannot be understood through a Freudian model of sexual liberation from repression; indeed, since the latter is complicit in the incitement of sexual discourse, it is a hindrance to our understanding of the significance of sexuality in the modern era. ‘[P]ower in our societies functions primarily not by repressing spontaneous sexual drives but by producing multiple sexualities, and that through the classification, distribution, and moral rating of those sexualities the individuals practicing them can be approved, treated, marginalized, sequestered, disciplined, or normalized’ (Bersani, quoted in Halperin 1995, 20). This third axis therefore directs us to critically examine the question of sexual identities (and what can be done to resist them).

The production of sexuality, the notion of sexuality as a ‘deployment’ or dispositif, the proliferation and interrelatedness of sexual identities: this is a very bald summary, but it is worth emphasizing these key elements, not least because several general commentaries are plainly misleading even in their summary of Foucault’s argument. Sara Mills’ recent introduction to Foucault, for example, bizarrely confuses Foucault’s critique with the comforting narrative of Victorian sexual repression that he sets out to challenge (Mills 2003, 84–5). In her defence it could be noted that Foucault’s presentation is oblique; and, in addition, as we shall see, he does not entirely discount the notion of ‘repression’. There is no equivocation on the Freudian discourse of repression: but on the silencing of sexuality, ‘It is quite false if you speak of language in general, but it is quite true when you distinguish carefully between types of discursive formation or practice’ (Foucault 2003, 70). However, this ventriloquism is a gross mistake, and it reminds us that it is all too easy to misrepresent Foucault’s views on sexuality. To take one further instance, consider the rather sterile argument over whether we should consider sexuality to be ‘socially constructed’ (as introduced in Stein 1990). Foucault’s insistence on sexuality as a discourse is usually taken to be an endorsement of the radical constructionist position – which is accurate enough as far as this goes, though what is meant by construction or production might be debated further. But Foucault is as often considered to have suggested as a result that sexuality did not exist before the nineteenth century. Taken to extremes – not uncommon – the suggestion is

2 On constructionism, in general, see the insightful discussion in Hacking 1999. However, as a counterweight to Hacking’s as it were ‘weak’ construction of constructionism, see the comments of Butler 1993, particularly in relation to the sex/gender distinction. For Butler, construction should be thought of not in terms of idealism or nominalism, voluntarism or determinism, but rather as a constitutive constraint, a process that involves discursive reiteration and the materialization of regulatory norms. Both Hacking and Butler are indebted to Foucauldian ideas, and though they are not easily reconciled, perhaps each does not in the end entirely contradict the other.
Foucault, Sexuality, Geography

absurd, both historically and theoretically. We would be better off perhaps to echo Foucault’s own rejection of blanket, universalizing statements about sexuality. When asked outright whether homosexuality was determined by nature and biology or by social conditioning, Foucault responded by declaring that the issue was beyond his expertise and declined to offer an opinion on the question (Halperin 1995, 4; Foucault 1997a). This was not simply evasion, but rather a strategic refusal to be intellectually blackmailed (Foucault 1997b). Foucault refused to be drawn into making unwise and impolitic statements about the relative balance of nature versus nurture, and instead preferred to offer in his histories of sexual discourse warnings about the dangers of the science of sexuality. Foucault’s response has never seemed more sensible; we need not deny the reality of the biological and the somatic (their specification is in any case a discursive performance, as Judith Butler has argued) to accept the power of the discourse of sexuality and to trace its history. Judith Butler sidesteps or displaces the essentialist/constructionist debate by arguing that the setting of limits to discourse is itself a discursive and materialized performance; this is not to say that there is nothing but discourse, nor to deny the reality/materiality of the non-discursive world, but simply to note that ‘the extra-discursive is delimited … by the very discourse from which it seeks to free itself’ (Butler 1993, 11). To put it another way, with reference to the material and extra-discursive body: ‘To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that which it-concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body’ (10).

If we can sidestep some of the wilder assertions in such a way, what does the Introduction to the History of Sexuality offer to geographers? Foucault’s discussion and foregrounding of sexuality as a discourse remains in many ways forbiddingly abstract. But Foucault does not abandon the attention to space and spatiality that has led Stuart Elden to characterize his work as a ‘spatial history’ (Elden 2001). For one thing, the Introduction follows on very closely from his analysis of disciplinary power, so replete with architectural and spatial referents; the Introduction, at least, is not in any sense a repudiation of his earlier genealogical emphasis on bodies and spaces. In linking the deployment of sexuality to the rationale of modern regimes, the emphasis on the disciplinary surveillance of the social field is in many ways straightforwardly recapitulated. Foucault adds that the deployment of sexuality has its very reason for being in the processes of ‘proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way’ (Foucault 1980, 107). This represents the intensification of the body as a target for power, a further and far subtler colonization of the body by discipline. The state apparatus of disciplinary institutions – schools, workhouses, prisons, as well as the more obvious magdalens and lock hospitals – indeed become saturated with the discourse of sexuality. It is impossible

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3 For confirmation of Foucault’s notion of sexuality as a modern institution, see Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin (1990). Hull (1996) concurs. For a different view, however, see for the ancient world, Skinner (2005), and for the medieval, Karras (2005).
to imagine their operation, and their role in modernity, without understanding the proliferation of sexual discourse. This is a theme that I return to in the second section of this chapter, but it is enough for now to acknowledge the very evident link with disciplinary spaces of modernity.

It is also important to take literally Foucault’s invocation of sites of sexuality. Foucault argues very forcefully for instance that the family is the most active of these ‘sites’, with one of the most significant consequences of the deployment of sexuality being ‘the affective intensification of the family space’ (Foucault 1980, 109). On the one hand, Foucault is clearly keen to confront the notion that the space of sexuality is confined to the marriage bed; when he writes that ‘[a] single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space as well as at the heart of every household, but it was a utilitarian and fertile one: the parents’ bedroom’ it is only to set up the straw man for his critique of the repressive hypothesis (1980, 3). However, Foucault does argue that the family ‘anchors’ sexuality; it is where the deployment of an earlier system of alliances (concerned with marriage, kinship, consanguinity, legitimacy, property, the reproduction of an elite, and so on) became intertwined with the new deployment of sexuality. As John Ransom puts it, ‘Whereas the old deployment of alliance (basically, kinship) was tied to the broader social system by facilitating the ordered circulation of wealth and the reproduction of an elite, the new deployment of sexuality helped to intensify awareness of the body and its rhythms of production and consumption’ (Ransom 1997, 69). Sexual bodies were now productive (or unproductive), normal (or abnormal), proper (or perverse). The family becomes a crucial social and spatial formation that effectively conceals the significance of sexuality by claiming to be its source (Foucault 1980, 111). It appears to banish sexuality from the public and social sphere by locating it in the family and the private sphere. I have taken some liberties with this last suggestion, as Foucault rarely refers to the private and the public as such, but it is a legitimate one, given the proliferation of spatial imagery surrounding the concept of the family. Foucault asks (in a nod to the carceral archipelago): ‘Was the nineteenth-century family really a monogamic and conjugal cell? Perhaps to a certain extent. But it was also a network of pleasures and powers linked together at multiple points and according to transformable relationships’; it is ‘a complicated network, saturated with multiple, fragmentary, and mobile sexualities’ (Foucault 1980, 46). And far from simply underwriting a normalized sexuality, the centrality of the family also provokes an intense awareness of the other sexualities (and spatialities) to which it is intimately connected. One can think here, if one wanted to concentrate on Victorian sexual narratives, of the straying husband whose dalliances with prostitutes threatens his wife and unborn child with disease and death; or, if one wanted a more contemporary equivalent, that of the closeted husband who journeys from the safety of the suburbs to explore his sexual desires in leather bars and S/M clubs (Califa 2000). In each case the family is not isolated from literal or metaphorical ‘contagion’, and its place in the modern discourse of sexuality is characteristically paradoxical. We should also consider, therefore, alongside the approved space of the family, the ‘perverse spaces’ that are inseparable from the proliferation of other sexual identities: ‘those
devices of sexual saturation so characteristic of the space and the social rituals of the nineteenth century’, is how Foucault puts it (1980, 45, italics in original). One key space of perversity for example – a ‘much narrower space’ than the family, as Foucault describes it elsewhere, is the frame of reference for the figure of the masturbating child: ‘It is the bedroom, the bed, the body; it is the parents, immediate supervisors, brothers and sisters; it is the doctor: it is a kind of microcell around the individual and his body’ (Foucault 2003, 59). If Foucault had completed the series on sexuality according to his original plan, there would no doubt have been an analysis of the role that the crusade against masturbation played in installing sexuality in the most intimate domestic spaces: not only requiring children to confess their sexual transgressions but at the same time attaching the taint of perversity to those parents who too thoroughly supervise their offspring. Foucault’s history of sexuality (both published and prospective) directs us in this way to investigate the various sites, scales and spaces in and through which the techniques of sexuality are propagated.

Thirdly, there is a concern, embedded in Foucault’s discussion of biopolitics, with what we might call the geopolitics of sexuality. Biopolitical rationality necessarily links the body with the body politic, so that sexual conduct becomes a proper domain of government, and of ‘governmentality’. Sex and sexual subjectivity become biopolitical issues because ‘It was essential that the state know what was happening with its citizens’ sex, and the use they made of it, but also that each individual be capable of controlling the use he [sic] made of it’ (Foucault 1980, 26). Here, Stephen Legg’s recent contribution to the retheorization of population geography, which makes much use of unpublished or recently translated material from Foucault’s lecture series, makes it crystal clear why this should be a concern for geographers. It is obvious from Foucault’s discussion of the Malthusian couple as an object, target and anchor of sexual knowledge why demographers should be concerned with the History of Sexuality (Foucault 1980, 105; Clifford 2001, 110–11). But the History speaks to population geography in a different register. Drawing attention to ‘the different scales and spaces in which populations are conceived and governed’, Legg demonstrates that sexuality is implicitly or explicitly inscribed into the modern biopolitical state; the problematization of ‘population’ and the technologies of new ‘governmental spaces’ are indebted to the emergence of sexuality (Legg 2005, 137–56, 144). Simply put, the modern state and its delineation of its field of operations cannot be divorced from sexuality, from a concern with reproduction, disease and deviancy; in short, biopolitics is geopolitics. Equally important, however, is the fact that the biopolitical state can be separated neither from the history of sexuality nor the construction of race. In her pioneering analysis of Foucault’s discussion of race in the Introduction to the History of Sexuality, Ann Laura Stoler has demonstrated the significance of sexuality for students of both colonialism and imperialism. Stoler is no mere exegete, but she rightly points out how much of the Introduction’s focus

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4 For a good commentary on governmentality see Dean 1999; within geography see Hannah (2000). For examples of work on sexual themes, see Brown (2000, 88–115, note that this chapter was written with Paul Boyle), and Howell (2004, 229–48).
on race has simply been ignored by commentators and critics (Stoler 1995; 2002). Stoler particularly emphasizes the 1976 lecture series at the Collège de France over and above the Introduction to the History of Sexuality where racialized sexuality is recognized as only one domain amongst many. She shows by contrast how in Foucault’s account biopower was not only bourgeois in origin, but also imperial. The bourgeois model of the self – productive, respectable, normal – was secured through a comparison both with the sexualities of colonial others and with those of ‘internal enemies’ at home, so that ‘[t]o be truly European was to cultivate a bourgeois self in which familial and national obligations were the priority and sex was held in check – not by silencing the discussion of sex, but by parcelling out demonstrations of excess to different social groups and thereby gradually exorcising its proximal effects’ (Stoler 1995, 183–4). In this way, Stoler has convincingly affirmed Foucault’s original insight that colonial discourses of sexuality were productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of them. The Introduction thus offers geographers of imperialism an opportunity to focus on the importance of sexuality for the colonial project, and an insistence that the construction of metropolitan sexualities cannot be separated from this imperial history: ‘[t]here was no unitary bourgeois self already formed, no core to secure, no “truth” lodged in one’s sexual identity. That “self,” that “core,” that “moral essence” ... was one that Europe’s external and internal “others” played a major part in making’ (Stoler 1995, 194).

There is a great deal, then, even in the relatively few pages of the Introduction, that speaks directly to the geographies of sexuality. It is certainly a text that should be read more widely and more carefully than it has been. For all this, though, it remains the case that it is a work with frustrating ellipses, and even the most generous assessment reveals some notable omissions. To focus only on the question of sexuality as a discourse, there is a striking lack of geographical specificity in the Introduction and the rest of the History. Foucault’s Eurocentrism may be readily conceded, and Ann Stoler’s recovery of a discourse on race and colonialism notwithstanding, we may also simply pass over the unwillingness to concede the discursive contours of regions, nations and communities. Beyond this though, it is a puzzle that Foucault says nothing about the ‘(hidden) geography’ that lies behind the production of discourse – as for instance the concentration of discursive authority and institutions in metropolitan centres (Phillips and Watt 2000, 1). Richard Burton’s sexual geographies, to take but one example, as ably discussed by Richard Phillips, illustrate the role that geographical imaginations of sexuality at the colonial margins played in the critique as well as the constitution of ‘Victorian’ sexuality (Phillips 1999). To take another perhaps more critical example, we might wonder what role, what place, there is in the history of sexuality for non-European sexual discourses. In the Introduction Foucault blithely contrasts the modern, western scientia sexualis with the ars erotica of ancient and modern others (including ‘China, Japan, India, Rome, the Arabo-Moslem societies’), but the suspicious taint of orientalism here has, for some recent critics, taken on special significance in the context of Foucault’s
notorious endorsement of the Iranian revolutionary movement, and in the knowledge of the Khomeini regime’s subsequent gender and sexual politics.\footnote{On Foucault’s orientalism and its significance, see the very critical comments of Afary and Anderson (2005). For a more careful and judicious discussion of the ‘otherness’ of the non-Western world in sexual discourse, see Bleys (1996). I might note here that there is more careful discussion of non-western sexualities – discourses and practices – in later volumes of the History, though these remain fleeting and intriguing rather than substantial.}

It is moreover a real limitation that the materiality of discursive agency – including its social and spatial specificity – is barely acknowledged; as if geography and genealogy do not require each other. There is I might add by contrast a great deal of work, hardly or not at all indebted to Foucault, which explores these discursive geographies of sexuality. To take just erotic or pornographic discourse as an example, consider Felicity Nussbaum’s discussion of the place of the prostitute in eighteenth-century English pornography: ‘Written on the body, on London, and on the world map, sexual geography established an analogy between prostitute and torrid zone, so that one was a geographical displacement (evoking a geographical equivalent in segregating prostitution into confined “stews”), and the other a socioeconomic and moral distinction (evoking a correlative categorization of the geographically displaced Other)’ (Nussbaum 1995, 97). In the same period, and equally concerned with gender, Karen Harvey has recently considered how, in English erotica, male and female sexuality were viewed spatially. She identifies ‘a widely shared culture of sexualized locations and bodies’ whose spatial codes and metaphors allowed the integration of the moral and the physical. In an appealing and provocative formulation, Harvey argues that in this discourse ‘sex is a place for men to visit’ – that is, sex is rendered spatial, confining it and firmly situating it, separate from the world of masculinity (Harvey 2004, 172, 173). Although this work recapitulates the argument that sexuality is produced in discourse, it owes more to feminist analyses of gender and sexual identity, and there is here a more revealing and rewarding focus on spatial narratives within that discourse than anything to be found directly in Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*.

We should not, then, think that the geographical analysis of sexuality, even simply as discourse, begins and ends with Foucault. The *Introduction* contains much that is stimulating, but even in its general discussion misses a great deal that is useful, even essential, for geographers of sexuality. I have, for reasons both of lack of space and expertise, to neglect the other volumes in the series, and I am aware of my hypocrisy in doing so, but I hope that I have said enough to at least suggest the potential as well as the pitfalls of the texts of the *History* for geographers. In the next section, which treats sexuality as a * dispositif* as well as a discourse – that is as a political project, a normative system and apparatus, concerned with the control and regulation of bodies, acts and individuals – we will see that the general discussion of sexuality in Foucault’s works is similarly intriguing and ingenious but at the same time equally erratic and misleading.
From the *History to the Geography of Sexuality*

The *History of Sexuality* does not of course exhaust the significance of Foucault’s writings on sexuality. Although his work traces the emergence of the sexual as a distinct field, he was at the same time concerned to show how impossible is the segregation of sexual discourse from other forms of power/knowledge; we have seen for instance how in the conceptions of biopower and governmentality sexuality was central to the understanding of the emergence of the ‘social’, a ‘quasi-object’ that defined the domain of liberal government (Donzelot 1980). Sexuality and society were indeed never separate or separable; it is hard to see how each discourse could have emerged without the other. The tenor of Foucault’s critique is in any event to disassemble sexuality as a ‘quasi-object’ in itself, and to trace how the discourse of sexuality was implicated in the wider regime that modernity represents. Bearing this in mind, it becomes necessary to place the notion of sexuality as a *dispositif* within the context of Foucault’s discussions of discipline and disciplinary power, all the more so since geographers have by and large taken more from the discussion of discipline than from any other part of Foucault’s corpus of work (Driver 1994).

Geographers have of course been quick to identify in Foucault’s disciplinary genealogies a distinctive place for space. The discussion of panopticism, with its emphasis on the spatial distribution of bodies in the service of surveillance and the project of individual reformation, remains arguably the most well known element of Foucault’s work. Geographers have rightly been stimulated by Foucault’s dictum that ‘discipline is above all an analysis of space’ (Elden 2001, 139). Historical geographers, in particular, have localized, detailed, developed, and extended Foucault’s insights into the emergence and spread of a new, disciplinary power in the modern era. I am thinking here, *inter alia*, of Felix Driver’s careful mapping of poor law reform in nineteenth-century England and Chris Philo’s thorough discussion of madness and moral management (Driver 1993; Philo 2004). 6 If we ally such work to that of historians and historical sociologists, our understanding of disciplinary power in Britain, at least, has been substantially developed over the last quarter century.

Having said this, the thematic of sexuality *within* the discussion of discipline has not been particularly well developed. This is as much a criticism of Foucault as of his interpreters. It is rather striking, re-reading Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, the extent to which not just gender but also sexuality is neglected. It does not take too much imagination however to register the extent to which ‘discipline-blockades’ like the military camp, the school, the monastery, the hospital and the prison were pervaded with the disciplining of sexuality. Foucault admitted as much in the *Introduction* to the *History of Sexuality*, when he wrote that ‘On the whole, one can have the impression that sex was hardly spoken of at all in these institutions. But one only has to glance over the architectural layout, the rules of discipline, and their whole internal organization: the question of sex was a constant preoccupation’

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6 In my own work on the regulation of prostitution I have also drawn critically upon the theme of discipline (Howell 2000).
He was speaking here of eighteenth-century secondary schools, as it happens, but the point is a general one. These disciplinary institutions were saturated with the new discursive understanding of sexuality, as were their theories and practices of space. Elsewhere, in fact, Foucault speaks more persuasively about this link between sexuality and disciplinary technologies. In the 1974–75 Collège de France lectures, for instance, Foucault states that ‘if instead of the army, workshops, and primary schools et cetera, we consider these techniques of penance and practices in the seminaries and colleges that derive from them, then we see an investment of the body at the level of desire and decency rather than an investment of the useful body at the level of aptitudes. Facing the political anatomy of the body there is a moral physiology of the flesh’ (Foucault 2003, 193). Consider for instance the installation of pastoral care and the confessional into disciplinary institutions (226–7), and the simultaneous silencing and incitement of sexuality in the spatial partitioning and control of bodies in colleges, seminaries and schools (232–3).

There is then, in the lectures at least, a much closer engagement between discipline and sexuality, particularly in the discussions of ‘normalization’ and ‘regulation’; but it is still the case that the disciplinary society Foucault begins to trace is curiously asexual. Consider the English workhouse. From the Foucauldian account of disciplinary power, the new model workhouse is a straightforwardly panoptical institution, based on the unprecedented Malthusian principle of the separation of husband and wife. This was a device to prevent procreation, but it was also a statement about the workhouse’s deliberately alienating environment, an essential element of the deterrent workhouse test of need. But to reduce sexuality to a question of design is wholly misleading. As Seth Koven has recently pointed out in his marvellous book Slumming, the workhouse occupied a central place in the imagination of sexual deviance in Victorian England (Koven 2004). In James Greenwood’s sensational account, ‘A Night in the Workhouse’, published in The Pall Mall Gazette in 1866 and influential for nearly a century or more, the casual ward of the Lambeth workhouse in London was transformed into something little short of a male brothel. The workhouse, supposed then as now to be harshly policed institution where sexual intimacy was effectively banished, became in the sensation journalism of the time, virtually the opposite – a space of sexual excess and perversity. The workhouse was not merely (allegedly) a site of abominated sexual practices, however; it was in addition a space in which heterodox sexual desires could be represented and explored. Koven’s wider discussion of the spatial and epistemological practice of ‘slumming’ is a signal contribution to accounts of flânerie and urban rambling. These were ‘spaces in which social investigators, clergymen, reformers, philanthropists, social workers, and writers could explore and represent heterodox sexual desires and practices’ (Koven 2004, 27). Indebted in part to Foucault’s linkage of discourse to the construction of sexualized identities, it also challenges the seemingly monolithic account of the ‘deployment’ of sexuality in the service of bourgeois hegemony, the surveillance state, and disciplinary society. Of course this might be read as another demonstration of the lack of silence about sex, and perhaps also simply as another incitement to power, in this case to control the sexual behaviour of male casuals, but
it was not easy for the machinery of local and central government to address such an issue, and the implications were never very reassuring. It is rather easier to accept Koven’s conclusion that ‘The sodomitical subtext of “A Night” threw into disarray the social scientific categories underpinning sanitary and poor-law reform’ (Koven 2004, 57). Koven also notes that Jeremy Bentham’s essay of 1785 argued that sex between men should not be considered a crime.

The problem of prostitution/sex work is just as pertinent an issue. Although Foucault devotes relatively little attention to the prostitute, she certainly figures in his roster of discursively exemplary sexual figures, and it is easy enough to relate the management of prostitutes and prostitution to the discussion of disciplinary society. Miles Ogborn’s discussion of the London Magdalen Hospital, for instance, suggests that women, and in particular female prostitutes, might just be the first modern subjects (Ogborn 1998, 39–74). The Magdalen, the eighteenth–century metropolitan reformer Jonas Hanway’s home for penitent prostitutes, was a pioneer in the use of space to produce an autonomous, self-reflexive, individualized – and thus modern – subjectivity. It anticipated the disciplinary technologies attendant upon the birth of the prison, and it clearly laid out the belief that regulated and disciplined behaviour could produce moral subjects. This account is suggestive rather than conclusive, but these conclusions have been largely approved by Kevin Siena’s recent history of the relationship between sex, disease and social welfare in early modern London. Siena’s narrative is rightly cautious, and demonstrates that London’s venereal disease institutions put medical treatment above moral reformation – salivation above salvation – but by the end of the eighteenth century there was an evident eagerness to bring the two together, and to use segregation and discipline to effect projects of reform (Siena 2004). Sexuality was therefore fundamental to discipline and to the spaces of modernity; Ogborn is absolutely right to claim the need to construct ‘an understanding of modernity’s disciplinary armoury and its characteristic subjectivities that gives full weight to gender and sexuality’ (Ogborn 1998, 73). In the project of penitentiary reform of prostitutes we have not only a clearly gendered but also a sexualized form of disciplinary power and authority.

We might take the question of prostitution further, however, because it sheds light on the limitations as well as the advantages of a concern for disciplinary power. In the first place, Miles Ogborn and others have also related the nineteenth-century regulation of prostitution to the development of a disciplinary society. In Britain, the Contagious Diseases Acts (1864–1889) represented the closest equivalent to the regulationist regimes in Europe that attempted to combat venereal disease by subjecting female sex workers to disciplinary surveillance, regular medical inspection, and incarceration in ‘lock’ hospitals if found to be in a contagious state. Ogborn has written here that the project of regulation represented a fundamentally disciplinary

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7 Stuart Elden points out (personal communication) that the female prostitute would surely have figured large in the projected volume in the *History of Sexuality* devoted to the hysterical woman. I say ‘she’, but there is brief discussion of male prostitution, or rather anxieties about male prostitutes in the ancient polis (Foucault 1985, 217–18).
Foucault, Sexuality, Geography

Moreover, the foremost historian of British regulationism, Judith Walkowitz, has acknowledged the Acts in terms of a Foucauldian ‘technology of power’ (Walkowitz 1980, 4–5). If regulationism is modern, it is characteristically a disciplinary modernity. Its essentials – inscription, inspection, and incarceration – are symptomatic of the disciplinary society. The police registration of prostitutes clearly recapitulated the extension of surveillance technologies, whilst their intimate medical inspection embodied the penetrative power of the medical gaze. The incarceration of prostituted women similarly invokes the theme of disciplinary enclosure and institutionalization, and these can be elaborated even beyond the key regulationist institutions of the lock hospital and the prison; for the red-light district, the brothel, and the Magdalen also appropriate this distinctive concern for enclosure, confinement and surveillance. We are directed to an acknowledgement that disciplinary technologies were appropriated for the policing of sex and the regulation if not always reformation of deviant sexual subjects.

However, on closer inspection, there are some oddities and ambiguities about such a reading of prostitution regulation. It is puzzling, for instance, that Walkowitz’s pioneering and influential history of the Contagious Diseases Acts referred to the then recently published first volume of the History of Sexuality, but not at all to Discipline and Punish. This is surprising because in that book Foucault explicitly discusses prostitution and its regulation. Clearly indebted to the work of Alain Corbin on regulationism in France – particularly Paris – Foucault considers the function of prostitution in its relation to wider society (Corbin 1990). It is principally, he says, as a form of useful delinquency that nineteenth-century prostitution must be understood:

Delinquency, controlled illegality, is an agent for the illegality of the dominant groups. The setting up of prostitution networks in the nineteenth century is characteristic in this respect: police checks and checks on the prostitutes’ health, their regular stay in prison, the large-scale organization of the maisons closes, or brothels, the strict hierarchy that was maintained in the prostitution milieu, its control by delinquent-informers, all this made it possible to canalize and to recover by a whole series of intermediaries the enormous profits from a sexual pleasure that an ever-more insistent everyday moralization condemned to semi-clandestinity and naturally made expensive; in setting up a price for pleasure, in creating a profit from repressed sexuality and in collecting this profit, the delinquent milieu was in complicity with a self-interested Puritanism: an illicit fiscal agent operating over illegal practices. (Foucault 1979, 279–80)

Sidestepping for the moment the references here to sexual repression, this is rather suggestive of the ways in which prostitution might be, under regulationist authority, controlled, managed, and administered. In this reading, regulationist practices constitute ‘an instrument for administering and exploiting illegalities’ (1979, 280). Colonized by the dominant illegality of class and class power, prostitution could be made into a useful delinquency only through the development of a sophisticated technology of administrative and police surveillance. As Foucault puts it, ‘The
organization of an isolated illegality, enclosed in delinquency, would not have been possible without the development of police supervision' (1979, 285).

Historians and geographers have been authorized then to read regulationism as an element – not a marginal one – of the disciplinary society whose development Foucault traces in *Discipline and Punish*. As Corbin notes in his pioneering work on Parisian regulation, a thesis developed seemingly in tandem with Foucault’s study of discipline, ‘The desire for panopticism … finds expression in a quasi-obessional way in regulationism’; the ‘enclosure’ of commercial sex work under the impress of regulationist policy constitutes ‘a tireless effort to discipline the prostitute, the ideal being the creation of a category of “enclosed” prostitutes’ (Corbin 1990, 9, emphasis in original). He singles out four enclosed spaces – the lock hospital, the Magdalen, the prison and the brothel – that serve as the disciplinary institutions from which disciplinary power could radiate outwards into the wider society. Regulationism, to echo Foucault’s analysis of the prison, ‘isolates, outlines, brings out a form of illegality that seems to sum up symbolically all the others, but which makes it possible to leave in the shade those that one wishes to – or must – tolerate’ (Foucault 1979, 277). Given that in the discourse of sexuality prostitution was ‘tolerated, that brothels were ‘tolerances’, prostitution policy in much of nineteenth-century Europe appears to be a species of the disciplinary genus.

It is worth contrasting this emphasis on discipline, however, to the comments that Foucault makes in the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*:

Such was the hypocrisy of our bourgeois societies with its halting logic. It was forced to make a few concessions, however. If it was truly necessary to make room for illegitimate sexualities, it was reasoned, let them take their infernal mischief elsewhere: to a place where they could be reintegrated, if not in the circuits of production, at least in those of profit. The brothel and the mental hospital would be those places of tolerance: the prostitute, the client, together with the psychiatrist and the hysteric – those ‘other Victorians,’ as Steven Marcus would say – seem to have surreptitiously transferred the pleasures that are unspoken into the order of things that are counted. Words and gestures, quietly authorized, could be exchanged there at the going rate. Only in those places would untrammelled sex have a right to (safely insularized) forms of reality, and only to clandestine, circumscribed, and coded types of discourse. Everywhere else, modern Puritanism imposed its triple edict of taboo, nonexistence, and silence. (Foucault 1980, 4)

I hope that I may be forgiven another long quotation, and especially one that seems simply to recapitulate Foucault’s description of regulationism in *Discipline and Punish*. The point here is that this last statement is not Foucault speaking. It repeats the loaded words of puritanism and repression from *Discipline and Punish*, and adds hypocrisy for good measure; but these are concepts that are not authorized by the *History of Sexuality*. This is in fact a statement of the kind of discourse – about the Victorian repression of sexuality – that the *History of Sexuality* is famously formulated to oppose. In this view – again it is a straw man of sorts – the underworld of prostitution exists only to cater for the ‘other Victorians’, and thus it acts as a kind of index of bourgeois hypocrisy, the repression of sexual instincts, and
their transference to special, hidden places of sexual transgression. None of these views is endorsed by Foucault’s mature analysis. It is as if Foucault’s focus on the disciplinary function of prostitution has become transformed, somewhere along the line, into something more complex and considered. It is not hard to see why Foucault might come close to repudiating the focus on discipline, or on discipline alone: for one thing, emphasizing the disciplining of prostitution might remind one too much of a sexually repressive regime; on the other hand, the licensing and toleration of prostitution might suggest only hypocrisy. And, withal, the emphasis on enclosure, isolation and secrecy does not fit very well with the remarkable volubility of the Victorian discourses of sexuality.

None of this is meant to take Foucault to task for inconsistency. It is well known that Foucault changed his mind or happily thought better of earlier formulations. But we may reasonably ask what was Foucault’s view of regulated prostitution in the formation of modern society. It seems to me that whilst the later Foucault would surely repudiate the clumsy emphasis on puritanism, repression and bourgeois hypocrisy, the significance of ‘places of tolerance’ would not be lost. If they are certainly not the necessary concessions to irrepressible sexual instinct, regulated brothels and tolerated zones of prostitution do at least exist as heterotopia or counter-sites within modern societies, as ‘other places’ that testify to the spatial differentiation of modernity. But it is better to say, perhaps, that regulationism is not a classic ‘discipline’ at all. Sexual regulation, as it is expressed in the regulation of sex work, is better seen as a branch of biopolitical rationality, and of a related ‘governmentality’ that supplements if not succeeds disciplinary power. Unlike discipline, which is focused on the training of the individual body, biopolitical techniques are aimed at bodies as they relate to the health of entire populations; governmentality, moreover, at least in its ‘liberal’ form, conceded certain ‘freedoms’, spaces and domains alien to state control, as a necessary adjunct to the process of government. It is in this sense that regulation of prostitution – and perhaps of sexuality in general – might be understood. The publication of the 1975–1976 lecture course certainly suggests that this is how Foucault conceived it. In these lectures, Foucault stated that there are two ‘series’ – the first, that of ‘body-organism-discipline-institutions’, and the second, that of ‘population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State’ (Foucault 2003, 250). The second axis or series was not about controlling the individual to the fullest, disciplinary extent, but about assuring the biopolitical security of the State; this was ‘a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined but regularized’ (2003, 253). ‘Regularization’ – a word virtually synonymous in Foucault with regulation, and linked to ‘normalization’ – is here quite distinct from discipline. The normalization of sexuality is not to be confused with the general technique of discipline, and in many ways cuts across it. Regulationism in particular, and regulation in general, is certainly spatial, but it is not identical with the kinds of panoptical and carceral technologies that geographers have well examined. The distinctive spaces of regulated prostitution should thus be seen in terms of a calculated disposition rather than simply a carceral discipline, that is as ‘a matter for discipline, but also a matter for regularization’ (2003, 252).
I have spent some time on this one example because it is necessary to disentangle the Foucauldian notion of sexuality as a dispositif from the largely discredited thesis about ever increasing disciplinary power and the spread of social control mechanisms throughout the social body. Regulated brothels were places in which a certain sexuality was ‘tolerated’ rather than simply disciplined; it engenders, literally, certain spaces of sexual ‘freedom’. ‘Men are permitted to make love much more often and under less restrictive conditions. Houses of prostitution exist to satisfy their sexual needs’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1997, 146). It is not about the disciplining of sex, but about the production of sexual subjects and the combating of certain dangers and irregularities (disease, perversity, disorder, and so on). A Foucauldian perspective on the regulation of sexual practices and sexual identities should not then be confined to a focus on disciplinary technologies. Deployment (faulty translation as it is) is not a synonym for discipline. If we open up the question of sites for the deployment of sexuality, and its disposition – by which I mean ‘the spatial and strategic arrangement of things and humans and the ordered possibilities of their movement within a particular territory’ – then the conception of biopolitics and governmentality offer I think a more productive Foucauldian resource for geographers, though one whose use is still in its infancy (Dean 1999, 105, quoted in Joyce 2003, 3). It moves Foucault’s discussion of power away from a concern with the coercive techniques of the disciplinary institutions to the more insidious, dangerous and ‘commonplace’ geographies of ‘normalization’. Biopolitics, in ‘liberal’ states at least, speaks to spaces of ‘freedom’ colonized by power in the modern era – that is to say, to those spaces in which the exercise of personal freedom is authorized and indeed required. Sexual ‘freedoms’, of course, are fundamental here, and it is to this question that the final part of this chapter is directed.

Geography and Sexuality after Foucault

Looking at Foucault’s work on sexuality, one generation on, we must acknowledge its limitations for the study of both the history and the geography of sexuality. In terms of the discourse of sexuality, even Foucault’s most famous statement – his rejection of a Victorian ‘repression’ of sexuality – seems, on closer inspection, a much more guarded and specific statement, even to the point of being platitudinous; and, in any event, several historians have recently challenged his account both empirically and theoretically. For instance, Michael Mason is both concessionary and critical towards Foucault’s work in his discussion of the rise of an anti-sensual mentality in Victorian Britain (Mason 1994). Hera Cook on the other hand straightforwardly rejects Foucault’s account, noting that he himself concedes a repression of sexual discussion within the social constraints of a ‘restrictive economy’, and more importantly arguing that in an age before adequate contraceptive techniques the fear of conception meant that women disciplined and repressed their own sexuality (Cook 2004). This does not represent a return of ‘repression’, exactly, but it does signal a more considered understanding of Victorian sexuality, one that neither takes the latter as an index of
our own liberation nor removes the gulf between them and us. Within geography, whilst it is productive to emphasize the role that geographical representations play in mapping sexual identity, there may well be alternatives to discursive models of sexual subjectivity; Phil Hubbard has pointed to ‘pschosocial’ models, for instance, and has suggested that the two might after all be reconciled. For many, the somatic and the psychic have not been and can not be folded into the discourse of sexuality; Foucauldianism is not the only game in town (Hubbard 2002). This is subject to the criticism, however, that the psychic and the somatic, in being discursively defined as non-discursive, remain cultural and social constructions. Likewise, in terms of the sexuality as a dispositif, we have seen that it is too easy a temptation to talk of a disciplining of sexuality, a social and spatial regulation that leaves little room for real histories and geographies.

However, there is one area where a much more unequivocally positive appreciation of Foucault’s significance for geographers of sexuality is called for, and that is his discussion of sexual identity; or, rather, sexual subjectivity. For Foucault’s approach, elaborated in the later volumes of the History of Sexuality, but also in a variety of statements elsewhere on contemporary gay politics and culture, make it clear that whilst sexual identities were indeed produced and ‘deployed’, there was nevertheless considerable room for manoeuvre, a space in which individuals and communities could explore alternative kinds of sexual subjectivity (Foucault 1997a-d). It is not simply that identities might be resisted and reclaimed, through a ‘reverse discourse’, though this is important. It is moreover that sexual radicals could experiment with desire and pleasure, culture and community, in short a whole field of ethical relationships with oneself and others that the term ‘sexuality’ does not even begin adequately to represent. It is for this reason that Foucault dedicated such effort to an exploration of antiquity, for he found there, in an age as it were ‘before sexuality’, ethical models of conduct that challenge our own culture’s social and political norms (Larmour, Miller and Platter 1998). Whether or not we should endorse any or all of these models – Foucault’s discussion of askesis is the most prominent – the point remains that Foucault redirects our concerns away from the issue of sexual identity towards a discussion of the variety of practices by which we recognize ourselves as sexual subjects. This sounds very abstract, but it has clear implications for contemporary sexual politics. Foucault’s work has suggested to many for instance that a politics based on essentialized sexual identities – ‘gay’, say – is limiting, exclusive, and politically vulnerable (Watney 2000, 50–62; Halperin 1995). Foucault makes it clear that he is fully appreciative of the gains made by marginalized sexual minorities in the contemporary era, and concedes that an emphasis on a (natural) sexual identity has been politically useful in the past. But he has forcefully made the case that resistance should entail a refusal of the discourse of ‘sexuality’ that we have inherited from (at least) the Victorians. It is for this reason that, after initial suspicion and denigration, Foucault has become of such central importance to contemporary sex radicals. In gay politics, and in queer theory or theories in particular, Foucault’s work has been strikingly influential. Geographers
of sexuality have also made significant contributions to this politics and this theory (Bell and Binnie 2000; Binnie 2004; Binnie and Valentine 1999; Brown 2000).

Consider, firstly, the concept – or rather the discourse – of the ‘closet’. Although I am not aware that Foucault spoke directly about the term, his discussion of the role that ‘silence’ and ‘silencing’ plays in the discourse of sexuality is the direct inspiration for Sedgwick’s highly influential Epistemology of the Closet (Sedgwick 1990). Sedgwick extends Foucault’s epistemological analysis of sexuality to the cultural effects of the regime of ignorance that is implied in the proliferation of sexuality as a discourse. The closet is the inevitable result: ‘by the end of the nineteenth century, when it had become fully current – as obvious to Queen Victoria as to Freud – that knowledge meant sexual knowledge, and secrets sexual secrets, there had in fact developed one particular sexuality that was distinctively constituted as secrecy: the perfect object for the by now insatiably exacerbated epistemological/sexual anxiety of the turn-of-the-century subject’ (1990, 73). Part of what Sedgwick points to is the way in which the ‘closet’ functions discursively in relation to power; and her analysis necessarily throws into question the emphasis in gay politics on coming out of the closet, of refusing to be silenced, of being truthful about one’s sexuality. Whilst this discourse certainly has been empowering, it is problematic if it envisages the world ‘outside’ as being somehow outside of power. And thus the notion of gay ‘liberation’ is also fundamentally flawed. As David Halperin puts it, ‘Coming out is an act of freedom ... not in the sense of liberation but in the sense of resistance’ (Halperin 1995, 30, italics in original). In Sedgwick’s remarkable essay in political epistemology, the closet is a place of contradictions whose impossibility helps rather than hinders its working in the interests of a homophobic and heteronormative society. Following from this, however, we can note that the closet is more than simply a spatial metaphor. In this respect, Sedgwick is not particularly helpful; her absolute unwillingness to respond to the spatial formations of the ‘epistemologically-cloven culture’ she describes means that injunctions to attend to ‘the contingencies and geographies of the highly permeable closet’ remain rhetorical (Sedgwick 1990, 12, 165). A geographical analysis of the closet also recognizes the limitations of a politics based on the spatial narrative of ‘coming out’. George Chauncey’s recovery of the ‘gay male world’ of early twentieth-century New York, for instance, is a critique of the spatial metaphor of the closet, countering the myths of gay men’s isolation, invisibility, and internalization (of society’s heterosexist norms) by pointing to the ways in which gay men appropriated public space and reterritorialized the city long before ‘Stonewall’ (Chauncey 1994, for similarly impressive recent accounts of geographies of male homosexuality in London, see Cocks 2003; Houlbrook 2005, 40–134). This ‘gay world’, in contrast to the established narrative of the pre-Stonewall ‘closet’, was diverse, creative and remarkably public, even spectacular; it was nothing less than an ‘open secret’ (Miller 1988, 192–220). The point here is not to affirm a ‘freedom’ that simply did not exist, nor to deny the real achievements of the 1970s, but to explore the contours of a gay (male) culture outside of the discursive politics of either sexology or gay liberation; this was a world in which the gendered identity of the ‘fairy’ prevailed, where effeminacy was a cultural survival
strategy, and one which structured gay men’s sexual and social encounters. Again, the debt to Foucault is very striking – Chauncey can describe, persuasively and in great detail, a very recent historical geography before and in the early transition to ‘homosexuality’/‘heterosexuality’. It is a world that the discourse of the ‘closet’ paradoxically (or maybe not) serves to silence and make invisible.

Beyond this, though, there is a closet or rather series of closets that are enacted and performed in material space. Michael Brown’s studies in his remarkable book *Closet Space* show how contemporary society maps and remaps a heteronormative and homophobic spatiality; the materiality of the closet, as it operates at a variety of scales, mediates and indeed is fundamental to the experience of oppression (Brown 2000). In such ways, geographers have thus begun to reveal the metaphorical and material nature of the closet and to reflect on the strategies of liberation and resistance necessary to combat it. The questions that the institution of the closet raises concerning visibility and invisibility, isolation and concentration, privacy and publicity are of course also very current when thinking about gay spatialities in general. We have clearly come a long way from the pioneering explorations of gay men’s urban geographies, with their affirmation of the need for gay men (at least) to congregate in gay neighbourhoods in order to survive, publicize and politicize. Recent work, influenced to greater or lesser degree by Foucault, has been more sceptical about the role of ‘gay ghettos’ like San Francisco’s Castro, particularly with the question of lesbian spatialities in mind (Mitchell 2000, 184–193; for a recent unapologetic prioritization of gay identity politics, however, see Armstrong 2002). But we might as geographers go much further than this. Rather than see space as fundamental to the production of sexual identities like ‘gay’ – or even ‘queer’ at least in the sense of ‘Queer Nation’ – we might view space in terms of its contribution to the kinds of self-fashioning that Foucault considers in the later volumes of *History of Sexuality*, in which the practice of (sexual) subjectivity is foregrounded. For instance, Foucault spoke intriguingly about the bathhouses of San Francisco and New York as ‘laboratories of sexual experimentation’ in which communities of pleasure might be enacted; the bathhouses allowed, he suggests, for the possibility of desubjectivization and desubjugation, for the affirmation of non-identity (Foucault 1997a, 151; Halperin 1995, 94). There has been much written, from a pretty openly homophobic standpoint, about the bathhouses, but there has been little genuine consideration of their role in the making and unmaking of gay subjectivities (Altman 1982, 79–80; Chauncey 1994, 207–225; Corber 1997, 142; Foucault 1997a, 146–7). Were the bathhouses really emancipatory and utopian spaces, creative of an ‘empty space of new relational possibilities’ (Foucault 1997c, 160)? It is a moot point, but the role of places and spaces such as bathhouses, bathrooms and bars (and bedrooms too of course) in the creation of new forms of subjectivity surely deserves greater consideration by geographers.

Again, the question of queer is central. Jon Binnie has recently referred to Michel Foucault as ‘the daddy of queer theory’, and whilst this seems a peculiarly inappropriate remark, it is clear that he has been vitally if complexly influential in the development of queer theory and queer politics (Binnie 2004, 70). This has perhaps
been largely through the work of other theorists and commentators. Eve Sedgwick’s analyses are clearly important here, even if her own work has largely been directed to textual criticism. Perhaps of more importance – certainly for geography – has been Judith Butler’s critique of the sex/gender distinction, and her development of a theory of the performance of both gender and sex (Butler 1990; 1993). Butler’s appropriation and extrapolation of Foucauldian insights remain highly influential, taking what is a constructionist approach to sexuality to a logical extension. By denaturalizing not just ‘sexuality’ but sex, Butler can demonstrate that the binary order of heterosexuality is conventional, arbitrary, and confused; heterosex is just as much a performance as, famously, is drag. Such a strong constructionist position makes Butler’s affinities with Foucault perfectly clear (Bristow 1997, 215, 218).

Despite the fact that Butler herself does not readily endorse the geographical emphasis on the spatial context of sex/gender performances, and despite the fact that geographical work influenced by queer theory tends not to reference Foucault, this emphasis on performance is one of the main conduits through which Foucault’s work on sexuality has flowed into the discipline of geography (Bell, Binnie, Cream and Valentine 1994; Binnie 1997). By drawing attention to ‘the spatial specificity of the performance of gender identities’ geographers have demonstrated how all space is sexualized. It is nevertheless notable how little direct reference to Foucault is made in geographical work on performativity, nor indeed on queer. The recent Environment and Planning D: Society and Space theme issue (21(4), 2003) on ‘Sexuality and space: queering geographies of globalization’ contains not a single reference by any contributor to Foucault’s History of Sexuality. It would be better to say that all space carries traces of heteronormative spatiality, and/or that all space is actually queer, in the sense that the norms of heterosexual society are unstable and incoherent. This means, for one thing, that the identification of spaces as either gay or straight is fundamentally mistaken. Speaking of places such as Greenwich Village or the Castro, for instance, Jean-Ulrich Désert has written:

The general perception and belief, in part from the mistaken notion that most other places are really straight, is that these are gay/queer zones. This implication, seductive as it is, invites the occupant or observer into a complicit act of faith. Queer space is in large part the function of wishful thinking or desires that become solidified: a seduction of the reading of space where queerness, at a few brief points and for some fleeting moments, dominates the (heterocentric) norm, the dominant social narrative of the landscape. The observer’s complicity is key in allowing a public site to be co-opted in part or completely. So compelling is this seduction that a general consensus or collective belief emerges among queers and nonqueers alike. (Désert 1997, 21)

The implications for a queer politics are diverse, and contested, but queer theory is extremely powerful in contesting not just gay identity, but all gendered and sexual identities – all identities, in fact. It may be that heterosexuality as a material practice is underplayed by queer theorists but by revealing that heterosexuality, as the absence of abnormality, depends on homosexuality, and by demonstrating that a logic of exclusion lies at the heart of all questions of identity queer theory has revealed a
whole new landscape of power, previously barely glimpsed, let alone understood (on
the general neglect of heterosexuality, and its problematization within geography,
see Hubbard 2000).

Conclusions

Geography’s first, very belated, engagement with sexuality seems to have been
the publication of Richard Symanski’s *The Immoral Landscape* in 1981, a study
of female prostitution indebted to sociobiology, fully approving of capitalist
individualism, and thoroughly masculinist in substance and tone (Symanski 1981).
That this book appeared more or less coincidentally with the English edition of the
*Introduction* to the *History of Sexuality* is something of an embarrassment, but the
work that has appeared in the last twenty-five years in geography represents some
kind of sustained apologia. For geographers of sexuality, Foucault’s writings do not
amount to anything like a programme – together with their suggestions, cautions,
and brilliant insights, there are ambiguities, false trails and frustrating ellipses –
but they do represent the most powerful inspiration to examine the spatial history
of sexuality. As David Halperin notes (2002, 42–68), Foucault’s work is valuable
precisely because it does not have a theory of sexuality. I have tried in this chapter
to suggest how Foucault’s focus on the discourse of sexuality is both revealing and
limiting, and in addition how the concern for sexuality as a *dispositif* ought to be read
as something more than sexuality’s cooption within the development of a disciplinary
society. It is clear enough that considerable problems remain with regard to the place
of sexuality within Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies. It is equally clear
that we should not ask Foucault to assume responsibility for work that remains to
be accomplished. The geography of sexuality remains a very young field, whose
introduction into the academy is still contested in many places, but there are plenty
of indications of the rewards of that engagement and encounter. Amongst the most
important has been the work of queer geographers in revealing the spatial codes by
which heterosexism is inscribed into all of our lives, and I would like to reiterate that
Foucault’s most unequivocally positive influence has been in this analysis of sexual
identity and subjectivity. Now a paternity test might not, after all, reveal Foucault
to be the ‘father’ of queer theory; and feminism’s contribution – (I cannot resist
asking: as its *mother*?) – has in any case been routinely downplayed and neglected.
But it would be difficult to deny that Foucault anticipated as well as inspired a queer
epistemology and a queer politics. It is Foucault who most forcefully problematizes
the modes by which individuals recognize themselves as sexual subjects, and it is
Foucault who has himself become a kind of rallying cry for those who wish to oppose
this kind of oppression through ascription. David Halperin rightly draws attention
to a ‘Foucault effect’ by which his life and theories have become part of the fabric
of social and political resistance (Halperin 1995, 13–14; and literally so in terms
of the AIDS Names Project quilt, Halperin 1995, 123–5). It is hard to see how any
contemporary critique of sexual normalization can ignore Foucault’s life, his work,
his example. Geographers have been less effusive, and hagiography has not formed much of its engagement with Foucault, but geography too has been marked by his noble and unwavering politicization of the sexual.

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Chapter 26

The Problem with *Empire*

Mathew Coleman and John A. Agnew

Introduction

There has been a resurgence of interest in the logic and substance of geopolitical practice at the global scale. This renewed interest can, in part, be traced to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and to the Bush administration’s subsequent invasion of Afghanistan as well as its unilateral and pre-emptive war against Iraq (Arrighi 2005). Indeed, much of this literature focuses explicitly on the US and on its geopolitical interests. For example, it is said: that the international stage is an increasingly dense network of imperial interactions centered on Washington DC – a ‘world state’ in which US geopolitical and geoeconomic power is more concentrated and far-reaching than it was in 1945 (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; 2002; Shaw, 2000); that the ‘grand strategy’ of the current Bush administration is to exploit the post-9/11 geopolitical climate of fear to shore up support for the Anglo-American model of free trade and for US capitalism more specifically (Callinicos 2002); that the punitive financial innovations engineered by the IMF, the World Bank, Wall Street bankers, and other international financial institutions headquartered in the US allows the US Treasury to restructure trade relations with LDCs around exploitative market access politics (Gowan 1999); that US neoimperial might in the world economy is the product of a successful post-Bretton Woods drive to break down national controls on finance and to redirect global savings to the US (Panitch and Gindin 2003); that, although imperial, US foreign policy is caught between economic, political, ideological, and military projects which play out incoherently on the ground and which portend a crisis of leadership (Mann 2003); and, among other things, that the ongoing US war in Iraq is a unilateral attempt to secure access to the Middle East oil spigot in order to give energy-dependent US-based firms a competitive advantage over overseas rivals (Klare 2001, Harvey 2003; Jhaveri 2004; more generally on the resource basis of US geopolitical practice, see Cohen 2003).

Our goal here is not to adjudicate between these positions but rather to suggest that, on the whole, and despite some important differences (see discussion in Agnew, 2003), there is widespread agreement in this literature that global scale geopolitical practice centers on the US, and moreover, that the US is a (neo)imperial power with identifiable territorial and/or strategic ambitions. It is in the context of these ongoing debates, then, that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* (2000) is
noteworthy. For *Empire* marks a decisive conceptual break in the (loosely speaking) political economy literature on the spatiality of (neo)imperial power between those who would continue to see states and state interests – and specifically, US foreign policy – as geopolitically relevant (as above) and those, following Hardt and Negri’s lead, who would see the problem of government in a quite different light as absent any place-specific identities or territorial strategies. *Empire*’s apparent legacy, then, is that it has shifted the terms of debate about what might constitute the spatiality of geopolitical power at the global scale. For example, whereas the scholars grouped together above would presumably disagree about whether contemporary world geopolitics is about an inter-national geography of states or a more complex scalar geography of power, as well as about whether or not US geopolitical practice should be considered coherent or representative of certain interests, Hardt and Negri, on the one hand, refuse the relevance of any political geography (*i.e.*, states, regions, cities, *etc.*) to the exercise of power, with the exception of the undifferentiated and engulfing space of the global; and on the other hand, downplay the geopolitical importance of the exercise of power via boundaries, borders, and regulations on the movement of peoples, products, and monies. The upshot is a model of global government which neither insists on the territoriality of power nor on the existence of a set of located interests (coherent or otherwise) that might be cobbled together and referred to generally under the rubric of US foreign policy. Hardt and Negri see the global scale of geopolitical practice as an instance of imperialism without an emperor, and moreover without an empire, if by the latter term we mean some geography over which imperial influence is exerted.

We should state upfront that we find *Empire* to be a much-needed intervention in the literature on the spatiality of (neo)imperial power. While legions of scholars have broad-sided *Empire*, usually for the authors’ lack of attention to the class problematic, it is our feeling that the book has prompted a good deal of useful debate about the what and how of contemporary government which at the very minimum has pointed to the difficulty of explaining contemporary world politics using state-centric mappings of power. As Walker (2002a, 339) puts it, despite its omissions and shortcomings, *Empire* nonetheless insists that ‘international relations is not a synonym for world politics’ (see also Barkawi and Laffey 2002). We also appreciate Hardt and Negri’s attempt to articulate an imperialism in which power is not neatly centered in one location and extended coherently outwards toward the periphery. At the same time we find that Hardt and Negri’s inclination to develop a general model of power ‘without regard to the specific modalities of the exercise of different kinds of power in different kinds of contexts’ (Jessop 2003, 54) to be extraordinarily problematic and deserving of interrogation.

A central claim we will make here, then, is that *Empire* offers a suspect account of the spatiality of power that erases the geographical particularities of geopolitical practice. We will describe Hardt and Negri’s discussion of power as a spatialized calendar of successive modes of government in which the transition from modernity to postmodernity is absolute. Our basic critique is that Hardt and Negri’s spatialized calendar of power leaves us with an unproductively polarized account of how power
might operate spatially. In *Empire*’s terms, power either functions according to a (now defunct) sovereign model of power and its strict boundaries between self and other, inside and outside; or, it operates according to an antithetical postmodern logic which does away with boundaries between self and other, inside and outside. This unqualified either/or mapping of political power – as either centered on states or de-centered in networks – prohibits a much more complex appreciation of the re-territorialization and/or re-scaling of state power in late modernity, a topic which has been taken up recently by political geographers (Brenner 1998; Brenner et al. 2003; Mansfield 2005).

But given that this is a book about the French political theorist and philosopher Michel Foucault and his importance to the discipline of geography, a closely related goal in this chapter is to point out how Hardt and Negri’s spatial calendar of power draws on a selective – and we think, deeply misleading – interpretation of Foucault’s work on subjectivity and government. The base line for us is that although Hardt and Negri’s analysis pays lip-service to Foucault, it in fact does a great disservice to his nuanced understanding of when and where we might expect to find alterations to the Hobbesian model of state power. Indeed, exemplary of perhaps the bulk of writing about Foucault when it comes to the question of power, Hardt and Negri employ Foucault’s insights about sovereign-juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical modes of government to discuss how one overcomes and replaces the other in a temporal succession of modes of government. Arguably, this periodization of power owes more to thinkers such as Carl Schmitt for whom the 20th century is marked by a decisive transition from sovereign (state) to legal (global) government than it does to Foucault, for whom such epochal transitions would be fundamentally ungenealogical. In this sense, we will suggest that Foucault is best interpreted not as an historian of great epochs but as a philosopher; and following from this, that his philosophical interrogation of power and subjectivity proceeds more spatially than temporally, or in other words proceeds on the basis that relations of power are made manifest more clearly in space rather than sequentially in time. Our project here, then, is to review Hardt and Negri’s assumptions about contemporary Empire and juxtapose these with Foucault’s genealogy of power, in order to offer what we find to be a much more complex account of power and its spatialities. At the broadest level, our goal is to look again in more detail at the theoretical claims and equivalences skirted over in *Empire* (also see Wainwright 2004) with an eye to how we might re-conceptualize the geography of contemporary (neo)imperial government.

**Foucault’s Geosociology of Political Power**

Taken as a whole, Foucault’s studies can be considered as a more or less sustained attempt to treat in general the question of the constitution of subjectivity. As Foucault
himself explains, his work seeks to ‘create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 1982, 208). This focus on how subjects come to know themselves and others led him to a career-long consideration of what has been called the ‘analytics of government’, or the relatively stable ‘regimes of practices’ through which subjects are both realized and self-realized (Dean 1999, 20–27). Portions of this work on government are frustratingly underarticulated in spatial terms, and at times Foucault appears equivocal about the importance of thinking geographically about power and subjectivity (Foucault 1980a). Indeed, for some geographers, by virtue of his emphasis on the topologically dispersed quality of power relations, Foucault’s analyses obfuscate the grounded scalar spatiality of power and operate generally via an ‘evacuation of the spatial’ (Allen 2003, 191). We tend to agree, however, with Elden’s (2001) argument that Foucault’s various attempts to come to terms with the diversity of subjectivity-constituting techniques of power can be read as so many mappings of power, particularly as they probe explicitly into the complex and sometimes convoluted spatiality of the practices that produce modern subjects. From this perspective we might note that for Foucault ‘les questions d’espace’ guided a career-long interrogation into modes of government and the production of modern subjectivity (see in particular Foucault 2000a; 2004, 13). \footnote{Foucault (2000a): ‘I think it somewhat arbitrary to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through the other.’}

For us, Foucault’s crucial political geographic argument in his exploration of government and subjectivity is that we rethink relations of power beyond the state, or more accurately, beyond the state as an already and always centralized apparatus of interests and strategies which is at best tangentially concerned with individuals and their everyday lives. For example, a recurring target in Foucault’s work is the model of government articulated in Hobbes’ \textit{Leviathan}. Foucault finds this model wanting because it amalgamates subjects into a contractual mass and then essentially forgets about them, or at least assumes their consent, calculability, and/or obedience as the collective, unified body of the state. For Foucault (1980b, 90), if politics is a sort of Clausewitzian war inscribed ‘in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and everyone of us,’ the question of political order and stability necessarily exceeds a static territorial relation between sovereign subjects (conceived as a singular, coherent body) and their sovereign. As Foucault argues (1982, 334):

\begin{quote}
I don’t think that we should consider the modern state as an entity that was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and their very existence, but on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure in which individuals can be integrated.
\end{quote}

Those forgotten in canonized theories of the state become, for Foucault (1980b, 98), subjects through which – rather than over which – power is exercised:
We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. This would be the exact opposite of Hobbes’ project in the *Leviathan*… Think of the scheme of *Leviathan*: insofar as he is a fabricated man, Leviathan is no other than the amalgamation of a certain number of separate individualities who find themselves reunited by the complex of elements that go to compose the State; but at the heart of the State, or rather, at its head, there exists something which constitutes it as such, and this is sovereignty, which Hobbes says is precisely the spirit of Leviathan. Well, rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit, I believe that we must attempt the study of the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power.

From this comes Foucault’s (1980b, 102) widely cited claim that ‘we must eschew the model of the Leviathan in the study of power’. However, Foucault’s call to ‘cut off the King’s head’ (121) is not a dismissal of the state or an argument for its dissolution, as is frequently claimed (Curtis 1995; Kerr 1999; Bartleson 2001). Rather, Foucault’s appeal is to theorize subjectivity in terms beyond either the coercive downwards exercise of force or the consensual upwards transfer of rights from autonomous unified individuals that have dominated both liberal and Marxist accounts of power. For Foucault, the problem of modern subjectivity requires understanding power differently as an all-pervasive field of structuration which percolates below and outside the sovereign’s sanctioned reach but which nonetheless intersects with sovereign-juridical power. Foucault’s principal project, we might say, is to reintroduce the problem of subjectivity to that of government, or in other words to restate the relation between the sovereign and his/her subjects such that the binary sovereignty/obedience mapping of power can be complicated with alternate explanations of the way that power works and subjects are formed (Hindess 1996; Allen 1997; Sharp et al. 2000; Herod and Wright 2002).

For us, then, Foucault’s work should be valuable for political geographers because by interrogating the conditions of possibility of subjectivity it avoids conflating general questions about the spatiality of power with much more (historically and geographically) specific questions regarding the territorial powers of the state. Otherwise said, in his exploration of the way that modern individuals come to self-recognize as subjects, Foucault looks askance at the modern geopolitical imagination, which insists rather simplistically that power is about coercion exercised monopolistically and coherently by practitioners of statecraft between (and over) undifferentiated blocks of subjects fixed in absolute spaces referred to as states. What he offers instead is what we might call a ‘geosociology of political power’ or an understanding of the complex sociological contexts of overlapping and discontinuous spatialities of power in the plural (Agnew 2005).

It is in this general spirit of problematizing the spatial operation of sovereign power via the study of subjectivity that Foucault discusses two principal techniques of subject-constituting power above and beyond the sovereign’s exceptional power to take life, or the sovereign’s ‘power of the sword’ (Foucault 1979). Schematically, we can say that for Foucault subjects are produced by two additional, generally overlooked, technologies: 1) by micro-practices that divide, isolate, and objectivize; and 2), in the midst of less determinate participatory configurations of self-
examination. The former are disciplinary technologies of power centered directly on individual bodies, and the latter are biopolitical technologies of power exercised indirectly through and by means of populations of bodies. For the most part, political geographers interested in Foucault’s work on subjectivity have zeroed in on the first (Driver 1985; 1993; Soja 1989; Herbert 1996; Hannah 1997; Pallot 2005), and as such have examined in detail Foucault’s panoptic techniques of spatial segregation in Discipline and Punish (1978). The tendency, then, has been to interpret Foucault’s work on power from the standpoint of subjects as malleable bodies socially produced under duress and surveillance.

The disciplinary mode of subjectivity-constituting government involves a very specific spatiality, which we will review here only briefly. On the one hand, disciplinary power requires an absolute spatial configuration which Foucault calls the ‘figure of the camp [la figure du camp]’ (Foucault 2004, 18). In the form of 17th and 18th century schools, penitentiaries, hospitals, barracks, etc., the figure of the camp functions via the strict placement of bodies in closed, partitioned, empty, and transparent spaces (quadrillages) of examination and correction (Foucault 1978, 170–94). And on the other hand, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, 153) argue, these absolute spaces of correction occur at a micro-scale, and accord to place-specific norms and punishments: ‘Scale is crucial [to disciplinary power]; the greatest, most precise, productive, and comprehensive system of control of human beings will be built on the smallest and most precise of bases.’ Accordingly, the spatiality of disciplinary power is best described as an intensive, institutional time-space geometry of local and concrete power relations whose uniformity or relationality over space cannot be assumed (Philo 1992).

The question of the comparative variability of localized disciplinary exercises of power is of key importance in Foucault’s work. For example, although the panopticon is about the centralization of power it is at once about the localization of power, and shows how the constitution of productive ‘docile bodies’ does not require the uniform exercise of juridical power by the sovereign across an even, isotropic surface. As Foucault (1978, 170) argues:

> Instead of bending all its subjects into a single, uniform mass, [disciplinarity] separates, analyzes, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units … It is not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent, economy. These are humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state.

As such, Foucault describes disciplinarity as a radical departure from the generalizing spatial logic of sovereign-juridical power:

> The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions … is opposed, therefore, term by term, to a judicial penalty [of the sovereign] whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating
individuals, but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by hierarchizing, but quite simply by bringing into play the binary of the permitted and the forbidden. (1978, 183)

That the operation of disciplinary power accords to locally specific norms and punishments does not mean, however, that the figure of the camp exists somehow outside the jurisdiction of the more abstract and macro-scale territorial powers of the sovereign. Indeed, Foucault is careful to describe disciplinary power as the relocation and transposition of sovereign power to substate centers of incarceration (Foucault 2003). In effect, Foucault elaborates on the problem of discipline to demonstrate how state power can be (formally and informally) subcontracted to remote, local, and specialized authorities. So, although Foucault has been rightly criticized for expelling law from his analysis of power (Hunt 1992; Hunt and Wickham 1994), his basic project in *Discipline and Punish* is to move away from purely legal theories of sovereign power to contemplate how power might be exercised through localized relations of measurement, normalization, treatment, and rehabilitation typically thought irrelevant to, or at least strategically removed from, the exercise of sovereign authority.

Judged by some as a ‘bleak political horizon on which the subject will always be an effect of power relations, and on which there is no possibility of escape from domination of one sort or another’ (Patton 1998, 64; see also Gordon 1991, 4–8), Foucault’s emphasis on discipline was significantly retooled in *The History of Sexuality* (1979). Here, we find an emphasis on a more general or global technology of power which explores how individuals might resist or otherwise navigate (although never escape) relations of domination. Foucault describes this second ‘nondisciplinary’ technology of government – which on the whole has been side-stepped by political geographers (although see Philo 1992; Ó Tuathail 1996; Herod et al. 1998; Sharp et al. 2000) – as a biopolitical model of power which operates in a spider-like fashion through populations rather than over individual bodies or in a strictly territorial fashion.

The diffused spatiality of this second technology of power is altogether dissimilar to the centralized operation of power under disciplinarity. Gordon (1991, 20; emphases added) describes the difference as one between the ‘police conception of order as a visible grid of communication’ and the ‘necessarily opaque, dense, autonomous character of the processes of the population’. Whereas the former concerns a fixity of power relations in specific localities or places, the latter is about more extensive ‘spaces of dispersion: spaces where things proliferate in a jumbled-up manner on the same level as one another’ (Philo 1992, 139). It is appropriate, then, that against the disciplinary figure of the camp Foucault describes biopolitical power as active in an ‘aleatory space [espace aléatoire]’ or ‘field of intervention [un champ d’intervention]’ (Foucault 2004, 22, 23). The goal of biopolitical government is not the direct management of the individual through the concentrated scrutiny and correction of his/her actions in a carceral space. Rather, what Foucault has in mind is a sort of laissez-faire regulation in which vast circulations of things and
people are managed in the aggregate according to cost-benefit statistical analyses, loosely delineated bands of acceptable conduct, and measurements of risk – what Foucault (2003, 7–8) sums up as ‘mechanisms of security [dispositifs de sécurité]’. For example, Foucault suggests that the production of sexual subjectivity in the late eighteenth century depended not on corrective means of punishment in institutions in specific locations but on the decentered, network-like circulation of specialist biopolitical knowledges about the dangers of female sexuality, child masturbation, and procreative behavior, as well as of the conjoined qualities of pleasure and perversion (Foucault 1978). With these knowledges, the practice of government shifted from the conduct of others under surveillance by an authority to the conduct of the self – an exhaustive ‘government of the living’ in which individuals, as members of a larger accumulation of beings said to possess certain tendencies and characteristics, self-scrutinize and then confess piecemeal their apparent deviances to an authority (Foucault 1997a). This is a technology of power built on the ‘slow surfacing of confidential statements’ rather than on a penal system of hard and fast rules which define exactly what is permitted and prohibited (Foucault 1979, 63).

As with his discussion of discipline, Foucault’s elaboration of biopower as a mechanism of security is inherently spatial in that it unsettles the simplistic state-centric model of power at the heart of the Leviathan. Foucault’s (1997a; 1997b; 2000b; 2003) provocative reinterpretation of 17th and 18th century raison d’état and the police science of polizeiwissenschaft is illustrative. Raison d’état’s shepherd-like power over the flock omnes et singulatim – over all and each – was, for Foucault, operative not simply through the top-down royal prerogative of the King, but also through myriad bottom-up technologies of self-scrutiny and confession on the part of individuals compelled to obey the sovereign. Thus, on the one hand, obedience under polizeiwissenschaft stemmed in part from the sovereign-juridical threat of sanction outlined in legal code, from the sovereign’s exceptional power of the sword, as well as from the sovereign’s attempt to generate a thorough accounting of the peoples and places under his/her territorial control. However, on the other hand, this last mercantilist goal of total geopolitical and geoeconomic knowledge – about a population’s size, strengths, weaknesses, resources, wealth, and health – was as much the development of a ‘government of individuals by their own verity’ (Foucault 2000b, 312) as it was in any easy sense an expression of the all-powerfulness of sovereign knowledge. In short, Foucault suggests that polizeiwissenschaft – due to the sheer size of state populations about which knowledge was needed, and the impossibility of accumulating with any enduring certainty knowledge about their shifting properties – was a much more participatory phenomenon than is acknowledged in standard theories of state sovereignty. The upshot is that Foucault effectively does away with the dialectic identities of the governor and the governed, and replaces them with a fluid, diagrammatic conceptualization of power in which subjects are caught up in constitutive, collusive webs of non-localizable and co-extensive relations (Deleuze 1988, 23–44).

What we can extrapolate from this brief survey of discipline and biopower (for more, see Huxley and Philo, chapters 20 and 27 in this volume) is that Foucault
sought – via an examination of prisons, hospitals, madness, and sexuality, throughout a period taken as exemplary of sovereign territorial power – to explore the subjectivity-structuring power relations missed by the oftentimes simplistic sovereign-juridical model of power employed by historians of the state. The point here is that if through his discussion of disciplinarity Foucault relocates sovereign power to a local, carceral site at some remove from the direct authority of the sovereign, then through his discussion of biopolitical power he discusses yet another dislodgement of the sovereign-juridical model of power, for example by looking to an array of ‘mechanisms [of security] through which it becomes possible to link calculations at one place with action at another, not through the direct imposition of conduct by force, but through a delicate affiliation of a loose assemblage of agents and agencies into a functioning network’ (Miller and Rose 1990, 9–10; Rose and Miller 1992). In this sense, Foucault’s insistence on the ‘micro-diversity’ of power rather than on the ‘macro-necessity’ of state power can be compared favorably to the discussions initiated by thinkers such as Gramsci and Poulantzas on hegemonic networks of social reproduction and strategic relations (see in particular Jessop 1987; 1990; 2005). Indeed, Gramsci’s discussion of hegemony in *The Prison Notebooks* (1971, 206–76) – which suggests that the labor of government is performed as much through the self-government of individuals as through official moments of statecraft – can be considered an important pre-cursor to Foucault’s contention that scholars of government look again, and with care, at the individuals and populations typically displaced in Hobbesian accounts of sovereign power. At any rate, what Foucault’s double displacement of the sovereignty/obedience mapping of state power offers political geographers is a much more complicated story about the spatiality of power than we might get from, say, Cold War-era political sociology, political geography, and political science scholarship whose treatises on the conditions of possibility of political community were for the most part based on a narrow sovereign-juridical interpretation of power (Walker 1993; Agnew 1994; Edkins 1999).

**The Multitude and the Thermidor**

Hardt and Negri hitch their thesis about the shape and substance of the changing properties of global imperial government to Foucault’s displacement of sovereign state power. This is counter-intuitive insofar as Foucault has very little of substance to

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3 Foucault’s work on subjectivity and government is not *sui generis*. Consider, for example, how Gramsci’s (1971, 268) discussion of ‘legislation’ in *The Prison Notebooks* turns to the problem of self-government, in ways remarkably similar to *The History of Sexuality*: ‘The assertion that the State can be identified with individuals (the individuals of a social group), as an element of active culture (i.e. as a movement to create a new civilization, a new type of man and of citizen), must serve to determine the will to construct within the husk of political society a complex and well-articulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society – but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement.’
say about imperialism. Indeed, as Ann Laura Stoler (1995, 14) points out, Foucault’s genealogy of ‘bourgeois identity [is] not only deeply rooted in a self-referential western culture but [is] bounded by Europe’s geographic parameters’. Nonetheless, Foucault’s problematization of sovereign-juridical government is the inspiration for *Empire* insofar as Hardt and Negri, like Foucault, seek to unravel the Hobbesian model of power found in much writing about world politics. Let us briefly, then, review the argument in *Empire*.

For Claude Lefort, in his *Democracy and Political Theory* (1988), modernity’s democratic revolutions shifted questions of law, power, and knowledge from a monarchical seat above the social world to a public site defined by uninterrupted social contest and material labor. Lefort describes this new location of authority as an uncertain ‘empty place’ born from local sociological contingencies, and he argues that anxiety with its indeterminacies – particularly among rulers – gave rise to totalitarian forms of government which sought to restore order in a violent ‘fantasy of the People-as-One’ (1988, 20). A similar dynamic lies at the root of the many arguments presented in *Empire*. For Hardt and Negri, modernity is about a radical refounding of questions of knowledge and authority in the immanent, material practices of the human multitude – that seething mass of creative, restless, and dynamic populations which in the modern period make up the living stuff of states. Indeed, for the authors of *Empire*, modernity is constituted by the rejection of transcendental knowledge and growing awareness of the partiality or situatedness of truth claims in various technical, political, social and historical contexts. And as with Lefort, Hardt and Negri (2000, 75) argue that this growing appreciation for the localization of knowledge in the everyday was met with repeated counter-revolutionary attempts on the part of the sovereign to bury immanent knowledges, reestablish ‘ideologies of command and authority, and thus deploy a new transcendent power by playing on the anxiety and fear of the masses, their desire to reduce the uncertainty of life and increase security.’

However, there is a key difference between the analysis presented by Lefort and that in *Empire*. Whereas Lefort sees a singular, totalitarian response to modernity’s democratic revolutions, Hardt and Negri see a more multi-faceted encounter that, although born in modernity, continues to be relevant today in a period identified as the postmodern. From modernity, then, according to Hardt and Negri, we have inherited an ongoing struggle of (literally) history-giving proportions between the creative forces of immanence and the restorative forces of transcendence, between the generativity of the multitude (plural) and the Thermidor (singular) who seeks to channel, divide, and/or extinguish the revolutionary agitations of the former.

If Hardt and Negri’s historical narrative returns us again and again to a recurring and spiraling struggle between the forces of immanence and transcendence, regardless of time and space, it does at the same moment present us with a rather interesting calendar of power. In other words, *Empire* presents a provocative account of different spatialities of power and resistance, or revolution and counter-revolution, predominant in various epochs of constitutive encounter between the Thermidor and the multitude. Hardt and Negri’s specifically spatial account of the differences marking transcendent imperialism (modernity) from immanent Empire
The Problem with Empire

(postmodernity) is what is of primary interest to us here. We will look first at the spatiality of power and resistance in what Hardt and Negri describe as the modern disciplinary society, and then at the altogether different spatiality of power and resistance characteristic of what they call the postmodern society of control.

In modernity, according to Hardt and Negri, the generative powers of the multitude were besieged by a many-sided, combative, and elusive constellation of conservative knowledges and practices which the authors refer to as the ‘sovereignty machine’. The ‘sovereignty machine’, which brought together the extensive power of capital and the intensive police power of the state, sought the replacement of princely command or abstract sovereign-juridical power with the state’s territorial power of administration and ‘arrangements of discipline’, which exerted ‘a continuous, extensive, and tireless effort to make the state always more intimate to social reality, and thus produce and order social labor’ (2000, 89). On the one hand, the state apparatus imposed a penal order on newly territorialized populations and thereby prevented the multitude ‘from organizing itself spontaneously and expressing its creativity autonomously’ (2000, 83). This found a complement in nationalist and colonial articulations of identity and difference which gave citizens – rather than the multitude – what we might identify as a noncosmopolitan sense of belonging which complemented the state’s institutional and administrative territoriality. And on the other hand, the expansion of capitalist relations of production across the globe brought peoples and places into a common economic field which – albeit geographically uneven – uniformly appropriated the multitude’s material labor. Merging for a brief spell in the contradictory institutions and passageways of civil society, the countervailing territorial logic of the state and the networked logic of capital worked together to ‘accomplish the miracle of the subsumption of singularities in the totality, of the will of all into the general will’ (2000, 87–88). In other words, the organization of capital under the disciplinary umbrella of the state cut violently into and across the generative, networked material energies of the multitude.

The scope of the contemporary Thermidorian counter-revolution is substantially more bewildering and at least in terms of spatial organization, owes very little if anything at all to the territorializing disciplinary logic sketched out above. Following the work of prominent Marxist theorists on the boundary-dissolving cultural politics of late modernity, Hardt and Negri suggest that the ‘sovereignty machine’ has recently been replaced by a maze-like postmodern paradigm of ‘imperial sovereignty’ signposted by the politics of difference and structurally undergirded by the growth of radically decentered regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation. This new condition of imperial sovereignty – in which the sovereign’s counter-revolutionaries have abandoned the fort and have circled round to join the marching masses from the rear in a confusing mass of political networks, as in Seattle – is, for Hardt and Negri, in substantial part the product of the globalization of the American constitutional experiment, which governs according to checks and balances rather than by executive fiat.

In this sense, Hardt and Negri’s notion of newly emergent imperial sovereignty can be likened to Carl Schmitt’s Weimar Republic-era discussion of Wilsonian
internationalism. Schmitt warned after the end of WWI and repeatedly thereafter of the arrival of a new form of American imperialism dependent not on the simple military might of the Allied powers but on the erection of global legal and commercial networks, which operate by deterritorializing the existential commitments and institutional functions once monopolized by states (Schmitt 1976 [1932]; 1985 [1933]; 1987; 1996 [1938]; see also Ulmen 1987). For Schmitt, the 20th century diffusion of the American republican experiment – in the name of global peace and human rights – was, then, really about the geopolitical production of a decentered, supranational ‘empty space’ (Schmitt 1996 [1938], 49) of depoliticized, spectacular consumption and cultural difference governed through the privatizing and pluralizing tendencies of democratic government and constitutional law. The point here is that Hardt and Negri present more or less the same story, arguing that the ‘contemporary idea of Empire is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’ (2000, 182). The difference, however, is that whereas Schmitt saw the US as an undisclosed force behind the global liberal project, Hardt and Negri see no one orchestrating agent, and certainly not the US. As they explain in an addendum to Empire (Hardt et al. 2002b, 210–11):

The US government is not the centre of Empire, and its president is not the Emperor. The primary principle of Empire … is that its power has no actual and localizable centre. Imperial power is distributed in networks and through articulated mechanisms of control … The centre of Empire, if it still makes sense to speak of that, resides in no place but in the virtuality of its power. The long 20th century, then, is not really an American century, but an imperial century.

Indeed, from Hardt and Negri’s perspective, Empire cannot be about US power because contemporary imperial government is the antithesis of state power; because in postmodernity the counter-revolution has abandoned the ‘the tired transcendentalism of modern [state] sovereignty, presented either in Hobbesian or Rousseauian form’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 161; Hardt et al. 2002a, 179–80). Now arranged in democratic, open, and consensus-based networks in which horizontal processes of self-regulation – rather than vertical disciplinary tactics – thwart the material creativity of everyday lives, the Thermidor has forsaken the quest for transcendence via the state. Instead, ‘it’ now pursues a differently imperial strategy – a parasitical one that simultaneously reproduces and taps the unruly powers of the multitude while at once providing a minimum of functional balances, limits, and

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4 The key point of departure between Empire and Schmitt is the latter’s celebration of the state and sovereign exceptional authority. Although critical of Wilsonian liberal internationalism, Hardt and Negri do not embrace Schmitt’s ‘Hobbesian existentialism’ (Strong 1996). Indeed, they move in the opposite direction and embrace deterritorialized non-state networks, in the manner suggested by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and moreover, celebrate these networks as a potentially revolutionary geography (see in particular the exchanges in Negri and Zolo 2003 and Veroli and Mudem 2002). For the centrality of Schmitt to Empire, see Balakrishnan (2000) and Hardt and Dumm (2000).
equilibria necessary to keep the anarchic potentialities of the multitude in check. This is an immanentist mode of network power which – in spite of our reference to Schmitt – at least nominally owes its formulation to Foucault’s discussion of biopolitical power, or what we described above as a shepherd-like network of forces active in an ‘aleatory space’ of flows and circulations. And it is this biopolitical notion of imperialism which sets the analysis in *Empire* apart from other current theories about the territorial imperial strategies adopted by the US in the global political economy. For the biopolitical logic of Empire is inclusionary and democratic rather than exclusionary and authoritarian, and its spatiality is an unbroken ‘field of interventions’ rather than either a world of sovereign states or of border-drawing disciplinary tactics.

**The Multiplication – Not Polarized Periodization – of Government**

The most remarkable argument in *Empire* is not that power might operate via disciplinary techniques or biopolitically, but that these modes of government have a specific temporality. For Hardt and Negri, we have passed neatly from a modern – and now defunct – mode of counter-revolutionary resistance to the multitude (the ‘sovereignty machine’) to a postmodern mode of Thermidorian government (the ‘unitary machine’) in which it is ‘no longer possible to identify a sign, a subject, a value, or a practice that is ‘outside’’ (2000, 385). In other words, we have moved from an era of sovereign and disciplinary power to an era of biopolitical power in which there are little if any traces of the former mode of government. Indeed, although disavowing that their work is teleological in the sense of a necessary and pre-ordained series of (modern and then postmodern) regimes of government, Hardt and Negri are nonetheless quite clear that their broad-brushed goal is to periodize these two polar opposite forms of sovereignty as temporally *distinct* and *successive* phenomena:

> [O]ur hypothesis is that since Empire is itself a universalizing phenomenon, it can be conceived adequately only in a global perspective. The object of study itself demands this large-scale framework … [W]e understand the nature of Empire though a periodizing argument, as the successor to the modern, imperialist form of capitalist power. Such periodizing arguments always require a significant historical sweep and, specifically, our notion requires that we theorize in some detail the modern period that we claim has come to an end. Our book seeks to give new names to a series of phenomena that can no longer be conceived adequately using our old categories.

From this universalizing perspective, then, the brand new moment of Empire is marked by everything that the former was not: the collapse of borders, the withering away of states and national economies, the smoothing of global space, the eclipse of centers of power, the effacement of local particularities, the collapse of relations of identity/difference, and the obliteration of the ‘outside’ more generally; it is the inverted – Ohmaean, neoliberal – image of the modern world’s spatiality of power
defined perhaps by what has been called the ‘death of geopolitics’ (Blouet 2001, 159). Territoriality is now not simply on the wane but is altogether irrelevant to the political: the contemporary world is a ‘smooth space of uncoded and deterritorialized flows’ such that the ‘place of politics has been de-actualized’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 333, 188).

The upshot is a deeply problematical temporalization of the spatiality of power which, paradoxically, reifies rather than problematizes the Hobbesian model of sovereign government. By this we mean that sovereignty and state territoriality remain a (hidden and unproblematized) benchmark in Hardt and Negri’s work against which changes in the spatiality of (neo)imperial power are plotted.5 The result is an oddly polarized spatial calendar of power in which either the state orders social relations powerfully and effectively (then) or it does not (now); either power is territorialized in the form of the state (then) or it is thoroughly deterritorialized in webs which have nothing to do with state government (now); and, finally, power is either transcendental (in the form of the state’s counter-revolutionary powers) or immanent (in the form of networks without centers). The central underlying problem with Empire’s immanentist reframing of global power, then, is that in taking the sovereign state as the paragon of modern government transcended in postmodernity, Hardt and Negri leave conventional accounts of the spatially coherent operation of state power uninterrogated and in turn can pose nothing except the negative spatial image of Hobbes’ binary sovereignty/obedience mapping of power (i.e., the network) to explain the contemporary spatiality of global government.

Our point, then, is twofold: first, that Hardt and Negri present a state-centric account of how power works, which requires that power be either territorial or networked, and nothing in between; and second, that they then go on to annex these two distinct spatialities of power to two distinct temporalities – modernity and postmodernity. The result is what we might call a polarized periodization of power. In this respect, Hardt and Negri do represent something of a departure from much scholarship about world politics making reference to Foucault. For example, Foucault’s influence in international relations has generally been to justify a continuing focus on the territoriality of juridical and disciplinary power at the expense of attending to the attrition of sovereign power and to the rise of resolutely non-sovereign (as well as non-disciplinary) modes of global biopolitical government (Hutchings 1997). The problem is, however, that Foucault’s insights about subjectivity, power, and the spatiality of government do not lend themselves easily to Hardt and Negri’s periodical project, if at all. As we argue below, with reference to Foucault, we prefer to see modes of government differently as spatialities of power which might re-

5 We are reminded of Walker’s (2002b) criticism of post-sovereign accounts of power which assume the state as an unproblematic center of power which has been avoided, evaded, and/or transcended in late modernity. From this perspective, state sovereignty remains the ‘assumed foundation’ of scholarship which disavows the contemporary relevance of the sovereign-juridical spatiality of power.
circulate through, and co-occur in, different geopolitical periods and with varying intensities (Galli 2001; Agnew 2005).

Hardt and Negri’s interpretation of Foucault is not unique. Foucault’s work on discipline and biopower is typically understood by his interpreters in terms of discrete phases of scholarship on subjectivity and power, comprising ‘early’ studies on the specificity of power relations and the subjugation of individuals under oppressive techniques of government, and ‘later’ studies focused more on nebulous networks underpinning relations of domination (Moss 1998). For example, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) remark that Foucault’s oeuvre is often divided up into a preliminary ‘genealogy of the modern individual as object’ and a subsequent ‘genealogy of the modern individual as subject’. This sort of distinction has led many scholars to construe Foucault’s ‘early’ account of oppression and ‘later’ account of domination not as complementary approaches to an overarching interrogation about the how of government and subjectivity but rather as different parts of a disconnected body of thinking which can be emphasized at will by an author. For example, Philo (1992) makes the very useful point that Foucault’s explorations have been used by political geographers in a sort of schizophrenic way to discuss either the strict spatial ordering of panoptic power relations (as in Soja 1989) or the fragmented and disordered nature of power (closer to Philo’s stance), as if the two are disconnected approaches to the problem of subjectivity and government. We are adding to this insight that it is often the case that Foucault’s examination of sovereign-juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical governmentalities are understood not only as disconnected phenomena but also as periodic, or as together comprising a history of successive moments and modes of government: disciplinary government replaces sovereign-juridical government; biopolitics replaces disciplinariness. Our position here, following in the spirit of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982; see also Burchell et al. 1991; Rabinow 1994; Dillon 1995; Moss 1998) is that this break between the ‘early’ and ‘later’ Foucault detracts from a larger argument Foucault makes about how various mechanisms of power build on one another and interpenetrate to produce multiple new modes of subjectivity-constituting government in which different relationships of power are stressed.

Nowhere does Foucault definitively periodize sovereign-juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical modes of government. Although a less generous interpretation would be that this discloses a general pattern of exaggerated and imprecise argumentation in Foucault’s work,6 the point we wish to draw attention to is that Foucault’s genealogical investigation of subjectivity, power, and government – which is weary of fixed identities and temporalities, and instead is attuned to history’s ‘moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells’ (Foucault 1977, 145) – would by definition refuse such a tidy historical periodization

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6 Two prominent Foucauldian scholars note that Foucault’s empirical work – plagued sometimes by an ‘interpretive exaggeration’ – is characterized by ‘areas of uncleanness and sketchiness which can be read either as confusion, or more sympathetically, as problems he has opened up for further exploration’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 126).
of power and subjectivity. We can go as far as to say that Foucault’s entire account of subjectivity is developed in order to refute such a chapter-like, beginning-and-end form of ‘global history’ in which the social world is divided temporally by distinct ontologies of power (Young 1990, 69-87).

A recently published collection of his 1976 lectures at the Collège de France entitled *Society Must be Defended* (2003) illustrates this point nicely. Here, Foucault denies the possibility of periodizing government by positing the superimposition and mutual constitution of disciplinary, biopolitical, and sovereign-juridical diagrams of power. Foucault argues (2003, 249), for example, that due to an inability to govern increasingly complex economic and political relations, the sovereign-juridical model of government underwent a double adjustment rather than an erosion; namely, an incorporation of, on the one hand, a disciplinary ‘anatamo-politics of the human body’, and on the other hand, a regulatory ‘bio-politics of the population’ (2003,249–50):

It is as though power, which used to have sovereignty as its modality or organizing schema, found itself unable to govern the economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialization. So much so that things were escaping the old mechanism of the power of sovereignty, both at the top and the bottom, both at the level of detail and at the mass level. A first adjustment was to take care of the details. Discipline had meant adjusting power mechanisms to the individual body by using surveillance and training … And then at the end of the eighteenth century, you have a second adjustment; the mechanisms are adjusted to phenomena of population, to the biological or biosociological processes characteristic of human masses.

Thus, the local surveillance of individual bodies as well as the biological regulation of the population are introduced into the very fabric of sovereign-juridical government as, respectively, first- and second- cut attempts to rejuvenate the sovereign-juridical model of government. As a result, the concept of sovereignty understood by Foucault – which is shot through with disciplinary and biopolitical practices, rather than replaced by them – is an uneasy and potentially conflictual combination of the sovereign-juridical ‘right of the sword’, disciplinary-carceral surveillance, and a biopolitical-capillary power ‘to make live and let die’.7 This is a clarification of what Foucault elsewhere refers to in passing as the need to reconfigure the ‘monstre froid’ of the state as ‘a triangle, sovereignty—discipline—government, which has as its primary target the population’ (1991, 102). The point is that the spatiality of state power is shaped by changes of accent rather than by wholesale reconfigurations that can be neatly marked out on a calendar. The result is a complex process by

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7 Foucault sees this combination at the heart of Nazi geopolitics. For Foucault, Nazism’s corporeal identification of threat drew on biopolitical articulations of disturbance to the health and vitality of the population. But at the same moment such biological identifications were an ‘indispensable [warring] precondition that [allowed] someone to be killed’, expelled, rejected, or exposed to certain potentially lethal risks – either via the (disciplinary) concentration camp or inter-state warfare (Foucault 2003, 256).
which modes of subjectivity-constituting government are multiplied, reactivated, and transformed (Foucault 2004, 3–29; Fontana and Bertani 2003). Indeed, as Foucault argues in his 1977–1978 lectures, Sécurité, Territoire, Population (2004, 10, our translation), sovereign-juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical techniques of government do not define a fragmented temporal series but a constellation of overlapping and complex relationships:

There is not the age of the legal, the age of disciplinarity, the age of security. You do not have mechanisms of security which take the place of disciplinary mechanisms, which themselves would have taken the place of juridico-legal mechanisms. In fact, you have a series of complexes [of power] in which what changes, of course, are the techniques themselves which become more refined, or in any case become more complicated, but especially what changes, is the dominant mechanism or more exactly the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms and mechanisms of security. Said otherwise, you have a history of techniques themselves.

In short, what Hardt and Negri give us – despite their claim to a Foucauldian genealogy of government, which we can now consider suspect – is an overarching, universalizing, and cyclical struggle between forces of light (the multitude) and darkness (the Thermidor) which in various epochs – modern and postmodern – actualize in distinct and successive arts of government and spatialities of power. What Foucault gives us – as a philosopher of subjectivity interested primarily in the spatiality of power – is poles apart: a consideration of how disciplinary and biopolitical arts of government combine and recombine with sovereign-juridical powers to produce a topology of power that doesn’t quite fit either the traditional realpolitik map of inter-national politics or the ‘end of geography’ thesis (for an discussion of the interstitial spatiality of power in Foucault, which anticipated Empire, see Dillon 1995; see also Dillon and Reid 2000; 2001). So, if Hardt and Negri owe an intellectual debt to Foucault’s work on subjectivity, power, and government, then they do so by means of ‘teleotranscendental’ logic (Connolly 1991, 181) that confounds the intellectual spirit that animates Foucault’s rethinking of the state as a monolithic apparatus of power. In fact, we can argue that Hardt and Negri – in describing the colonization of all space and time by an enveloping struggle between the multitude and the Thermidor, in which state power is either present or absent – embark on the sort of historical attunement that Foucault’s genealogy of subjectivity sets out to unsettle, disrupt, and open to further scrutiny (on genealogy and attunement, see Connolly 1985). What we see in Empire, from this perspective, is an inversion of Foucault that might be described as a paradoxical use of the ideas of a key and very public poststructural skeptic of ‘global history’ to reinscribe a certain overarching identity and purpose to History.
Conclusion

The philosophical problem for *Empire*, therefore, is that at the same time it provides an analysis of world politics based on an opposition between immanence and transcendence in which the former is explicitly favored, it implicitly reinstates a transcendentalist view of history – the ‘view from nowhere’ with all of its fallibilities. In this regard it departs fundamentally from the spatially nuanced understanding of the workings of power forwarded by Michel Foucault in our interpretation of his works. It is Foucault’s presumed take on power that is invoked by Hardt and Negri as one of their most important theoretical inspirations; but in their hands the either/or logic of a singular mechanism of power prevalent in a particular historical epoch transcends the and/or logic of multiple mechanisms of power (if in different relative balance between them over time) that we emphasize from the writings of Foucault. The unfortunate larding of Foucault’s biopolitics of power with Schmitt’s ‘total replacement’ logic of history produces a problematic compounding that leaves *Empire* without the compelling account of world politics that a more thorough affiliation with Foucault’s writings would have found immanent in his approach. If the writers we referred to in our introduction tend to see little but ontological continuity from the past in the geopolitics of contemporary world politics, Hardt and Negri see nothing but the totally new. The particular geographical problem for *Empire* is that its either/or periodization of the spatiality of power cannot do justice to the complexities of the spatial workings of power to which Foucault’s work draws explicit attention.

References


The Problem with Empire


Chapter 27

‘Bellicose History’ and ‘Local Discursivities’: An Archaeological Reading of Michel Foucault’s Society Must be Defended

Chris Philo

You might ask: Why all these details, why locate these different tactics within the field of history? (Foucault 2003a, 207)

The first English-language volume of Michel Foucault’s lecture courses at the Collège de France appeared as Society Must be Defended (Foucault 2003a), covering lectures given between 7th January and 17th March, 1976.¹ As Surokiecki (2005, no pagination) notes, the book covers ‘a topic’ – in short, the relationship between history, war, politics and power – that is ‘not [one] Foucault wrote on at length in any of his previously published work, so the lectures include a lot of new, compelling material’. An exception for an Anglophone audience is the first two lectures, which were translated as the ‘Two Lectures’ chapter in the Power/Knowledge collection (Foucault 1980a; in Gordon 1980). The course was given at an intriguing moment in Foucault’s thinking, sandwiched between the publications of Surveiller et punir (Foucault 1975; translated as Discipline and Punish, 1977) and the first volume of Histoire de la sexualité (Foucault 1976; translated as The History of Sexuality, Vol.1, 1979a).² Its contents reflect a significant shift in his understanding of power from a disciplinary version to one concerned with the various levels of biopower, individual and collective, operating alongside – note, not instead of – the swarming disciplinary mechanisms. What also occurs is a return to Foucault’s older fascination with

¹ The French edition, ‘Il faut defendre la société’, appeared in 1997. The second English-language volume of these lectures (8th January to 19th March, 1975) is Abnormal (Foucault 2003b), the French edition being Les Abnormaux (1999), and there are two more French editions awaiting publication in English (L’herméneutique du sujet, 2001; Le pouvoir psychiatrique, 2003).

² Elden (2002; this volume) argues that the book carries material that Foucault probably envisaged being explored further in the projected sixth volume of The History of Sexuality on the theme of Population et races (‘population and races’).
questions of discourse and knowledge, in which this book might be seen as a hinge between the conventionally demarcated ‘archaeological’ and ‘genealogical’ phases of Foucault’s oeuvre. Indeed, this book arguably embodies continuity between these two stances on intellectual inquiry, rather than discontinuity, and Stone (2004, 79) suggests that ‘the[se] lecture courses offer the archaeological analysis that is implicit (or sometimes completely missing) from the published works’. A further implication is that Foucault sketches here the ground of what he terms ‘political historicism’, a politicized approach to history that necessarily tracks between the archaeological and the genealogical, and one usefully complementing what have since been cast as his ‘critical and effective histories’ (Dean 1994).

My intention below is to offer a reading of these elements within the book, providing a text-based exegesis with the focus squarely upon the book itself (see also Elden 2002). As such, the chapter will be a fragmentary intervention in the genealogy of Foucault’s own thinking, but at the same time will take seriously what Foucault himself claims about the utility of ‘genealogical fragments’ (2003a, 11). The book certainly enhances what Foucault brings to the spatialized analysis of power (Elden 2002; 2005), and speaks to recent attempts at enlarging what might be taken from Foucault beyond the portrayal of a too-simplistic panoptic power (wherein the figure of Bentham’s Panopticon has perhaps become an impediment to progressing inquiry: see also Driver 1985; 1993a; 1993b; Elden 2001, esp. 133–50; Hannah 1997a; 1997b; Philo 1989; Robinson 1999). More particularly, the book may also contribute to the project of showing the centrality of population, and by extension population geography, within Foucault’s later writings on ‘biopower’, ‘biopolitics’ and ‘bioregulation’ (Elden 2006; 2007; Legg 2005; Philo 2001; 2005).

Additionally, because the book touches upon the eclipse of sovereign power, seemingly replaced historically by an admixing of disciplinarity and biopower, it has also figured in debates provoked by Agamben (1998) about the possible continuation of sovereign

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3 The final (eleventh) lecture, covering ground similar to that in The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1979a, Part V), identifies a shift, gradually materializing in the Early Modern era, from ‘the power of sovereignty’ – the power of the sovereign to take life – to a ‘power over life’ – the power of the state and related institutions, those operating in the field of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1978; 1979b [trans.]), to make life. Running alongside the development of ‘disciplinary power’, directed at individual bodies through the manipulation of institutional-spatial forms, Foucault detects a gathering ‘biopower’, concerned more with collectivities (masses of population) and how to govern their demographics, overall health and hence productivity. As he says: ‘we have two series: the body-organism-discipline-institutions series, and the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State [series]’ (2003a, 250). In the book, we hear about ‘the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what [Foucault] would call a ‘biopolitics’ of the human race’ (2003a, 243), and various aspects of this new object, ‘population’, are discussed: ‘It is these processes – the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity and so on – together with a whole series of related economic and political problems … which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, become biopolitics’ first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control’ (2003a, 243).
power in more contemporary forms of biopolitical socio-spatial exclusion (Ojakangas 2005 [and responses]; also Cadman 2006).

In the face of a tendency of too many geographers to treat Foucault solely as ‘the geometry of power’ (Philo 1992), however, my reading of the book tackles the less-noted connections back to archaeologies of discourse and knowledge. I will argue that these connections are not incidental, but vital supports for the intellectual scaffolding and ethico-political intent of his later work, and will suggest that reconstructing what Lemert and Gillan (1982, 39) term Foucault’s ‘bellicose history’ – itself compellingly elaborated in the book – amounts to a valuable exercise demonstrating the continuing salience of his oeuvre to contemporary thought. I will conclude by underlining certain spatial dimensions integral to Foucault’s bellicose history, indexed by his constant references to ‘the local’ and parallel insistence on prioritizing multiplicities. I will also demonstrate that the book provocatively extends Foucault’s spatialization of history, complementing the more existential and social-historical variants of his ‘spatial history’ as elaborated by the likes of Elden (2001, Chapters 4 and 5) and Philo (1986; 1992; 2004), precisely because its ethico-political charge is conveyed through an imagery touched by the bloody spatial juxtapositions of the battlefield.

**Society Must be Defended: Power, Politics and War**

The book is indeed about ‘power’, a subject-matter introduced when reflecting on the ‘power effects’ or the ‘power-hierarchy’ (2003a, 10) of conventional science, a theme to be revisited later. Foucault asks:

‘What is power?’ Or, rather – given that the question ‘What is power?’ is obviously a theoretical question that would provide an answer to everything, which is just what I don’t want to do – the issue is to determine what are, in their mechanisms, effects, their relations, the various power-apparatuses that operate at various levels of society, in such very different domains and with so many different extensions? (2003a, 13)

This quote encapsulates Foucault’s orientation: he is not striving for a ‘total theory’ of power, which he feels is implausible given worldly complexities, but instead wishes to interrogate the many different dimensions of power traversing ‘real’ societies. This is also why he resists the standard means of analyzing power, smacking either of ‘economism’ (2003a, 13), reading power as the ‘property’ of the economically dominant class, or of ‘repression’ (2003a, 15–18), reading power as ‘that which represses nature, instincts, a class or individuals’ (2003a, 15; a notion associated with Freud). Alternately, he contrasts a ‘contract-oppression schema’, one ‘articulated around power as a primal right that is surrendered’ (2003a, 16–17), with a ‘domination-repression schema’ wherein the realm of the social is conceived as ‘a perpetual relationship of force’ (2003a, 17) identical in principle (if not empirics) to the conflicts of war-time. This is not the place to retread Foucault’s well-known critique of ‘the repressive hypothesis’, central to *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault
1979a, Part II), and neither is it necessary to trace the equally well-known relational, circulating and capillary vision of power as something ‘productive’ – creating things, making things happen – developed in the second lecture and then also in The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1979a, esp. Part II, Chapter 2; for a geographical commentary, see Sharp et al. 1999).

Rather, what is most distinctive is how Foucault elaborates a model of power informed by a sense of war:

> Power is war, the continuation of war by other means. At this point, we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. … Politics, in other words, sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war. Inverting the proposition also means something else, namely that within this ‘civil peace’, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balance, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions. (2003a, 15–16)

Foucault extends these claims, exploring what he calls ‘bellicose relations’ (2003a, 23), and in effect elaborating what Lemert and Gillan (1982, 39) usefully refer to as his ‘bellicose history’. The analysis is scattered, including notes on ‘all the techniques that are used to fight a war’ (2003a, 47), but the key point is that Foucault advances ‘as a principle for the interpretation of society and its visible order … the confusion of violence, passions, hatreds, rages, resentments and bitterness, … [and] asking the

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4 The second lecture and Foucault’s chapter on ‘Method’ (in Foucault 1979a) are similar, underscoring that power is not to be conceived as emanating from a ‘single centre’, nor something to be analyzed in terms of individuals’ ‘intentions or decisions’, nor something to be traced to removed origins but rather located in ‘the places where it implants itself and produces its real effects’ (2003a, 28). Most usefully, he writes: ‘Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination – the domination of one individual over others, of one group over others, or of one class over others; keep it clearly in mind that, unless we are looking at it from a great height and from a very great distance, power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power’ (2003a, 29).

5 One passage reflects upon the whole context and content of war: ‘War in the sense of the distribution of weapons, the nature of the weapons, fighting techniques, the recruitment and payment of soldiers, the taxes earmarked for the army; war as an internal institution, and not the raw event of a battle. … War is a general economy of weapons, an economy of armed people and disarmed people within a given State, and with all the institutional and economic series that derive from that’ (2003a, 159–60).
Bellicose History’ and ‘Local Discursivities’

elliptical god of battles to explain the long days of order, labour, peace and justice’ (2003a, 54). Putting it another way:

[This bellicose history] is interested in defining and discovering, beneath the forms of justice that have been instituted, the order that has been imposed, the forgotten past of real struggles, actual victories, and defeats which may have been disguised but which remain profoundly inscribed. It is interested in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the codes … (2003a, 56)

Revealingly, he also sees a connective tissue between bellicose history and his conceptualizing of power:

So what is the principle that explains history? First, a series of brute facts, which might already be described as physico-biological facts: physical strength, force, energy … A series of accidents, or at least contingencies: defeats, victories, the failure or success of rebellions, the failure or success of conspiracies or alliances; and finally, a bundle of psychological and moral elements (courage, fear, scorn, hatred, forgetfulness, et cetera). Intertwining bodies, passions and accidents, according to this discourse, that is what constitutes the permanent web of histories and societies. And something fragile and superficial will be built on top of this web of bodies, accidents and passions, this seething mass which is sometimes murky and sometimes bloody; a growing rationality. The rationality of calculations, strategies and ruses; the rationality of technical procedures that are used to perpetuate the victory, to silence, or so it would seem, the war … (2003a, 54–5)

This account, resonating with claims in *Histoire de la folie* (Foucault 1961, translated as *Madness and Civilization*, 1967), implies that the rational calculus of modern institutions, including the machinations of disciplinary power, should not be regarded as the expression of enlightened ‘truth’ – as the working of some anonymous ‘law’ moored in a rightfully constituted ruling force – but rather as an outgrowth of murk and blood: ‘of wild dreams, cunning and the wicked’, the latter ‘hav[ing] won a temporary victory’ (200a, 55). Thus we find why Foucault looks to war, to the base

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6 Foucault hints at a gradual ‘cleaning up’ of history, with it becoming less openly bellicose through time – with less violent scrapping between fairly random groups of people encountering one another through invasions, pillages, raiding parties, etc. – and the increasing role of the (monarchical) state as the only body owning the legitimate means of waging war: ‘gradually, the entire social body was cleansed of the bellicose relations that had permeated it through and through during the Middle Ages’ (2003a, 48).

7 This text can be read in part as the story of how Reason, the forces, imperatives and orders of rationality, progressively wins dominion over Unreason, the chaotic and embodied passions of humanity untamed by mental, behavioural and social ‘norms’ of conduct (see Philo 1999; 2004, esp. Chapter 2). In *Society Must be Defended*, though, Foucault arguably allows more continuity between Reason and Unreason, if we continue to deploy these terms, such that the supposedly rational (cool, calm, truth-based) strategies of those in charge of modern states, for instance, are portrayed as actually shaped by the low cunning, wickedness and spiteful passions of ‘unreasonable’ people unleashed in war-time.
passions but also the grubby tactics of both the battlefield and those who persuade others to fight, as a guide for further theorizing of power.

The Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges

*Society Must be Defended* is not just about power, however, since it also addresses questions of discourse and knowledge. Foucault reflects on why he does what he does as an historian, acknowledging the traps of a ‘fevered laziness’ (2003a, 4):

> It’s a character trait of people who love libraries, documents, references, dusty manuscripts, texts that have never been read, books which, no sooner printed, were closed and then slept on the shelves and were only taken down centuries later. All this quite suits the busy inertia of those who profess useless knowledge. (2003a, 4–5)

Even so, Foucault remains persuaded of some worth in recovering the discourses that might stand, as it were, tangential to the major currents of historical change; and much of the book is written in praise of what such dusty alternatives, such ‘counterknowledge[s]’ (2003a, 130), can bring to the table of critical scholarship. In crafting this justification, he cites the present-day emergence of an ‘immense and proliferating criticisability of things, institutions, practices and discourses’, achieved in large measure by ‘the astonishing efficacy of discontinuous, particular and local critiques’ (2003a, 6). He means ‘local’ in various ways to be considered later, but all implicate the production of critiques – counterknowledges – emerging from particular people, settings, sites, points and maybe networks, their effect being to challenge the coherence of ‘totalitarian theories’ and the assumed ‘theoretical unity of their discourses’ (2003a, 6). Returning to the political imperatives of *Madness and Civilization* (Foucault 1967), an example is given of discourses railing against the orthodoxies of a medical-psychiatric establishment, and reference is made to ‘the strange efficacy, when it came to jamming the workings of the psychiatric institution, of the discourse, the discourses – and they really were very localized – of antipsychiatry’ (2003a, 5). The hint here about a geography of antipsychiatry, given its localization in given places and not others (Jones 1996; 2000), is worth remark, and is wholly consistent with what he asserts about the thoroughly ‘local character of the critique’ integral to ‘what might be called the insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (2003a, 6–7).

Foucault explores two senses of what he means by subjugated knowledges:

> When I say ‘subjugated knowledges’, I mean two things. On the one hand, I am referring to historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations. To put it in concrete terms if you like, it was certainly not a semiology of life in the asylum or a sociology of delinquence that made an effective critique of the asylum or the prison possible; it really was the appearance of historical contents. Quite simply because historical contents alone allow us to see the dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask. (2003a, 7)
The scholarly skills of the historian, exposing the everyday combats of the past, is what thereby liberates a subjugated knowledge, isolating an ethico-political purpose for the (critical) historian and anticipating the larger canvas on which the later chapters paint a picture of historical writing, war, politics and power. But what of the second sense of this term? Foucault continues:

When I say ‘subjugated knowledges’, I am also referring to a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity. And it is thanks to the reappearance of these knowledges from below, of these unqualified or even disqualified knowledges, … the knowledge of the psychiatrized, the patient, the nurse, the doctor, that is parallel to, marginal to, medical knowledge, the knowledge of the delinquent, what I would call, if you like, what people know (and this is by no means the same thing as common knowledge or common-sense but, on the contrary, a particular knowledge, a knowledge that is local, regional or differential, incapable of unanimity and which derives it power solely from the fact that it is different from all the knowledges that surround it), it is in the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible. (2003a, 7–8)

According to Foucault, a critical stance on the world is cultivated in the soils of ‘these singular, local knowledges, the noncommonsensical knowledges that people have, and which have in a way been left to lie fallow, or even kept in the margins’ (2003a, 8). They are the stuff out of which the first kind of subjugated knowledges can emerge, comprising the raw material to be fashioned in a scholarly manner that is ‘historical, meticulous, precise’ (2003a: 8); and so the two forms of this knowledge – its local inception and eruption, on the one hand, and its scholarly recovery and representation, on the other – are positioned as intimately paired in the orbit of broader, social-critical ambitions. As Foucault explains, ‘it is the coupling together of the buried scholarly knowledge and knowledges that were disqualified by the hierarchy of erudition and sciences that actually give the discursive critique of the last fifteen years its essential strength’ (2003a, 8).

Foucault reflects upon the coupling mentioned here, bringing into the same frame his twin meta-projects of archaeology and genealogy:

Both the specialised domain of scholarship and the disqualified knowledge … have contained the memory of combats, the very memory that had until then been confined to the margins. And so we have the outline of what might be called a genealogy, or of multiple genealogical investigations. We have both a meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights. … If you like, we can give the name ‘genealogy’ to this coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics. That can, then, serve as a provisional definition of the genealogies that I have been trying to trace with you over the last few years. (2003a, 8)

Moreover, he goes on:
genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal and scientific theoretical discourse. The project of these disorderly and tattered genealogies is to reactivate local knowledges – Deleuze would no doubt call them ‘minor’\(^8\) – against the scientific hierarchicalization of knowledge and its intrinsic power-effects. (2003a, 10)

I will return to the point about struggles against the power-laden hierarchies of science, but for now hear the absolutely explicit link that Foucault then makes;

Archaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them. That just about sums up the overall project. (2003a, 10–11)

This bold statement cannot be ignored as a summation of how, in the mid-1970s at least, Foucault saw the various elements of his oeuvre fusing together, with genealogical critique – usually conceived in terms of critiquing power relations – depending upon a prior excavation of diverse subjugated knowledges or local discursivities. There are seeds of such a conception in the early-1970s essay ‘Nietzsche, history, genealogy’ (Foucault 1971; 1986 [trans.]), to be sure, but here Foucault more fully encompasses ‘all the fragments of research, all the interconnected and interrupted things I have been repeating so stubbornly for four or five years now’ (all of his ‘genealogical fragments’: 2003a, 11). Revealingly, Foucault concludes the first lecture by musing on the character of power, sketching out some of the more abstract, non-economic and non-repressive conceptualizations of power already mentioned. He also introduces the interest in war and the proposed reversal of Clausewitz’s aphorism, but the fact that these materials sit comfortably alongside remarks on subjugated knowledges, local discursivities and the pairing of archaeology with genealogy shows that Foucault himself takes all of these as threads tugged from a larger tapestry. In simple outline, this is because he regards the terrains of both discourse and everyday social life as striated by what are ultimately the same features of struggle, force, domination and repression that mark the battlefields, war cabinets and propagandising of real war.

‘Disqualified Knowledges’, Enlightenment and Science

I want now to amplify the relational cast of Foucault’s claims about subjugated knowledges, clarifying his view that such knowledges are constituted, sustained and potentially made most effective within the horizon of more prominent, prevailing and one might say ‘powerful’ knowledges. Foucault’s vision here:

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\(^8\) The explicit nod to this Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of ‘minor theory’ is intriguing, and see the useful explanatory editorial endnote in 2003a, 20–21, Note 5. In the geographical literature, see Katz (1997).
… is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified or nonlegitimated knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organise them into a hierarchy, organise them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a science that is in the hands of the many. (2003a, 9)

The ethico-political imperative of such a vision is evident here, but so too is a broader critical stance on how certain knowledges legitimated under the banner of ‘science’ (Science even) become orthodoxies guiding the major currents of thought-and-action. Genealogies retrieving, reconvening and re-presenting knowledges that do not get so legitimated are, ‘primarily, an insurrection against the centralized power-effects … bound up with the institutionalisation and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours’ (2003, 9). It is in this sense that Foucault describes genealogies as ‘antisciences’, not so much because they are opposed to the intellectual content of the sciences, in whatever guise, but because they resist the tendency – often concealed beneath the institutional structures and broader governmental claims accompanying and made on behalf of Science – for everything that does not conveniently ‘fit’ with mainstream agendas to be sidelined. In short, genealogies remain sceptical about ‘the aspiration to power that is inherent in the claim of being a science’ (2003a, 10); they must ask ‘What theoretical-political vanguard are you trying to put on the throne [by naming something as a ‘science’, as part of Science] in order to detach it from all the massive, circulating and discontinuous forms that knowledge can take?’ (2003a, 10).

More concretely, Foucault critiques the Enlightenment and its effective disqualification of many species of knowledge from the table of acceptable wisdom. Lecture eight of the book contains an ‘excursus’ tackling the ‘discourse-power axis’ played out in ‘the privileged period of the eighteenth century’, the aim being to ‘outwit the problematic of the Enlightenment’ (2003, 178):

… to outwit what was at the time described (and was still described in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) as the progress of enlightenment, the struggle of knowledge against ignorance, of reason against chimeras, of experience against prejudices, of reason against error, and so on. … I think that we have to get rid of [this stereotype] when we look at the eighteenth century – we have to see, not this relationship between day and night, knowledge and ignorance, but something very different: an immense and multiple battle, … not between knowledge and ignorance, but … between knowledges in the plural – knowledges that are in conflict because of their very morphology, because they are in possession of enemies, and because they have intrinsic power-effects. (2003a, 178–9)

This quote exemplifies Foucault’s sense of discourse as itself a bellicose battlefield, as well as highlighting an alertness to ‘knowledges in the plural’. He substantiates such claims as follows, gesturing to an uneven geography of the Enlightenment (see also Livingstone and Withers 1999):

It is often said that the eighteenth century was the century that saw the emergence of technical knowledges. What actually happened … was quite different. First of all, we have the plural, polymorphous, multiple and dispersed existence of different knowledges,
which existed with their differences – differences defined by geographical regions, by the size of the workshops or factories, and so on. The differences among them – I am speaking of technological expertise – were defined by local categories, education and the wealth of their possessors. … At the same time, we saw the development of processes that allowed bigger, more general, or more industrialised knowledges, or knowledges that circulated more easily, to annex, confiscate and take over smaller, more particular, more local and more artisanal knowledges. (2003a, 179)

There was an ‘immense economico-political struggle around or over these knowledges’ (2003a, 180), with many knowledges, usually the most local, place-specific and craft-bound, losing out in the face of knowledges that, for whatever precise reasons, were more readily standardized, ‘universalized’ and squared with the emerging ‘scientific’ claims of the Enlightenment. Foucault wonders too about the role of the state in ‘eliminating or disqualifying what might be termed useless and irreducible little knowledges’, and in striving to ‘normalize’ dispersed knowledges so as ‘to break down the barriers of secrecy and technological and geographical boundaries’ (2003, 180).

Similarly, the Enlightenment sought ‘to homogenize, normalize, classify and centralize … knowledge’ (2003, 181), an occurrence in tune with a wider elevation of science – the championing of ‘Science in the singular’ (2003a, 182) – as a means of excluding or taming other, folk, amateur and misfit ‘knowledge that exists in the wild, any knowledge that is born elsewhere’ (2003a, 183). Moreover, Foucault identifies ‘four operations’ – ‘selection, normalisation, hierarchicalisation and centralisation’ – that ‘we [also] see at work in a … study of what we call disciplinary power’ (2003a, 181), thereby detecting disciplinary processes within the realm of discourse that parallel those arising in more material institutional and social spaces (Foucault 1977). Intriguingly, in describing ‘the disciplinarisation of polymorphous and heterogeneous knowledges’ (2003a 182), he proposes that ‘statements’ were being ‘sorted [according to] those that were acceptable … from those that were unacceptable’, imposing ‘a control that applies not to the content of statements themselves, to their conformity to a certain truth, but to the regularity of enunciations’ (2003a, 184). Putting things like this relates Foucault’s claims about the ‘disqualifying’ of knowledges to passages in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1969, 1972 [trans.]), and so once again the book evidences the links between genealogy and archaeology.

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9 Foucault is here talking particularly about medical knowledge.

10 By ‘elsewhere’, Foucault does in part mean other material spaces, those outwith a mainstream ‘institutional field – whose limits are in fact relatively fluid but which consists, roughly speaking, of the university and official research bodies’ (2003a, 183). The geography of knowledge, and more particularly the historical geography of (what comes to count as) science, is here constituted as central to Foucault’s wider argumentation (see also Livingstone 1995).

11 I.e., to the rules governing who, as it were, is ‘authorized’ to speak with an ‘authority’ that is widely recognized.
Historical Writing and the Discovery of Power, Struggle and Society

What may surprise readers of the book is its preoccupation with seemingly quite arcane matters to do with the history of France, England and, more broadly, ‘Europe’. In fact, six of the eleven lectures provide snippets of a ‘big picture’ historical geography, speaking of different peoples, ‘hairy bands’ (2003a, 202), ‘nations’, even ‘races’ (see below),12 moving across the lands of what is now Europe, coming into contact, invading, co-habiting, making alliances, breaking them and going to war with one another or at least entering into war-like relations. In part, the ambition is to demonstrate that the ‘politics’ of such peoples, struggling for supremacy or, more modestly, jostling for position in these conflicts ‘of old’, could easily be interpreted as the continuation of war by other means (thus demonstrating the salience of inverting Clausewitz’s aphorism). Yet, in a typically Foucauldian manoeuvre, and notwithstanding the mass of often quite indigestible details collected,13 his main purpose is not to prove in some once-and-for-all fashion that the ‘truth’ of history is that politics is simply war by another name. Rather, it is to trace a process whereby scholars writing about history – the early historians, if you like – began themselves to conceive of history in this fashion, and in the process composed a history that took war-like relations, the antagonisms endemic to struggle, conflict, combat and the like, as the model for what needed to be analyzed. As Foucault (2003a, 47) asks, ‘How, when and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? Who, basically, had the idea of inverting Clausewitz’s principle?’14 He declares that this ‘is the question I am going to pursue a bit in coming lectures, and perhaps for the rest of the year’ (2003, 47).

Although in this context Foucault often uses the curious phrase ‘race war’,15 what he is actually charting is the rise of a social history – or, to be more precise, a politicized version of social history – taking as its point of departure the fracturing

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12 ‘New characters appear: the Franks, the Gauls and the Celts: more general characters such as the peoples of the North and the peoples of the South also begin to appear; rulers and subordinates, the victors and the vanquished begin to appear’ (2003a, 75–6).
13 Leading him at one point to the self-reproach quoted at the head of my essay: ‘Why all these details?’ (2003a, 207).
14 In terms of historical chronology, though, and as Foucault realises, the question is really ‘who formulated the principle Clausewitz inverted?’, since the principle here – identifying politics as the continuation of war in peace-time – ‘was a principle that existing long before Clausewitz’ (2003a, 48).
15 Foucault claims that ‘[t]he war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode, is basically a race war. At a very early stage, we find the basic elements that make the war possible, and then ensure its continuation, pursuit and development: ethnic differences, differences between languages, different degrees of force, vigour, energy and violence; … the conquest and subjugation of one race by another. The social body is basically articulated around two races’ (2003a, 60). As this quote makes evident, Foucault is using the term ‘race’ as a shorthand for a range of ethnic differences – overarching a diversity of social, cultural, religious, linguistic and related differences – that arguably should not be homogenized in this manner.
of ‘society’ into groups, classes or social units of some form or another (they are certainly not all ‘races’) who are commonly in conflict with one another (whether violently or in an ongoing state of attrition likely to trigger moments of physical dispute). His overall argument is that this approach to writing history, one reviving the struggle-based contours of ‘biblical history’, has gradually emerged from under the yoke of a very different form of history-writing, what might be termed ‘Roman history’, where elements of conflict were left strangely muted and often glossed over.\(^{16}\) The aim of such Roman history was to paper over the realities of invasion, subjugation and bloody revolt, in favour of an account stressing fundamental continuities and even ‘rights’. A Romanist account said something like this: people X may have invaded region Y, forcibly subduing opposition and creating a new hierarchy of wealth, status and influence, but it can be shown that people X are in fact descendants of people who once lived in region Y, and so are only returning to claim what is rightfully theirs. Such a mode of history legitimated the sovereignty of whoever was ruling at the time of writing, supposedly proving lines of monarchical lineage to ‘justify’ the rights, apparently sanctioned by deep history, of an invading monarch to take the throne of a subjugated land or an imperial force the government of such a land. This history was of course an imagined history, fostering an imaginary geopolitics of lawful sovereignty, and in particular efforts were made to imagine links between Roman power and that of the kings who ‘succeeded’ the Romans on the European stage during the Dark Ages. Such a history dispensed with anything that splintered the past, thereby questioning the continuities, rights and justifications of sovereignty, and any alternative ‘histories’ that might have been told – folk-tales perhaps, telling other stories about invasions and their consequences – were quite literally ‘written out of court’. A connection exists to what I said previously about the interest in subjugated knowledges, since Foucault spies the seeds of what he calls ‘counterhistory’ (e.g. 2003a, 66, 70) in alternative forms of history-writing that began to challenge Romanist accounts by urging a return to the spirit if not the letter of biblical history.

To reiterate, this move – performing ‘its counterhistorical function’ (2003a, 66) – necessarily entailed a social history, emphasizing that the people who ended up living in a particular region would rarely be a unitary body happily living under a time-honoured, historically sanctioned sovereign, but instead a population fractured along at least one basic fault-line: namely, that between conquerors and conquered, or, more subtly, between those who (as the descendants of both invaders and their

\(^{16}\) Foucault identifies ‘the emergence of something that, basically, is much closer to the mythico-religious history of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans. We are much closer to the Bible than to Livy, in a Hebraic-biblical form much more than in the form of the annalist who records, day-by-day, the history and the uninterrupted glory of power. … [I]t is not surprising that we see, at the end of the Middle Ages, in the sixteenth century, in the period of the Reformation, and at the time of the English Revolution, the appearance of a form of history that is a direct challenge to the history of sovereignty and kings – to Roman history – and that we see a new history that is articulated around the great biblical form of prophecy and promise’ (2003a, 71).
collaborators) had locally become the rulers and those who (as the descendants of both
the invaders and any other waifs, strays and strangers) had locally become the ruled.
As Foucault states, ‘[t]he two groups form a unity and a single polity only as a result
of wars, invasions, victories and defeats, or in other words acts of violence’ (2003a,
77). His insistence on a bipolar formulation may now strike us as too simplistic, and arguably stands at odds with his own emphasis on multiplicity elsewhere in the
book, but there are resonances with other of his texts where history is depicted as
eriven by a great divide between the included and the excluded. For the moment,
though, we simply need to acknowledge that Foucault ‘prais[es] the discourse of
race war’ (2003a, 65) – this bipolar vision of historical struggle – precisely because
its entry into the hallways of history-writing challenged the Roman model of history.
As he declares, ‘the history that appears at this point, or the history of the race
struggle, is a counterhistory’ (2003a, 70). What occurred in the manoeuvres of these
early historians had one further big effect: namely, to insert ‘society’ into history;
or, more accurately, to insert a construct like ‘society’, acknowledging the presence
of groupings within a given region differentiated by access to wealth, status and
influence, into the writing of a history bothered about the politics of legitimacy (of
who does or does not wield legitimate power in said region). Foucault hence talks
about a ‘new subject of history’ (2003a, 134):

17 In their postscript, Fontana and Bertani (2003, 283) remark that a ‘binary relationship
which is introduced … by the phenomena of domination, and which the model of war explains,
does not really explain the multiplicity of the real struggles that are provoked by disciplinary
power or the effects government has on the modes of behaviour produced by biopower’.
18 In fact, much could be said about the provocative historical geography of ‘the Same
and the Other’ (esp. Foucault 1970, xxiv) as a framework and motif that punctuates various
of Foucault’s texts (for a commentary, see Philo 1986; 2006; also Elden 2001, Chapters 4 and
5). It clearly maps on claims made by him about the spatialized relations between Reason
and Unreason, notably in Madness and Civilization (Foucault 1967; Philo 1999; 2004, esp.
Chapter 2), and also between the Normal and the Abnormal (Foucault 2003b; also Elden
2006; Stone 2005).
19 It must be said with force that in no way is Foucault justifying racism. Indeed, at
various points (e.g. 2003a, 61–2, 254–61; also Foucault 1979a, Part V; and Elden 2002, esp.
131–3) he starts to explain – and to critique – the emergence of racism within new forms
of ‘bioregulation’, buttressed by new biological theories that pervert Darwin, outlining
racism’s complicity with both the imperial-colonial project and the most hateful eugenicist
programmes of certain late-nineteenth and twentieth century states (with Nazi Germany
obviously being the most shocking exemplar). As he observes: ‘In the nineteenth century
– and this is completely new – war will be seen not only as a way of improving one’s own
race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and
the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one’s own race. As more and
more of our numbers die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer’ (2003a, 257).
The whole problematic of dealing with ‘abnormals’ is also signposted here, referencing many
other features of Foucault’s oeuvre (e.g. Foucault 1967; 2003b) that spiral away from, yet
remain connected via notions of race war and bioregulation, to the themes of this book.
It is what a historian of the period calls a ‘society’. A society, but in the sense of an association, group or body of individuals governed by statute, a society made up of a certain number of individuals, and which has its own manners, customs and even its own law. (2003a, 134)

It is on this count that ‘society’ matters, hinting at a politicized sense of something called ‘society’ worth defending, which takes us towards what has been criticized as the strange title given to this lecture course.20 True, Foucault’s statements about the ‘defence of society’ surface when critiquing the racist outworking of the above-mentioned race war, wherein those in authority say: “We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the counterrace” (2003a, 61–2). Yet, as implied by his praise for the early historians opening up the race-social conflict paradigm, Foucault also sees something of critical value in the discovery of society, ‘this new subject of history’, that should be encouraged.

It is difficult to illustrate these claims, given the detail of Foucault’s commentary about past history-writing, but it is worth mentioning the contribution of one historian, Boulainviller,21 who is centralized by Foucault in no less than three of the lectures.22 This individual was called upon by Louis XIV to abridge the wealth of documentation found in reports requested on the state of France for the benefit of his heir and grandson, the duc de Bourgogne (2003a, 127–8). In 1727 Boulainviller’s two volume *Etat de la France* appeared, with a third volume in the following year and related texts, and, despite being commissioned by the monarch, these works of social-historical synthesis effectively disputed a version of history wherein ‘the King’s knowledge of his kingdom and his subjects ‘becomes’ isomorphic with the State’s knowledge of the State’ (2003a, 128). Boulainviller wished for a more variegated history, one that could avoid ‘saying’ exactly what an emerging administrative machinery, into which the King was increasingly embedded, might want it to say. More specifically, his sympathies lay with a bourgeoisie who had lost influence over both monarch and administration, and a goal of his historical writing was to reactivate a bourgeois self-knowledge, a bourgeois imagination even, that could stand against the abuses of executive power under the ancien regime (2003a, 154–5). He was hardly an advocate for the most oppressed within society, far from

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20 ‘The title of the book is misleading: Foucault does not believe in society as a force for good. Rather, it is the impulse to defend society at all costs that has been the defining force in the evolution of civilisation’ (Hussey 2005, no pagination). Basically I agree, but it strikes me that Foucault is also finding something more progressive in the discovery of a notion of ‘society’, since it provides a lever for critical analysis of the power-laden relations between the differentiated human fragments comprising a society.

21 There is some confusion over the spelling of this name: in the 2003 translation it is rendered as ‘Boulainvilliers’, but it is reckoned by authorities that ‘Boulainviller’ is more accurate (Elden 2002, 131, Note 16), the version that will be adopted here.

22 ‘I want to take Boulainviller simply as an example, because there was in fact a whole nucleus, a whole nebula of noble historians who began to formulate their theories in the second half of the seventeenth century’ (2003a, 144).
it, and Foucault is not claiming Boulainviller as some unexpected champion of the ‘Third Estate’. Nonetheless, in the sense detailed above, Foucault is crediting Boulainviller with a decisive role in heralding a new form of social history that could perform a function critical of the established order.

Corresponding with the wider sweep of the book, the centrality of war to Boulainviller’s take on history is what really matters:

Boulainviller makes the relationship of war part of every social relationship, subdivides it into thousands of different channels, and reveals war to be a sort of permanent state that exists between groups, fronts and tactical units as they in some sense civilise one another, come into conflict with one another, or on the contrary form alliances. There are no more multiple and stable great masses, but there is a multiple war. … With Boulainviller, … we have a generalised war that permeates the entire social body and the entire history of the social body; it is obviously not the sort of war in which individuals fight individuals, but one in which groups fight groups. (2003a, 162)

For Boulainviller, and for generations of social historians to follow, ‘war [becomes] basically historical discourse’s truth-matrix’ (2003a, 165), and he thereby ‘defined the principle of what might be called the relational character of power’ (2003a, 168), showing that ‘(and this … is the important point) relations of force and the play of power are the very stuff of history’ (2003a, 169). Foucault duly detects here a series of propositions about history, war, politics and power that, at bottom, encapsulate the major themes covered in the book. Furthermore, Boulainviller was ‘challenging … the juridical model of sovereignty which had, until then, been the only way of thinking of the relationship between people and monarch, or between the people and those who govern’ (2003a, 168), crafting instead an approach couched ‘in historical terms of domination and the play of relations of force’ (2003a, 169). Such an approach displayed a measure of commitment to those hoping to resist domination, even if here it was disaffected nobility rather than the dispossessed and marginalized groupings who we might more routinely envisage as the resisters of domination. I will shortly reconsider this politicized imperative in Boulainviller’s history, but the salient point is that Foucault’s reading of Boulainviller sets up the whole problematic for an alternative version of thinking history, precisely that bellicose history described by Lemert and Gillan (1982).

‘Bellicose History’ and ‘Political Historicism’

Foucault detects in the realm of discourse the same play of forces, strategies and tactics, all underpinned by wickedness and cunning, as he finds in the material history of people, places and power; and, indeed, there is a definite sense that the book is as much about the ‘war’ in discourse – the clash of discourses, including different discourses about, or ways of writing, history – as it is anything else. Lemert and Gillan (1982, 37–9) are interesting in this respect:
A bellicose history cannot be read by means of abstractions or systems of thought; nor by meaningful interpretations. History must be read in documents produced by these conflicts. Documents are visible, readable, practices regulated by specific relations at a specific time. … Yes, society is more than discourse. But it is in and by means of discourse that social conflict takes place.

Within the bellicose history of history-writing itself, Foucault identifies – as mentioned – the split between ‘the Roman history of sovereignty’ and ‘the biblical history of servitude and exiles’ (2003a, 68), a split then coursing through several centuries of historiography. He stresses that the Roman historians and their Medieval and Early Modern inheritors all tended to operate in the horizon of establishment power, asserting that ‘[i]n general terms, we can … say that until a very late stage in our society, history was the history of sovereignty, or a history that was deployed in the dimension and function of sovereignty’ (2003a, 68). Presumably there were always other versions of history in circulation, residues of the ‘biblical history’ together with – as also mentioned – folk-histories telling stories of invasion from the viewpoint of the pillaged not the pillagers, but the play of forces would have kept such alternatives largely unheard (except in obscure localities far from the seats of influence). There was always a potential battlefield where differing versions of history could have locked into combat, however, and one aspect of Foucault’s critical historiography is to identify when this potential to be a battlefield became actualized – in short, to find when mainstream and alternative historical accounts did first engage one another in an obvious fashion.

Foucault admits that: ‘I do not think that the difference between these two histories is precisely the same as the difference between an official discourse and, let us say, a rustic\textsuperscript{23} discourse’ (2003a, 78). Nonetheless, he presents the alternative accounts of history as loosely akin to the many, heterogeneous craft knowledges that were, as it were, the ‘surplus’ of the Enlightenment’s disciplinary ambitions (see above), and as thereby standing in an awkward, even oppositional stance to the more officially sanctioned varieties of Early Modern history:

… history found itself, for different reasons, in the same position as the technical knowledges … . For various reasons, historical knowledge entered a field of struggles and battles at much the same time. … When historical knowledge, which has until then been part of the discourse that the State or power pronounced on itself, was enucleated from that power, and became an instrument in the political struggle that lasted for the whole eighteenth century, the State attempted, in the same way and for the same reason, to take it in hand and disciplinarise it. … [T]here was a perpetual confrontation between the history that had been disciplinarised by the State and that had become the content of

\textsuperscript{23} The manuscript version says ‘scholarly and naïve’, rather than ‘official and rustic’ (2003a, 77, Footnote). The suggestion that the alternative versions of history might derive from the countryside, what I called a moment ago in the main text ‘obscure places’, does of course index fascinating possibilities for envisaging an uneven geography of history (of history-writing and -telling) wherein urban-rural contrasts might be significant.
official teaching, and the history that was bound up with the struggles because it was the consciousness of subjects involved in a struggle. (2003a, 185–6)

In the terms defined earlier, this means that Foucault regards the latter form of history as a subjugated knowledge of sorts. Attention has already been paid to what he says about a species of counterhistory (represented by the contribution of Boulainviller) that began to work with notions of race war or, more intelligibly for today’s audience, a model of social history fractured by clashing human groupings; and Foucault calls this model a ‘counterhistory’ precisely because of its adversarial character on the battlefield of historical writing, and also because it held out the promise of a political challenge in its immediate present (i.e. at the time of its writing).24

The counterhistory in question here, acknowledging the bellicosity of history, was confronted at different periods by ‘the philosophical order’ and ‘the political order’ (2003a, 59), both being hesitant about lending credence to voices from what were previously the sidelines of historical change:

Whatever form it takes, [this discourse of war and history] will be denounced as the discourse of a biased and naïve historian, a bitter politician, a dispossessed aristocracy, or as an uncouth discourse that puts forward inarticulate demands. … (2003a, 58)

… counterhistory that is born of the story of race struggle will of course speak from the side that is in darkness, from within the shadows. It will be the discourse of those who have no glory, or of those who have lost it and who now find themselves, perhaps for a time – but probably for a long time – in darkness and silence. (2003a, 70)

This kind of history was, and continues to be, ‘a disruptive speech’ (2003a, 70), telling not ‘of the untarnished and un eclipsed glory of the sovereign’, less about great ‘victories’, but more about ‘the misfortunes of ancestors, exiles and servitude’ (2003a, 71). It was, and is, a history that ‘has to disinter something that had been hidden’, and, crucially given the broader thrust of the book, a history looking for something ‘which has been hidden not only because it has been neglected, but because it has been carefully, deliberately and wickedly misrepresented’ (2003a, 72). Such a history strives ‘to show that laws deceive, that kings wear masks, that power creates illusions, and that [other] historians tell lies’ (2003a, 72), and it is also a history acknowledging the depredations of war while claiming rights for the dispossessed and the marginalized. The result is indeed a thoroughly politicized sense of history, a parcel of troublesome counterhistories sticking a knife in the belly of establishment histories. Such histories have commonly been opposed, as Foucault reflects:

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24 ‘[T]his discourse, which was basically or structurally kept in the margins by that of the philosophers and jurists, began its career – or perhaps its new career in the West – in very specific conditions between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries and represented a twofold – aristocratic and popular – challenge to royal power’ (2003a, 58).
In more general terms, and in the longer term, what had to be eliminated was what I would call ‘political historicism’, or the type of discourse that we see emerging from the [historiographic] discussions I have been talking about, … and which consists in saying: Once we begin to talk about power relations, we are not talking about right, and we are not talking about sovereignty; we are talking about domination, and about an infinitely dense and multiple domination that never comes to an end. (2003a, 110–11)

Unsurprisingly, it is again in the example of Boulainviller that Foucault finds the embryo of this ‘political historicism’, reconstituting this long-dead scholar’s ‘historico-political field’ (2003a, 167) – ‘a historico-political continuum’ – wherein ‘historical narratives and political calculations have exactly the same object’ (2003a, 169). Still extrapolating from Boulainviller, but returning to the thematic of war, Foucault then writes:

… we can say that the constitution of a historico-political field is an expression of the fact that we have gone from a history whose function was to establish right by recounting the exploits of heroes or kings, their battles and wars and so one … to a history that continues the war by deciphering the war and the struggles that are going on within all the institutions of [apparent] right and peace. … [F]rom the eighteenth century onward, historical knowledge becomes an element of the struggle: it is both a description of struggles and a weapon in the struggle. History gave us the idea that we are at war; and we wage war through history. (2003a, 171–2)

Thus Foucault returns, now armed with a political historicism in which political commitments inform historic inquiry while historical findings are mobilized in political interventions, to a renewed justification for the variety of history – archaeological excavations of subjugated knowledges as the basis for genealogical critiques of reprehensible power-effects – that he has long been endeavouring to practise.

Conclusion: ‘Geography Must Indeed Necessarily Lie at the Heart of My Concerns’

The book’s sensitivity to questions of geography – to do with space, place, location and environment, however precisely defined – should already be evident from the above, but let me conclude with a few speculative remarks. The first thing to note is Foucault’s continual referencing of the local, most obviously in his discussion of subjugated or disqualified knowledges, repeatedly accompanied by evocative terms such as ‘local knowledges’, ‘local categories’, ‘local critiques’ and ‘local discursivities’. This terminology is used to distinguish the knowledges that he has

25 Revealingly, Foucault concludes his fifth lecture by promising that ‘next time I would like to both trace the history of this discourse of political historicism and praise it’ (2003a, 111). The discussion of Boulainviller is then central to the sixth and seventh lectures, although it is actually in the eighth lecture that claims about ‘political historicism’ are foregrounded.
in mind from ones that might be described as ‘global’ or, perhaps more accurately, as *common* in the sense of being in common usage, widespread, prevailing, predominant, known to many, somehow ‘filling up’ all of a national territory (and maybe beyond). Indeed, Foucault explicitly distances what he also calls ‘little knowledges’ from the ‘common knowledge’ of the masses, including the taken-for-granted beliefs and assumptions comprising so-called ‘common-sense’ (2003a, 7); but he also distances these little knowledges from a host of other elite, expert and professional knowledges – ones carrying the sanction of Enlightenment or Science – that may not be common knowledge as such, but which are still widely diffused around many centres of research, learning and calculation. As Foucault clarifies when talking of ‘a knowledge that is local, regional or differential’, one ambition is simply to underscore that such knowledge ‘is different from all the knowledges that surround it’ (2003a, 7–8); in which case local becomes a marker of that difference when set against the homogeneity implied by describing something as ‘common’. When linking local knowledges to ‘disorderly and tattered genealogies’ (2003a, 10), moreover, a second ambition is to show how such knowledges, lacking coherence, organization and structure, depart from – and perhaps embody a critical window on or response to – more ‘total’ or even ‘totalizing’ knowledges, theories, worldviews and the like. I will return to this claim, but what I must add in passing is that Foucault conceives of alternative knowledges in a materially spatialized manner; so we are not merely in the realm of metaphor, as is perhaps the case with the spatial terminologies of some poststructuralist authors (Smith and Katz 1993). He says enough throughout the book to indicate that he really does picture at least some of the knowledges under scrutiny as anchored in quite particular places, with their ‘differences defined by geographical regions’ (200a, 179), arising in specific sorts of spaces – certain types of settlement, craft-workshop, school, hospital or asylum – or distributed around definable networks, maybe comprising the people working, living, attending or interned in the spaces just listed. A geographical attentiveness to the knowledges produced in named places and delineated spaces, especially to those that he calls upon us to liberate from their subjugation and disqualification at the hands of knowledges occupying superior positions in the power-hierarchy, is therefore pivotal.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{26}\) A valuable task might be to relate Foucault’s claims here to seemingly parallel constructions in certain literatures familiar to human geography. Geertz’s notion of ‘local knowledge’ (1983; see Barnes 2000; Cloke et al. 2004, 319–23) would be the most obvious, not least because Foucault actually uses this term, although a closer inspection suggests that Geertz’s focus on local formations of cultural meaning might veer towards a concern for ‘common sense’ (albeit common sense as locally constituted) that Foucault expressly disavows. The same might be true with respect to the notion of ‘indigenous knowledge’ (Briggs 2005), although an envisaged – and some might say over-played – binary divide between indigenous knowledges (particular locally-embedded environmental knowledges) and scientific knowledges (particularly Western-derived technological knowledges) does perhaps echo something of Foucault’s contrast between dominant and subjugated knowledges. Haraway’s (1988; see Barnes 2000; Merrifield 1995; Rose 1997) notion of ‘situated knowledges’ is
To pick up a point made a moment ago, Foucault’s concern for the local is also designed to register the importance of recognizing both differences and partialities in the realm of knowledge. There is a parallel with his formulation of a ‘general history’ over and against a ‘total history’, surfacing in the English introduction to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault 1972), and with his notes there about thinking history, discourse and knowledge in terms of ‘spaces of dispersion’ (Philo 1992, 148–50). In *Society Must Be Defended* this concern for the local also figures in the conceptualizing of power, which, while not supposed to be simplistically ‘localized’ in the sense of being ‘held’ by blocks of the powerful, is always traced through diverse local capillaries where its effects are made and felt. Echoing the formulations in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, but now stirring in an understanding of power as akin to the fleeting cobbles of forces, tactics, passions and events endemic to war, Foucault arrives (in his course summary) at this meta-description of what his scholarly approach resembles:

We are … dealing with a discourse [that of bellicose history] that inverts the traditional values of intelligibility. An explanation from below, which does not explain things in terms of what is simplest, most elementary and clearest, but in terms of what is most confused, most obscure, most disorganised and most haphazard. It uses as an interpret[ative] principle the confusion of violence, passions, hatreds, revenge and the tissue of the minor circumstances that create defeats and victories. (2003a, 269)

This approach is about accenting heterogeneity over homogenization, fragmentation over coherence, multiplicities over singularities: it is about the assault on the theoretical castles of Order, Truth and Reason (with their first letters capitalized). Put like this, Foucault in this book can readily be interpreted, with justification, as expressing a poststructuralist sensibility that is countering a structuralist model of history, language and society (one listing permutations and combinations governed by a set of prior possibilities whose overall order is known). As has now been argued several times, a poststructuralist sensibility is necessarily attuned to space, as what most obviously ‘guarantees’ the relational play of differences, juxtapositions and contingencies (e.g. Dixon and Jones III 1998a; 1998b; Doel 1999; Massey 2005; Marston et al. 2005; Natter and Jones III 1993; Pratt 2000). Another way of capturing Foucault’s stance in this book is to situate it in the orbit of postmodernism (Ley 2000; 2003), as a still more general assault on the ordering pretensions of modernist thought, and such a move was one that I made when aligning ‘Foucault’s another obvious point of reference, although, in stressing that *all* knowledge cannot but have origins that are situated, partial and thereby local, she also qualifies Foucault’s effective pitting of local knowledges (marked by their differences) against more global knowledges (as in a singular *Science*).

27 The relationship between Foucault and structuralism is often debated, but his vigorous distancing of his own projects from those of structuralism – voiced very strongly in the introduction and conclusion of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault 1972, esp. 15, 199–202) – strike me as convincing.
geography’ with ‘that wider current of thought (or ‘attitude’) now commonly referred to as postmodernism, in which the certainties of existing (modernist) intellectual projects … are thrown deeply into question’ (Philo 1992, 142; also Cloke et al. 1991, Chapter 6). Symmetrical with claims made about the alertness to space demanded by poststructuralism, so the likes of Gregory (1989) spell out the peculiar affinities between academic geography, with its traditional attachment to ‘areal differentiation’ (Hartshorne 1939), and postmodernism’s insistence on prioritizing differences of all kinds over the alleged indifference of modernism. All of these contexts help to make sense of what can be cast as the local obsessions and spatial multiplicities central to these lectures.

I will return to this issue for one last time presently, adding a further slant tied up with the book’s bellicose history, but it is important to appreciate the fierce backlash against the emphasis on difference integral to both poststructuralism and postmodernism. In various quarters, albeit not often so fiercely in print (but see Hamnett 2001; 2003), these approaches have been accused of a listless relativism, an ‘anything goes’ mentality, an ethico-political fecklessness, a lack of serious critical ambition, and an irresponsible celebration of playfulness over a serious engagement with social alternatives to an iniquitous status quo. While such a backlash is understandable, it does miss the more radical objectives of postmodernism, ‘domesticating’ its message so as to render it a prime candidate for critique (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992; also Ley 2003), and it fails to look closely at the precise reasoning that led the likes of Foucault to advance such strong claims on behalf of difference (and the local) in the face of ‘total’ and even ‘totalizing’ theories (ones debated in the academy and ones mobilized in structuring whole societies, such as fascism and debased versions of socialism: see 2003a, esp. 258–63). It is instructive to consider Foucault’s own words on the recovery of subjugated knowledges as the archaeological prelude to genealogical critique, a task which, as already explained, he sees as thoroughly infused with intense ethico-political purpose. Regarding ‘multiple genealogical investigations’ (2003a, 8), he proposes that their cumulative effect is to leave ‘total’ theories or discourses – ones as diverse as medical-psychiatric orthodoxy, neo-classical economics or Marxism – ‘cut up, ripped up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured, dramatised, theatricalised, and so on’ (2003a, 6). Stressing the local, difference-seeking, non-homogenizing nature of the critique proposed, he insists:

So that, if you like, is my … point: … the local character of critique; this does not, I think, mean soft eclecticism, opportunism or openness to any old theoretical undertaking, nor does it mean a sort of deliberate asceticism that boils down to losing as much theoretical weight as possible. I think that the essentially local character of the critique in fact indicates something resembling a sort of autonomous and non-centralised theoretical production,

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28 As Hannah (this volume) remarks, though, this framing of ‘Foucault’s geography’ within the orbit of postmodernism is not one that particularly appeals now: it reflected a particular moment when texts by the likes of Gregory (1989), Harvey (1989) and Soja (1989) had suddenly galvanized theoretical geographers into discussing postmodernism.
or in other words a theoretical production that does not need a visa from some common regime to establish its validity. (2003a, 6)

Yet, as many passages make plain, Foucault does not let this ‘local character of critique’, dealing in multiple possibilities and not requiring the sanction of some singular theoretical court of appeal, remain as a self-satisfied deconstructive mission. Rather, the local critiques, targeted as specific enemies or particular points of weakness in the power-hierarchy, are to be prompted by an ethico-political commitment; something that the central lectures progressively configure as a fully political historicism informed by sustained and detailed encounter with subjugated knowledges, peoples, places, experiences and events.

Finally to close, let me revisit once more that openness to space present throughout the book, whether talking of local discursivities, the local capillaries of power or the local character of critique. It might be objected that Foucault says little here that is as obviously about space as he does elsewhere when writing about the likes of asylums, hospitals, workhouses and prisons, and that as a result it is of less interest to a geographical audience than are many of his other texts. My counterclaim would be that it actually witnesses Foucault developing a still deeper awareness of why spaces matter, precisely because he explores the potential of a bellicose history whose baseline imaginary – the pitted battlefield, a patchwork of mud, rust and blood, an uneven landscape with collapsing tunnels beneath, a site of stressed humanity, strategizing but messing up, often running blindly – is from the very outset spatialized in a variety of ways. It may be a coincidence, but it was in 1976, around the time of these lectures, that Foucault was interviewed by the radical geography journal *Hérodote*, in the course of which he becomes excited about what a geographical perspective might add to his own thinking. What prompts this excitement, though, is his dawning appreciation of the connections between geography and war as a possible framing for his ongoing intellectual endeavours; and it is with his comments on this theme that I will now conclude:

Now I can see that the problems you put to me about geography are crucial ones for me. Geography acted as the support, the condition of possibility for the passage between a series of factors I tried to relate …

29 It is true, even so, that questions arise about whether Foucault envisions different local struggles ever gaining a more generalized coherence – linking hands with struggles over similar issues (e.g. psychiatric reform) in other places or with struggles over other issues (e.g. workers’ or women’s rights) in the same neighbourhood – and hence about his stance on so-called ‘rainbow coalitions’ (i.e. what risks attach to such coalitions in imposing singular grids over multiple realities?). In a way, the whole problematic of contemporary ‘social movements’, including the possibilities but also drawbacks of ‘convergence space’ (Routledge 2003), is here anticipated.

30 At various moments – deliberately not stressed in this chapter, because these were not its focus – such material spaces of institutions and everyday sites do get a mention. Note his reflections on the spatial arrangements of planned towns and housing estates (2003a, 250–51), but also various passing references to schools, asylums and hospitals.
The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods. One theme I would like to study in the next few years is that of the army as a matrix of organisation and knowledge; one would need to study the history of the fortress, the ‘campaign’, the ‘movement’, the colony, the territory. Geography must indeed necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns. (Foucault 1980b; in Gordon 1980, 77)

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