French Modern
Norms and Forms of the Social Environment

Paul Rabinow
# Contents

Acknowledgments ix  
Introduction to the Present 1  
1 The Crisis of Representations: From Man to Milieux 17  
2 Modern Elements: Reasons and Histories 58  
3 Experiments in Social Paternalism 82  
4 New Elites: From the Moral to the Social 104  
5 Milieux: Pathos and Pacification 126  
6 From Moralism to Welfare 168  
7 Modern French Urbanism 211  
8 Specific Intellectuals: Perfecting the Instruments 251  
9 Techno-Cosmopolitanism: Governing Morocco 277  
10 Middling Modernism: The Socio-Technical Environment 320  
Notes 359  
Bibliography 398  
Index 429
new types—hospitals, museums, public meeting halls, and train stations—to meet scientific advances and new social needs. The department store offered a great challenge to architects, as did the factory; modern life also called for a redesign of boutiques, bakeries, and butcher shops. Types had to be reintegrated into the local milieu as well as modernized. Rosenthal criticized the design of post offices and schools by Parisian architects who had never visited the towns in which these structures would be placed. Before intervening, a good architect ought to live in the city, walk its streets, use its services, and talk to its people. Modern times had special needs: “A renewed action, a virile will, and a reflective spirit will be necessary everywhere. Resuscitated cities must become perfect instruments, adapted to all of life’s needs.”

In Morocco, Lyautey and his team sought and partially achieved the latitude to expropriate property, levy taxes, and coordinate land-use policies which proponents of “enlightened, neo-conservative” Musée-Social urbanism were vainly advocating in France. It was in Morocco, under Lyautey’s leadership, that France’s first comprehensive experiments in urban planning took place. While sharing the Musée Social’s social paternalism, Lyautey looked to a complex juxtaposition of modern city planning with traditional Moroccan cities and their inherent social hierarchies (both encompassed by a national strategy of development) as the social field within which a controlled diversity might be constructed and regulated. With the socialists, Lyautey was outraged by uncontrolled speculation and felt the need for regional coordination of services; he also concurred that local communities should serve as social anchors for national policies concerning social needs. He also adopted such innovative technical proposals as the expropriation scheme Maurice Halbwachs prepared for the socialist party. The rest of Lyautey’s politics and outlook differed dramatically from those of the socialists.

The protectorate form (like paternalism) employs a rhetoric of cooperation, progress, and mutual accommodation. Lyautey pushed this form further than most. But he was not ready to face the question posed about his policies by a professor at the University of California at Berkeley in 1933: “What does happen when superiority is not sufficiently recognized, and what would happen should it disappear through the success of Euro-
pean tutelage?" The colonial situation was characterized by a false fraternité, the denial of égalité (in the sense of advancement through merit) due to French defense of national interests as well as to Moroccan elites who made no pretense to equality with their countrymen, and the absence of liberté, when neither French nor Moroccans had a right to any real political participation in deciding their fates. Under such conditions (and these were the ones that existed), a protectorate shifts from being an idea of government and becomes a device appropriately analyzed as a social technology.

Nonetheless, Lyautey did propose the problem of what norms and what forms of difference could coexist in the modern world. His search for a form within which the "spectacle of a congregation of humanity where men, so unlike in origins, dress, occupations, and race, continue, without abdicating any of their individual conceptions, their search for a common ideal, a common reason to live" is still valid.

Which social, aesthetic, ethical, and political forms could bring modernity and difference into a common frame is a problem, it is worth underlining, which persists today in Morocco, France and elsewhere.

Invasion and Protectorate

After Madagascar, Lyautey had returned (with a promotion) to the boredom of French garrison life. Again frustrated and restless, he activated his Parisian contacts and had Charles Jonnart, Governor General of Algeria, appoint him in 1903 to a delicate command in Ain Sefra, the southern region of Algeria bordering on Morocco. The border skirmishes and mobile tribal factions moving back and forth across the disputed frontiers enmeshed Lyautey and the French in larger contemporary European colonial politics. Without discussing in detail the extraordinarily complex diplomatic and political maneuvers that led to the French conquest of Morocco, suffice it to say that cat-and-mouse games continued throughout the period. Lyautey led his troops in and out of Morocco several times, in clear and conscious violation of international treaties. A series of incidents probably provoked by the French in Casablanca and Marrakech in 1907 were used as excuses to bombard Casablanca. Following these clashes, Lyautey made his first official visit to Morocco in December 1907, when he was sent to inspect the French troops who had landed in Casablanca. With Jonnart he formulated a plan to establish a protectorate in Morocco, thereby settling the Algerian border questions and "completing" the work of French imperialism in North Africa.

During this period Lyautey was consulted on Moroccan policy with some regularity by the reformist-socialist Minister of War, Alexandre Millerand, whose admission to the cabinet had sparked debate and caused division over the relationship of socialism to electoral politics. Poincaré, replacing Caillaux, forced the Moroccan sultan Moulay Hafid to sign a protectorate treaty on March 30, 1912. Under the treaty, France was obliged to appoint not just the head of a military mission but also a resident-general. The majority of the cabinet preferred a civilian appointment. However, with an uprising in Fez, the balance tipped the other way. A meeting of the cabinet was held on April 27. None other than Léon Bourgeois made the crucial arguments for a military appointment. The question was who should fill the position. Millerand succeeded in promoting Lyautey who, at the age of fifty-seven, became the first resident-general of Morocco. He succeeded in driving a column of troops from Algeria to Fez and then into the city itself. Although the military pacification of the tribes would not be completed for another twenty years, the protectorate was in place.

The First World War was an extremely trying period for Lyautey. The Germans (apparently with explicit orders) burned his family chateau in Lorraine, destroying his personal archives as well as the material traces of his "ancestral" ties to Lorraine. His sister's husband was killed early in the war; shortly thereafter, Antonin de Margerie, his closest childhood friend, died prematurely, as did Albert de Mun, with whom Lyautey had reestablished cordial relations. Lyautey was divided in his loyalties and ambitions between assuring the success of the protectorate and returning to France to play a major role in the war. Several of his close colleagues in Morocco had been recalled to France and appointed to high posts. Lyautey
knew the protectorate was extremely fragile: the entire central area of Morocco was in rebellion, and the cities could easily join in. While the protectorate offered Lyautey the possibility of a major accomplishment at the end of his career, the real center of military and political action and reward was in Europe. Lyautey was not without his enemies, and Parisian wisdom in the early stages of the war saw that he was kept at a distance, in Morocco. Having no other option, and hoping his time would come, Lyautey assumed a stoic profile.

In Morocco, military pacification of the tribes took center stage. Lyautey's pacification doctrine bore early fruit: from 1912 to 1914 the pacified areas were contained. Large numbers of Moroccan and other colonial troops fought valiantly for the French in Europe. While colonialism had never enjoyed wide public support in France, the troops' loyalty played a significant role in improving the image of the colonies after the war. Lyautey organized a series of expositions in Morocco to stimulate economy as well as to promote confidence in French Morocco's future. Biographers like Le Révérend breathlessly recount the effect these fairs supposedly had on the Moroccans; in June 1915, a rebel chief in the north agreed to surrender if he was authorized to visit the fair in Casablanca. Lyautey, as was his practice, received him publicly with full honors. This honorable surrender (Lyautey had learned from Gallieni how to stage such surrenders) no doubt explained the incident more than the chief's purported fascination with modern tractors. It is worth noting the increasing skill with which Lyautey used modern publicity techniques as political tools to mold French opinion.

From the beginning, Lyautey's relationship with the colon community in Morocco was strained. The French press in Algeria, judging him too sympathetic to the Muslims, had vigorously campaigned against him. Newspaper charges of his homosexuality corresponded with his marriage to the wife of a colonel killed in the war, who played an active and visible role in assisting him in social welfare affairs. From the outset, Lyautey alienated the local French press in Morocco by opposing the entry of large numbers of agricultural colonists, fearing their effect on racial relations: "As much as I can rely on certain industrialists and merchants, certain of my agricultural colonists have the mentality of wild beasts." His views of the former, however, were significantly less glowing when it came to land speculation in Casablanca. Lyautey's choice of Rabat over Casablanca as the French capital was directly related to the strength of these same industrial and commercial interests in Casablanca. Lyautey wanted a colony he could run on his own terms.

Throughout his career Lyautey was certain that the arts of government he deployed in the colonies were also applicable in France. He dreamt of leading a centralized, rationalized, and authoritarian war government, engaging all three estates, of "all of the vital forces of the nation for the war effort: infrastructures, materials, factories, harvests, new army recruits, finances, foreign propaganda, all forward looking." Lyautey repeatedly contrasted his vision of a self-sacrificing, elite, team effort with the bickering, indecision, and pettiness which he and many of his generation, on the left as well as the right, saw as the essence of the parliamentary regime.

On December 10, 1916 Lyautey received the telegram for which he had been restlessly waiting, offering him the post of Minister of War. If he accepted, what would be the consequences for Morocco? The message came from Aristide Briand. Overjoyed, Lyautey telegraphed back a conditional acceptance, learning immediately via the press that his appointment had already been announced. He also learned that the Ministry of War had been divided into three parts—war, transport and supplies, and arms production—without his consultation. Lyautey was assured that the three sections would remain under his authority. Lyautey maintained untroubled relations with Albert Thomas and his team of socialists in the arms production section; his major disagreements were with the military. Lyautey arrived in Paris on December 22 to find Joffre dismissed as head of the general staff and replaced by General Nivelle, who had already drawn up an ambitious (and catastrophic) plan for a renewed offensive strategy. The trap was clear; Lyautey was merely to mask the plans of others. On March 14, 1917 he fell into another ambush, clumsily and indignantly refusing to answer parliamentary questions on his
plans for aviation on the grounds that information had consistently leaked to the Germans. In a stormy parliamentary session he was accused of preparing a dictatorship. After eleven weeks of his ministry, lacking support as well as the skills necessary for Parisian struggles, Lyautey resigned. When Nivelle’s plans proved disastrous, Clemenceau was called to head a government instituting the coordination of powers Lyautey had proposed. After two months of recuperation in Vichy, Lyautey returned in May 1917 to his post in Morocco, which he held for eight years before being deposed by none other than Marshal Pétain.

From the Classical Self to the Modern Subject

Lyautey returned to the question of social hierarchy time and time again during his life. The problem had three aspects for him: the identification of an elite, the problem of form, and the valorization of social difference. Although Lyautey had identified the problem of modern elites as early as 1891 in his article on the “Rôle Social de l’Officier,” it was only during the Moroccan period that he began to employ the term “aristocracy” with any consistency. During periods of stagnancy and personal doubt, he indulged in fabricating an aristocratic genealogy for himself. To prove his royal blood, he traced his maternal line back twenty-two generations to Saint Louis. This attachment to the symbolism of bloodlines was deep in him. At other times, Lyautey knew that blood as a principle of legitimation for a modern elite was, at the very best, a dubious fiction which he manipulated to serve his own ends. His criticism of the aristocratic officer corps and its bourgeois imitators was too merciless to permit lapsing permanently into these reveries.

Lyautey knew that merit was the only source of legitimacy for an elite in the modern world. But how could one identify this elite, and how could it be reconciled with modern democracy? Speaking to an association of students, Lyautey struggled to define the modern elite so as to correspond with an aristocracy: “Aristocrat comes from the word aristoi-krates, which doesn’t mean the ‘nobles’ in the sense of a caste, but the best, the elite. 

Krates means power. Therefore, aristoi-krates means power exercised by the best, from above.” Written in 1930, the almost parenthetical “from above” revealed his abandonment of even the vestiges of democratic political participation. Rejecting equality, Lyautey substituted a paternalistic démo-phile: “I love the people, among whom I live. But if I love with all my heart, it is as a protector (patron) and not a democrat.” In 1920, at the height of his Moroccan experience, but following his disastrous experiences in the French Ministry, Lyautey wrote to his friend Paul Desjardins, “I have the dogma of social hierarchies in my blood, and all of my life, all of the practices of government have duly strengthened these sentiments in me.” Such common goals of health, vitality, justice, and beauty could only be actualized through a social hierarchy guided by an elite.

Le Révérend presents an anecdotal explanation of Lyautey’s stubborn opposition to representative democracy: Lyautey’s long absences from France. A stronger case lies in the problem of norms and forms. Lyautey’s principle of legitimacy was still based on connecting virtuous character with social forms through which this virtue could be actualized. Lyautey was still playing on the registers of representation and character, attempting to provide an anchor for modern society. One of Lyautey’s close collaborators in Morocco, George Hardy (a geographer and head of the protectorate’s educational services), was at pains to distinguish Lyautey from Barrès. Hardy maintained that although their language at times sounded familiar, their attitudes were profoundly different. Barrès’s traditionalism concealed resignation; Lyautey respected tradition but was totally opposed to such backward-looking, nostalgic resignation. Conservatism for Lyautey required incessant action. Lyautey was not ready to take the next step, to cross the threshold into full-blown modernism: from an elite legitimated by character (ethical superiority, service, and discipline) to one based on purely technical qualifications. Lyautey’s team, motivated by a dynamic esprit de corps, was not yet a technocracy.

Lyautey was generally lucid about the fictional and rhetorical character of genealogical exercises. During the latter part of his
life he understood the symbolic importance of his aristocratic fiction and its function in modern society, hence the importance this aristocratic discourse assumed in the biographies he commissioned. When he told his most important biographer—André Maurois—"you have invented me," he neglected to add (though certainly understood) that he had long since mastered the task. Throughout the course of his life Lyautey was self-conscious about his style, holding that "Form is a clear sign of character; appearance reflects intellectual and moral breeding."12 Lyautey's self-invention was based on rigorous self-discipline and on carefully staged public appearances. Like Baudelaire, Lyautey was a dandy, maintaining a personal and social elegance amid the banalities of modern life. He understood that his persona was more than personal; it was an important component of the social arts of government.

His mise-en-forme (fashioning) of all aspects of life—from his dress, to his marriage, to his home, to his team, to the architectural forms of the protectorate—was orchestrated with increasing agility and desperation. Lyautey had integrated a theatricality of self, work, authority, and order into his political strategy. By the time he arrived to take command of Morocco, this modern theater was part of his program. His restless attention to all details of the protectorate, from his own demeanor to the form of the cities, was more than a quirk of personality. The milieu was no neutral backdrop; it was the semantically rich product of history. Giving the protectorate a visible form was a political task of the first rank. The reconstitution of Morocco's architectural patrimony (for example, the preservation of the décor artistique) was more than a question of attracting tourists (although the economic and political interest in tourism was considered). Lyautey believed, in a last whisper of the Baroque, that appearance was at least functionally equivalent to being. Reconstruction was thus an essential component of pacification, including the pacification of the French.13

Lyautey's vision of political order turned on the perpetual manipulation of appearance before an audience both Moroccan and French. It was, in fact, Lyautey's bulwark against direct political participation on the part of either population. The protectorate form justified prohibiting the hated French parliamentarianism. Writing to Jonnart, the former Governor General of Algeria, Lyautey vented his spleen against the French:

Depraved and blind to the true meaning of the Protectorate, to the legitimate rights of the natives, the colonists claim for themselves all the rights of Frenchmen, behaving as conquerors in a conquered land, disdaining the laws and institutions of a people which exists, owns, keeps accounts, which wants to live and which does not intend to let itself be despoiled or enslaved. This becomes evident in the violence and animal belligerence characteristic of the French electorate; the result is an asphyxiating atmosphere.14

Lyautey denied the French political participation by defending the Moroccans; he defended the lack of Moroccan participation by invoking his respect for the hierarchical character of their institutions.

The society Lyautey sought to create, the society he hoped would spring to life in his new cities, was doubly hierarchical. Moroccan society exhibited a viable hierarchy: the requisite social forms existed, as did the range of virtues necessary to activate them. During the course of Moroccan history, an order had gradually defined social and spatial forms. Lyautey's adherence to the protectorate form (rather than to a doctrine of assimilative colonization) derived from this evaluation; the task consisted in identifying and strengthening these existing social forms and practices. He laid down the following imperatives: "Vex not tradition, leave custom be. Never forget that in every society there is a class to be governed, and a natural-born ruling class upon whom all depends. Link their interests to ours."15 It was time to introduce a technical modernity, with its advantages of hygiene and science, so as to reawaken Morocco's dormant energies without destroying its social forms.

This rhetoric of tradition was part wish-fulfillment, part strategy, and part rhetoric—meant to move an audience—and must not be taken too literally. Lyautey was in no position to adopt a contemplative Orientalism; he was no Pierre Loti in uniform.16 Lyautey was a conservative and not a reactionary; he knew perfectly well that Morocco was undergoing an inexorable process of change. The challenge was to find forms that
would preserve social hierarchy and its associated character structure through the coming turbulence. Lyautey's strategy was to renovate Moroccan society by transforming its elite. The problem lay not in identifying this elite but in finding French agents with sufficient knowledge of the country and the requisite character to orchestrate a direct, but highly formal, modernization of the Moroccan nobility (who would then guide the rest of society): "It is through this agent, in continual contact with the native chief, that the chief's horizons will gradually broaden, and, through him, that of the people; it is through the agent's efforts that we will implant, little by little, our ideas of justice, humanity and progress." For Lyautey the thorny problem was the social practices and the character of the French. He frequently combined a rhetoric of despair with indulgence for the Moroccans: "I have come out of this with an unspeakable contempt for my compatriots. I no longer work for any other cause than that of rationality and history, for Morocco in itself—and also for dear Muslim Morocco which has preserved all the traditions which I respect, all of the social ideas I share." 

What form could a modern hierarchy take? Lyautey's program of building the villes nouvelles adjacent to Morocco's older cities maintained Moroccan cities close to, but separate from, modern French settlements. Neither the norms nor the forms involved in this strategy were universals. As Lyautey's head of education put it, the French task in Morocco "should not in any way be confused with this 'civilizing mission.'" The theatricality of tradition, it was hoped, would present a constant social and moral stage to the French. If there was a civilizing mission, its target was the French. The problem was embodying the norms of science and art while creating an environment in which politics would not destroy the possibility of social hierarchy. At the heart of Lyautey's strategy was the problem of how to govern this doubly hierarchical situation. Precautions had to be taken: "There are two kinds of people from whom I wish at all cost to protect Morocco: the expropriators and the missionaries." If these groups were excluded, a well-tempered modernity would have a chance of success. While the two solutions were different, their association, Lyautey dreamed, would be complementary.

Leaving aside the fictive Moroccan society Lyautey's discourse projected, a question remains: What would a modernized Moroccan society look like? Lyautey has been appropriately criticized for his limited provision of modern public facilities for the Moroccans (schools, adequate health facilities, and representative institutions), and such criticism is valid. Whatever credibility this form of government had under Lyautey, under his successors it was little more than a facade masking non-action, neglect, and inequality. As Jacques Berque has pointed out, the discrepancy between the money spent on the old and new cities was immense. Between 1912 and 1924, 36.5 kilometers of sewers were built in the new cities of Casablanca, Fez, and Rabat, while only 4.3 kilometers were built in the older sections of the same cities. But the most telling flaw was the static conception of the space allotted to the Moroccans. Despite all the rhetoric of modernization, no provisions for growth or change were made.

Lest our anti-colonial hindsight become too sanctimonious, Daniel Rivet, in his monumental thesis on Lyautey in Morocco, documents the strong preference of Moroccan "notables" for a sanctuary away from the impure space of the Christian invaders. Such preferences were transmitted to Lyautey, who was all too eager to comply. He prohibited Europeans from entering mosques, a statute or custom which had not previously existed in either Morocco or Algeria. Further, it should not be forgotten that the spatial segregation of populations by religion was a central component of traditional Moroccan urban space. In addition to the desire of the Muslim elite to live apart from the Christian invaders, and the fact that many rural migrants found recognizable social networks already in place, a revealing bit of data indicates how Moroccans of the period viewed the twin-city ideal. The Jeunes Marocains, the sons of the notables toward whom Lyautey directed his policies, penned the first "Plan de Réformes Marocaines," denouncing the favoritism shown to the French but not criticizing the system of dual cities. In fact, the two types of citadinité coexisted until the Second
Lyautey formulated his social mission as follows: "to rip France from its current decomposition and ruin, through a violent reaction to its practices [moeurs], its inertias, its complacencies, by forming a more and more numerous group of the strong, unself-interested initiators, those who view things from on high." The agenda called for the invention of new forms of governmentality through which to reshape the fatally decadent and individualistic tendencies of the French. This was why the cities of Morocco were of such importance in Lyautey's eyes; they offered a way to avoid the impasses both of the metropole and of Algeria. Lyautey's famous dictum—"a construction site is worth a battalion"—was meant literally. Lyautey feared that if the French were allowed to continue practicing politics as usual, the results would be catastrophic. A directly political solution, however, was not at hand. What was urgently required was a new scientific and strategic social art; only in this way could politics be sublated—and power truly ordered.

The Most Modern Legislation

In April 1914, the first comprehensive urban-planning legislation in the French world, containing all the basic principles of Musée Social urbanism, was decreed in Morocco. It differed in two distinct ways from the French planning laws eventually passed after the First World War. The first was its principle of separating native cities from new cities (although variants of class and historical separation had been included in Musée Social discussions). The second was its means of implementing the legislation: by decree, not parliamentary legislation (resulting in massive and rapid expropriation); and by combining local responsibility for implementation with a limitation of local rights. The law included a vast number of regulations stipulating the width of streets, alignment of buildings, the height and construction of buildings, and architectural standards concerning color, style, and so on. A second law passed six months later gave the Protectorate extensive rights to install a technical infrastructure ensuring hygiene and services. A third law proposed property-holders' associations in each quarter, with joint responsibility for meeting zoning and architectural require-

ments. The government retained the right to substitute other land for that which it expropriated for large projects. All Moroccan cities were required to produce a Plan Directeur. None of these laws existed in France.

All cities were to be planned, ensuring control over future growth. In order to control speculation, once a plan (for an entire city and its quarters) was established, it was to be made public; during a one month period objections could be registered. After this short delay, a decree would be passed legalizing the plan. The scope and authority of each plan was total; its "public utility" clause was comprehensive. Everything falling within its boundaries was required to meet modern standards, even when these were not detailed in the planning document itself. For example, although the plan only specified the major road system, all the minor roads had to meet the code. Building permits were granted only if plans met the most rigorous water, sewage, and aesthetic standards. Strict regulations concerning architectural style in both the villes nouvelles and the medinas were defined. These last considerations were absent from French planning laws even after World War I.

Hubert de la Casinière, head of the Service du Contrôle des Municipalités du Maroc, argued that, lacking any means of implementation, the French urban-planning legislation had remained entirely Platonic; he boasted that in Morocco, where the administration was unconstrained by electoral contingencies, it would be possible to take action. In Morocco the task was not to invent principles but to apply them comprehensively. The main obstacle to achieving this goal was private property, which was to be controlled by means of administrative decrees in the name of the public interest. Lyautey was not restrained by a constitution, a parliament, or a Conseil d'État. Only in Morocco were the conditions of authority such that private interests could never block a project serving the public good; the Moroccan municipal legislation gave the administration almost total latitude. De la Casinière bluntly, if defensively, asserted that only in such a regime could such dramatic progress have been made in so short a time.

Special expropriation legislation was passed on August 31, 1914, permitting expropriation by zones; not only the buildings
immediately concerned but all those in the zone could be expropriated either to prevent speculation or to ensure health or aesthetic qualities. Power to expropriate property for the public good, to control speculation, and to retain for the collectivity profits from improvements was granted. Zoning by function was mandated (including extensive powers to establish no-building zones). Property values were to be fixed previous to the publication of the plan. Expropriation procedures differed from those in France; instead of letting a jury of peers decide on the level of indemnification, this power was given to a judge, as was the power to declare negative indemnifications if other profits accrued to the owner from the planning improvements. De la Casinière cited, as an example of the efficiency of the Moroccan legislation, the construction in 1922 of the boulevard of the 4e Zouaves in Casablanca. In Prost’s plan, this boulevard constituted the major axis of downtown Casablanca, linking the port and a proposed central Place de France by means of a broad avenue. However, part of the proposed avenue (a symbol of modernity linking commerce and industry as well as marking entry into Casablanca) was already lined with a variety of Moroccan buildings. In France, negotiations with individual owners would have dragged on for years; in Morocco, Lyautey applied the expropriation powers, and within four months the boulevard was under construction. The procedures were both authoritarian and effective.

A royal decree or Dahir of August 12, 1913 called for immatriculation of land in accordance with the Australian Torrens Act (a model long advocated by the Musée Social), which required all land to be registered, all deeds established, and the rights and obligations of both the administration and local landowners specified. This decree brought all urban land under the French property system and was the subject of all the predictable abuses. Provisions were made for land to be expropriated for public purposes, with the profits from the sale of the land to be used to pay for site improvements (roads, lighting, water, and drains). This was essentially the procedure advocated by Halbwachs and his socialist allies in the Cahiers du Socialiste, which had been consistently opposed in France.

Following an idea proposed by the Musée Social, a law of November 10, 1917 established and assigned broad powers and duties to local property holders’ associations. These associations were granted the power to redistribute property to meet the requirements of local plans. In effect, this provision meant that at least temporarily all the property within each jurisdiction was treated legally as if it were communally owned. For example, if the plan called for a road to be cut through its quarter, an association was required to draw up a plan for indemnification of its members. The government provided a technical specialist to assist them. The association did not have the power to block the proposed project; its rights were limited to the discussion of indemnities. Only fully registered properties were protected, forcing compliance with the decree. This provision opened the door to significant abuse, particularly concerning the rights of Moroccan property holders. The first test of these provisions, carried out in Casablanca, revealed some shortcomings, and the first modification was to divide the city into neighborhoods. The initial application seems to have been mechanical, not taking into account the differences in value of different buildings (i.e., that corner buildings were better business locations). A formula was devised to rectify this: more technical aid was recommended and in certain instances more generous indemnification. Political complaints were simply recast as technical problems: changes were made to perfect the technical components so as to undercut the charges of arbitrariness while not deviating from the principles of comprehensive planning and obligatory local participation in the plan.

Hubert de la Casinière defended the separation of quarters on hygienic terms: the habits of the lower classes propagated epidemics. Islamic fatalism, he continued, insured that pre-Protectorate Morocco had no notion of public health. Hence the priority given to the political and humanitarian work of French hygienists. As early as November 1912, Lyautey created municipal hygiene bureaus. In 1915 additional legislation was passed; its comprehensive goals included fighting epidemics and contagious diseases, collecting sanitary and health statistics, enforcing housing and urban-hygiene provisions (particularly
for industrial settings), providing medical assistance and food, and surveilling prostitutes. Individuals violating hygienic principles were held legally responsible for the charges necessitated to correct the abuses. To avoid epidemics, further statutes gave the municipality practically unlimited powers of entry into houses, and of prescribing mandatory rectifications. A principle of “public responsibility” was invented and enforced. The goal, de la Casinière insisted, was not segregation for its own sake. He criticized plans—in Fez and Meknes—in which the new city and the medina were spatially separated by too great a distance, requiring expensive transportation networks to link the two populations.

Guillaume de Tarde, another urbanist, attempted to defend Lyautey’s policy as one of degree: “Separation, yes, but not radical separation. This is not a kind of contemptuous attitude toward the native city (an attitude which I think is the English approach).” When the main function of separation of populations was surveillance and domination, the principle became nefarious. The English model of separation only reinforced a dangerous paucity of social contacts. Upon reading Kipling, de Tarde realized that British colonialism was essentially a “structure of police intelligence.” If the British citizen wanted distance, and therefore required police information, the Frenchman “loved the excitement of social life, thanks to which he knows what’s going on.” European cities should be built close enough for contact, but not so close as to absorb the native city. Deciding how this should be accomplished required the art of the urbanist, who was called upon to integrate adroitly local social realities in a successful plan.

Islands of Modern Civilization

Lyautey’s urbanism set ambitious goals. The proposed responsibilities of municipal administration extended to “the organization of agglomerated social life.” The task, reminiscent of that of eighteenth-century police, was particularly challenging in a new city with no history, customs, or social practices. De la Casinière performed a discursive ground-clearing operation. First, he made clear the differences between Moroccan and French history. Previously Moroccan administration had been bereft of administrative tools for hygiene and other essential municipal services. To the extent that these services had been provided, it had been done by the habous or charitable religious foundation. Municipal administration had no control over its own resources; its inability to plan marked its archaism. The “egregious ‘Orientalist’ insistence on Morocco’s supposedly isolated and static history was shared by all the Moroccan planners from Prost through the Le Corbusian Michel Ecchoard.

If the Moroccans had shown themselves incapable of inventing the administrative and scientific tools of modern municipal life, an opposite threat to modernity was posed by Europeans who flocked to Morocco to make their fortune. Casablanca was portrayed by the planners as suffering from the California or Wild-West syndrome: each boat brought “those undesirables down to new countries where everything remains to be done.” The “anarchy” produced by these people demanded mobilizing science and art to regularize the situation.

It also apparently demanded the elimination of representative political institutions. The strategy was control from above, legitimate as a means of ensuring the common good. While de la Casinière juxtaposed the archaism of Moroccan administration with the modernity of French planners, the key distinction in municipal legislation was between truly modern legislation and the sclerotic institutions of France. France’s elected municipal councils—in the eyes of de la Casinière a paralyzed and confused mixture of political assemblies and bureaucrats—had too often posed obstacles. Imitating the French model was not the path to efficient, modern rule: “It would be a mistake to try to transplant the organs of an old society into a new country.” The goal was to create “isles of modern civilization.” For Lyautey and his team, this meant exploiting the latest physical and social technology and avoiding politics. It has been pointed out that the characteristic feature of the protectorate system was the desire to erase the line between executive and legislative (not to mention parliamentary) powers. This temptation, as we shall see, spanned the political spectrum, albeit with differing degrees of regret over the price to be paid.
Rabat: Capital

During the course of 1913, with the military situation still very much in question, Lyautey debated the choice of the capital city, pondering the relative advantages and disadvantages of Fez, Rabat, and Casablanca. Although he chose Rabat, he was adamant that no single city should dominate the country. The royal city of Fez with its cultivated bourgeoisie, merchants, and scholars would continue to play an important economic and cultural role, as would Casablanca, designated Morocco's economic capital. Lyautey intended to link these cities in a functional, national network. Rabat would be "the factory headquarters. The first condition of operation for any enterprise is that its nerve centers function freely, that management [la direction], whether it be of a factory, a trading company, or an army headquarters, be installed under the best possible conditions and that all the elements be organized in close proximity."

In October 1912 a state architect named Petit was sent out from Algiers to sketch a plan for Rabat. Lyautey was furious: Petit's circulation plan was thoroughly inadequate; his scheme provided no control over speculation or building styles. By the end of 1913, the military situation was sufficiently under control (at least on the coast) for Lyautey to turn his attention to planning matters. Urging "a well-ordered, logical city plan, adapted to local conditions," Lyautey turned to Prost. Prost recounts how the discussions of the plans became "political and technical councils, gathered together under the chairmanship of the Resident Général, engaging central and local civil services, engineers, architects and doctors, and anyone whose personal experiences were liable to shed light on the many issues at hand." The social ambience of the plan's production, although mentioned in almost every participant's memoirs, has not been commented on by historians. Lyautey was highly conscious of orchestrating pressure and sociality. Anyone who doubted the value of the effort would not last long under these circumstances. A group élan and mutual investment in the overall result were Lyautey's means of avoiding the despised bureaucratic mentality of France.

Distribution of Functions, Theater of Limits

The sense of urgency was counterbalanced by an awareness of the need for technically proficient preparation. It was essential to remap the terrain topographically before preparing alignment plans for each quarter and the decrees implementing those plans. The recruitment and training of specialized personnel to implement the plans caused delays, as did fiscal constraints. The basic plan was not implemented until 1924 and more or less completed by 1930. This delay encouraged speculation in Rabat and in similar situations elsewhere. The most modern construction standards were imposed; height of buildings was determined by the width of avenues; open space and views from the buildings were fixed; and, above all, zoning was specified in detail. Rabat was to be linked with Casablanca (and other cities) on several levels, one of which was a national network of roads connected to the internal circulation pattern of each city. A modern rail system was planned and embedded in the city's structure.

The main administrative area was located away from the sea, running between the walls of the old medina and the sultan's palace. The European commercial district was set on largely undeveloped land in the triangle between the old medina, the sultan's palace, and the future headquarters of the resident-general. A military quarter was planned but not built; an industrial zone and further residential zones were planned and eventually realized. Circulation between these zones was organized around two perpendicular systems of roads. The first was a continuation of the road linking Casablanca and Fez, which bifurcated as it entered the Western section of the new city, with one part continuing along the outside of the medina and the other leading up to the imperial palace. The second system was composed along a north-south axis linking the old medina to the residence and the palace.

Prost included a system of parks and public gardens absent in Casablanca. Lyautey sought efficiency and beauty: "You will arrange this busy hive in such a way as to avoid making barracks. It should be attractive and cheerful; no enormous constructions, but, as much as possible, pavilions swimming in
greenery, conveniently linked by arcades or pergolas." The main avenue of the city was planned to contain all the major services (including an underground railroad station). Prost, perhaps inspired by Garnier, built an underground system of tracks leading to the rail station. This administrative core was to be a center of circulation in all senses of the term. Stylistic control was rigorous but inventive: conceived to facilitate communication among government services and to permit expansion, it included an extensive arcade punctuated by gardens, kiosks, fountains, and pergolas, so as to create a calm and intimate atmosphere for administrative activity. An architectural critic hostile to the political dimensions of Prost's project described the work as enormously refined, saying that Prost's office arrangements could be taken as models for the modern city.

Prost's plan envisioned an eventual population of 50,000 Europeans. The European presence in Rabat grew largely as a function of the Protectorate's administrative services, and hence was easier to regulate than that of Casablanca. The area planned for the European city was ten times that of the medina; European quarters surrounded the medina, prohibiting its expansion. This was one of Prost's major mistakes, as it ensured eventual overcrowding in the medina. Although neglected, the medina was not left unaltered. Its major thoroughfares were paved to facilitate the movement of goods, as well as for hygienic reasons. A certain amount of embellishment (e.g., tiles around fountains) was undertaken as part of Lyautey's economic and social policy of recreating an urban artisanal class. Stylistic controls were put into effect by means of a Dahir of February 13, 1914. An area of 250 meters around the medina was declared a no-building zone. A triangular park and adjacent cemetery extended the open space. This large area has been described as a cordon sanitaire. Indeed, as with Haussmann's avenues, the potential military, police, and circulation functions of such an open area are evident; Prost was continuing a tradition with this spatial arrangement. The slow but sustained move toward separating cultures had already begun in other parts of North Africa. The first urbanist operations in Algeria were motivated primarily by military considerations. Restrictions on building and movement followed directly from these concerns. By mid-century, as the conquest solidified, the desire for wide, densely-planted avenues, grand monuments, hospitals, and other European forms led to new interventions in the older urban fabric. The doctrine of two separate and opposed urban forms had not, however, been formulated, and only came into its own in Tunisia in the 1880s. Administrative services were placed on one side of the old city of Tunis, and the European commercial quarters on the other. There was differentiation but not rupture. It was not until the city plans of 1919 that the separation became official. Although Tunis's urbanist, Valensi, devoted more attention and resources to developing a modern infrastructure for the medina than did Prost, the results were the same: the medina's growth was limited, resulting in overcrowding and museumification.

François Béguin, in a striking turn of phrase, referred to the retention of the walls of Moroccan cities and the large open zones adjoining them as a "theatralization of limits." But one wonders what kind of theater was intended. For authors like Janet Abu-Lughod, Prost's plans were a theater of apartheid. One could just as aptly call this space a theatralization of urban diversity. It served not only as a safety zone and segregative space, but as an intercultural meeting ground where many cafes, small shops, and a bus terminal were located. Over the years the supposed cordon sanitaire functioned as one of the more socially active areas of the city. As Halbwachs had proven in Paris, the real actors were social groups who improvised on the script planners and emperors had provided for them. In modern theater, the boundary between the stage, the actors, and the spectators is often blurred.

Monuments

In the early days of the protectorate, French scholars busily conducted detailed archaeological, architectural, and topographic surveys of Morocco before the actual invasion and conquest. As Edmund Burke has shown, the period leading up to conquest was characterized by high-quality research and an im-
pressive objectivity and openness toward Morocco and other Muslim countries. Louis Mercier’s description of Rabat at the turn of the century offers a particularly rich example of this type of inquiry. Lyautey proceeded on the assumption that the particularities of each case should guide local policy. Anticipating Clifford Geertz and Edward Said, in 1927 Lyautey argued against attributing a trans-historical, trans-cultural essence to the Orient; there were Moslems, but no “general Islamic experience.”

Lyautey fought actively for the preservation of notable buildings. The Service des Beaux-Arts et des Monuments Historiques was created in November 1912, directed by the artist Maurice Tranchant de Lunel. The Service sought to preserve not only individual buildings but an “ensemble of construction.” In Rabat the choice of sites to be protected included the Casbah des Oudaia, a walled-off quarter where royal troops had been lodged. The Mosque and Hassan Tower complex, vestige of an immense mosque begun by the Almohade sultan, lay in ruins on an open field. It had been parcelled out to individual owners, and someone had even built a tennis court close by. The Service acquired the land, commissioned studies, and saw that the essential reconstruction was accomplished. An area of 50 meters around it was declared a no-building zone, and new buildings in a much larger surrounding area were restricted in height to 8 meters. By strict restoration of the individual buildings and of the site itself, the French turned these “artistic vestiges of a shining civilization” into monuments. The groundwork was laid for tourism, the museumification of Moroccan culture, and a new historical consciousness.

A city-wide policy of architectural control over Moroccan construction was instituted, and was applied also to French construction. The goal was to avoid a pastiche of Algerian “moorish” styles, characterized as “world’s fair decor,” as well as the individualism of suburban kitsch. The service sought to define a French architecture adapted to Moroccan conditions. Even in Rabat the control achieved was not total. Some of the poorer European quarters were characterized by the banlieue-de-Paris eclecticism Prost and Lyautey so detested. It is worth noting that Moroccan Jews and Muslims moved out of the medina and lived alongside the poorer French in these peripheral quarters. As the major lines of Prost’s plan became clear, speculative and uncontrolled building occurred. In 1917 Lyautey used the construction of a commercial and agricultural fair (adjacent to the palace) and a tramline built to transport visitors as a means of developing a whole new quarter, as well as of orienting construction along the stylistic lines he valued. He succeeded in creating a large park and university buildings and in defining the quarter as a choice location for luxurious villas. Wealthy Moroccans hired Lyautey’s architects to erect modern villas there. Class separation was emerging and ethnic separation was general, but neither amounted to apartheid.

Limits

Even the harshest critics of Lyautey’s colonial aims concede that Rabat’s extension was an aesthetic success. Abu-Lughod writes: “There is no doubt that the master plan drawn up by Henri Prost was impressive. Existing features of pre-1913 Rabat were sensitively integrated into the scheme and were used as the basis for a rational organization of the newer quarters.” Socially, economically, and politically, however, the plan was inadequate. Planning not only did not stem speculation but probably encouraged it. Prices in the central administrative areas rose 500 percent between 1915 and 1921, even though the main administrative buildings were all built on the sultan’s land. The political aim of control appears to have been achieved.

Why didn’t Prost plan for future growth of the Moroccan population or provide it with adequate services? At the 1931 International Conference on Colonial Urbanism, Prost lauded the political objectives of Lyautey’s urbanism. He rehearsed the list of justifications: Europeans and Muslims had different cultural habits; the protectorate was a collaboration; it was not meant to change Moroccan customs. The introduction of wide streets and a modern infrastructure of water and sewers would ruin the medina’s charm. Aside from the aesthetic and economic advantages (tourism), there were social reasons for preserving its picturesque character: it conserved Moroccan social
customs and presented an image of social hierarchy to the French. Acknowledging that his initial plans for Morocco had been overruled by events, Prost urged that the main theme of the next colonial urbanism congress be the preparation of new cities to accommodate the rural masses flooding into the cities of North Africa. The conference never took place.\(^{56}\)

The plan for Rabat itself, with its sharply drawn quarters and clearly defined zones, led over time to a certain rigidity. The first consequence was increased population density in the medina, which had been effectively boxed off (population rose 50 percent between 1912 and 1930). Crowding led to internal subdivision of housing, as more and more families were crammed into the same amount of space. Second, sauvage settlements began to appear along the foggy ocean-front areas beyond the limits of Prost’s plan. These settlements were often financed by Moroccans who plotted the quarters and named them after themselves—Lazreq, Rifai, etc. But these areas frequently lacked adequate water and sewers. To live in the quarters required some regular income, and so it was that around them even poorer Moroccans began to settle in precursors of the bidonvilles (shanty towns). In addition to his colonial arrogance, Prost’s shortsightedness was representative of this era of planning. The inability to predict change, to account for new variables such as the lure of the city (still poorly understood), and to find an adequate form to accommodate these processes, were weaknesses Prost shared with his entire cohort of planners on both the right and the left. The same processes of increasing density (resulting from underestimating growth), uncontrolled aesthetics, and hygienically substandard development were also occurring in France. This is not to deny the specificities of the colonial situation, but it does point to the more general limits of authoritarian planning by experts.

**Casablanca: City without Citizens**

Casablanca has posed problems not only for the urbanists who sought to control its growth but for those who seek to describe it. André Adam, the leading French historian of Casablanca, echoes the urbanists’ ambivalence and caution toward the city’s heterogeneous history and its less than savory inhabitants. Despite repeated statements from urbanists to the contrary, Casablanca had an incontestable past; in fact, occupation of the site has been traced to neolithic times. However, since it was never a royal city nor a major economic center, it could be said to have been a city without urbanity.

The earliest known name of the city, probably of Berber origin, was Anfa. As early as the fourteenth century Anfa had city walls, schools, and administrative officials. Its inhabitants engaged in trading and piracy. The Portuguese, already established at several sites on the Moroccan coast, sent a punitive expedition to raze the city in 1468 and again in 1469, leaving it in ruins for three centuries. The city was resurrected for strategic reasons during the last third of the eighteenth century. By about 1770, the city had acquired the name of Dar el-Beid’a (the white house), perhaps derived from the caïd’s house, a large construction whitened with chalk which doubled as a lookout tower.\(^{57}\) What the French called the old medina dated from the late eighteenth century and had been constructed essentially to complement the cannon emplacement and the garrison. The sultan built the city’s walls, military installations, and customs buildings. Neither monuments nor even a royal palace were built, and the interior arrangement of the city was left to its inhabitants. The population was initially composed of functionaries, troops, and the flux of rural people attracted by the city’s activity. There was no established, educated commercial bourgeoisie as in the major Moroccan cities of Fez and Rabat.\(^{58}\)

**Speculation, Dynamism**

The French invasion and colonization radically altered the situation. The first wave of French immigration brought economic activity, but not the kind of order pleasing to urbanists or most historians: “The citizens were Frenchmen who had built, beside the Moroccan city, a city to their own liking [à leur convenance et selon leur génie] but of the same disorderly, speculative, and soulless nature as the American boom towns.”\(^{59}\) Comparisons
with America were common. French historians continue to talk of a “gold rush,” of a chaotic, if energetic, seizing of an open frontier.

Casablanca’s dynamic commercial activity, its ethnic mix, its wide disparities of wealth and power, and its particular energy and order were evident from the early years of the century. Casa’s population had risen from 700 in 1836 to roughly 20,000 (including some 5,000 Jews) by 1907, including a floating population of 6,000 Moroccans fleeing rural drought and drawn by the city’s commercial activity. Its port was the busiest in Morocco. During the period of insecurity and invasion from 1907 to 1912, the European population of Casa exploded: from 1,000 in 1907 to 5,000 in 1909 to 20,000 in 1912 (12,000 of them French). After a 1911 accord with Germany giving the French permission to invade, the Moroccan “gold rush” accelerated; by the beginning of 1914, Casablanca housed some 31,000 Europeans (15,000 French, 6,000 Spanish, 7,000 Italians, etc.).

Two-thirds of the Europeans in Morocco lived in Casa. The Jewish population expanded rapidly, reaching 9,000 by 1912, as did the Muslim (30,000 in 1912). On the eve of the Protectorate, la bourgade miserable (the miserable market town) was thriving. From its inception, the European colony in Casablanca was particularly diverse, containing a goodly number of Italian, Maltese, and Spanish workers. Like Algiers, it attracted a substantial working-class population. Morocco’s first labor union was formed in Casablanca in 1910 by a French socialist militant who, having invested in land in the future industrial quarter, grew rich. His ambition, if not his fate, was representative. But as there was neither oil nor gold in Casa’s soil, its sources of easy fortunes were land speculation, commerce, and the port.

All speculation rested on the premise that France would conquer Morocco. Under Moroccan law and the various treaties agreed upon by the European powers and imposed on the sultan, foreigners had no right to own land. Despite this inconvenience, massive investment was made in land. The anticipation of profit was not restricted to the European community: Moroccans joined in the speculation, either alone or in joint ventures with Europeans. Speculation fed on itself, causing a massive inflation. Land prices rose as much as 600 times; certain areas of Casa were more costly than parts of Paris. These speculative forces meant that actual construction in the pre-Protectorate years was relatively slow; available money was invested in land. However, just outside the old medina, in the area between the French military camp and the Muslim cemetery (south, southeast of the port), frantic building was taking place, guided neither by aesthetics nor by hygiene.

Although the French colonial lobby, particularly Le Comité du Maroc, had been urging intervention in Morocco for some time, Casablanca’s first factory was built only in 1908. It was only with the establishment of the Protectorate and its state guarantees that major capital began to be invested (by Schneider’s Compagnie Marocaine, the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, and other banks). Commerce remained the dominant economic activity in the early years. Although the police functions for Europeans were ceded by the Spanish, from 1907 forward the French sought to establish some form of administration. At the end of August 1907, joint French/Moroccan controls were put in place, and a budget was created. By 1913 a somewhat more elaborate structure was created, having twenty members. It had very little statutory power, it served mainly as an organ for venting opinion. Nonetheless, it coexisted with a vocal, vigorous (and highly self-interested) press.

From the moment of his arrival in Morocco, Lyautey had been suspicious of Casablanca and its European inhabitants. A sustained and personal press campaign against him did not win him over to Casa’s cause: “I am aware that in my hands authority will remain inflexible and that no concessions will be made to demagogic pressures.” The circling of the sharks necessitated, he felt, a strong captain to guide the ship. In 1913, after some hesitation between Fez and Rabat and some juggling of political pressures from Paris, Lyautey made it known that Casa would not be the official capital of the Protectorate. When he announced his choice of Rabat a small fronde (rebellion) broke out in Casablanca. He stressed that the choice of Rabat was part of a larger conception of the Protectorate, i.e., that Fez would continue as the center of Moroccan tradition and that Casablanca was destined to be the economic center of
the country (Meknes was the designated agricultural center of the colon population). Lyautey’s strategy was to make Casablanca one element of a complex whole; he would do everything possible to ensure that the city prospered, but also that it did not become another Algiers. To underline his points, he had the army begin sanitary operations. Casablanca’s role was reinforced by Lyautey’s decision to construct a major port in the city. As early as 1912, against the technical advice of certain experts, Lyautey opted for a massive scheme covering 140 hectares. This was a truly spectacular gesture and posed a major technical challenge. Lyautey vigorously defended this project in Paris and was awarded funding to begin construction. Against all odds, the port was functioning by 1921.61

In 1907, the walled medina occupied some 60 hectares adjacent to the port. Immediately outside the city walls were a market area (supplementing markets in the city) and a cemetery. Near the port was a small extension of the walled city which the Sultan Moulay Hassan had built to contain the Europeans, but which they had refused to inhabit. This quarter lacked permanent residents; Moroccan troops were lodged there periodically, and a French military hospital was built there in 1907. The city itself was divided into three sections: first was the bourgeois section with the administrative headquarters, port officials, commercial houses, consuls, and Europeans, as well as the major mosque and saint’s tomb. Before 1912 this quarter was the center of European activity as well as Moroccan governmental institutions. Second was the mellah, or Jewish quarter, atypically not walled off (spatial segregation of religious communities in Morocco was hardly a French innovation; Jews had long been required to live in special sections in many Moroccan cities). In Casablanca, Jews and Muslims lived adjacent to each other on certain streets and even in certain buildings. Violence between the communities was apparently not as frequent as in other cities. The Jewish population was extremely poor; although living within the city walls, some Jews lived in tents or the first bidonvilles. This area was one of the first to be destroyed, as it was immediately adjacent to the area designed as the Place de France. The third quarter, the tnaker (a rural com-

pound surrounded by cactus), was occupied by the poorest inhabitants and was the point of entry for tribal people moving to the city. But as immigration from the countryside increased, the distinctions between these quarters blurred. An open area flanked the tnaker and functioned as a kind of public park. To the west of the medina another quarter began to form, the product of Moroccan speculation. This area was developed by wealthy Moroccans who built houses for themselves and occasional Koranic schools, and then laid out lots in straight lines meeting at right angles. Streets (being unproductive) were kept very narrow. In sum, Casablanca was highly distinctive in its mixing of populations; its peoples constantly refused spatial segregation, whether defined in terms of religion, race, ethnic group, or class.

An Indefinite Suburb in Search of its City

Initially, the European population was located around the military encampments and the market area adjacent to the medina. Speculation was the motor force of the city’s birth and growth, as well as the chief characteristic of its inhabitants’ ethos—if not that of its administrators, urbanists, and historians. In 1913 a contemporary observer captured this spirit when he compared Casablanca to “an ocean of hovels, a sort of unstructured suburb to an as yet unbuilt metropolis.”62 In the early years, investors drove land prices skyward but built comparatively little. Areas in which building and habitation did take place often reached extremely high densities, with the expected consequences. From the early days of the twentieth century, poorer people (and farsighted investors) were driven continually farther from the city center around the port and Place de France, even though substantial tracts of land remained undeveloped. The result was a spatial extension toward a continually receding periphery. One of the very first acts of the administration was to create a boulevard of four kilometers, considered disproportionately large at the time. An unintended consequence of this speculative, unplanned sprawl was the establishment of a circulation system far in excess of projected
requirements; areas located well beyond the urban perimeter were filled in during the building boom that followed the First World War.

The result was the second characteristic of Casablanca's growth: its consistent surpassing of the growth predictions of both urbanists and journalists. This dynamic, speculative sprawl led to a crisis in both the quantity and quality of housing available to the European and Moroccan populations, a crisis that continues today. It is worth mentioning that working-class, Mediterranean proletariat and subproletariat Europeans lived in bidonvilles as well as in substandard housing in the old medina. For different reasons, none of the forms of urban growth, from uncontrolled speculation, to Prost's Musée Social urbanism, to Ecochard’s “progressive” urbanism, to Moroccan state planning ever proved adequate in planning or providing for Casablanca's highly diverse citizenry. Although the modern city was born and flourished under the sign of speculation and free enterprise, its leading citizens were not above blaming the government for its problems. Typhoid and plague epidemics in the winter and spring of 1913–1914 brought calls for intervention. Profiting from this fear, and the temporary acceptance of planning measures it produced, Lyautey ordered an energetic clean-up by a military team for the littered field area around the Grand Suq, just outside the medina's walls.

Prost was given the task of creating order out of what was referred to as an already chaotic situation. Prost's plan turned on articulating the circulation network of the city and its economic functions within a zoning framework. He gave strategic importance to the placement and connections between the port and the railway station; between these poles he situated the commercial and industrial zones. Prost's plan encompassed 1,000 hectares. At a density of 150 inhabitants per hectare, this yielded a plan for 150,000 people, and led to Prost's being accused of megalomania.

Preliminary topographic and geological analysis—carried out under the pressure of speculation and increasing construction—confirmed the zoning choices. The industrial quarter (in the east and running north along the coast toward Rabat) had rocky soil, excellent for foundations and bad for gardens. In the west and southwest, the soil was richer and easier to irrigate. Wind patterns, which would carry future industrial waste away from the rest of the city, dictated the east as industrial and the west as residential. Between the two would lie two points of reference: the Place de France, the point of entry of the world (through the port) as well as the commercial center; and close by, the Place Lyautey, the administrative center. The spacious Place de France provided a focal center for the city's future commercial activity as well as an open and easily secured zone next to the old medina and port. Prost decided to take down the wall of the adjacent medina in order to enhance circulation (by means of a grand avenue leading to the port), scale, and symmetry. The Place was to house banks, commercial headquarters, luxury stores, restaurants, hotels, and concert halls.

Lyautey's decision to make Casablanca the economic pole of the country and his decision to expand the port to international scale required a major road system leading to and from the area, for commercial and industrial use as well as for symbolic grandeur and harmony. Given the existing ring-road system, Prost developed a fan-shaped system of roads centered on the port area but also connecting the major roads out of Casablanca to the rest of the country. A large avenue linked the train station to the Place de France. At the time Prost drew up his plans no tracks had been laid. The boulevard serving the industrial quarters also connected with the central road to Rabat; this road became the main intra-city commercial artery, and its corridor was soon the site of speculation and growth. Three hospitals for three clienteles (civilian, military, and native), grouped around a common set of laboratories and specialized facilities, were proposed. Prost planned a distribution of schools no more than 800 meters from residential areas. The war halted implementation of the plan, which was begun again in 1918. In the interim, the administration classified streets into voies urbaines (city streets) and voies privées (private streets), according to whether the property holders cooperated with the plan requirements: only the first group received paved streets.

In the eyes of urbanists and historians, the race against speculation and gold-rush immigration was at best tied.
lack of control over land acquisition combined with the plan's designation of areas for future growth actually increased speculation. The circular boulevard—which Prost had conceived as the outer limit of the city—was surpassed by the end of the First World War. A group of small settlements, almost villages, arose in this area, and a second peripheral boulevard and road system were required to provide services for them. After Prost's departure in 1923, pressure from settlers succeeded in abolishing height restrictions, and modest skyscrapers and apartments sprang up along the main arteries. The other consistently mentioned failure in Casablanca's planning was the lack of green space (the contrast with Rabat is striking). The only major park, an area of 30 hectares, was a sports field placed behind the Place Lyautey. Other green squares and open spaces were swallowed up by speculation.

The Style of the Protectorate

In Prost's plan, a large avenue linked the Place de France and the Place Lyautey. The latter site was occupied by the main barracks of the French army. Prost and Lyautey intervened to keep the military from solidifying these barracks in concrete, and succeeded in having the major military emplacements removed from the downtown area. Throughout Morocco, but particularly in Rabat and in Casablanca, Prost and Lyautey attributed a major importance to public buildings. They agreed that in Casablanca the facades should be constructed first and an area for expansion left behind, to be filled in when time and resources permitted. Prost said of the Palais de Justice in Casablanca, "it was morally necessary to build the facade, more so as it occupied the back of the administrative square."64

The role of the Place Lyautey was to symbolize (and actualize in its administrative functions) the Protectorate as a mediating institution. The two societies would meet there; hence its importance, and hence the need to give appropriate form to this crossing.

Before describing the Place Lyautey, some background concerning public spaces and architecture in colonial North Africa is required. François Béguin makes a distinction between the "Conqueror's Style" and the "Protector's Style."65 Here, as in so many other domains, Algeria was Lyautey's counter-model. Algiers and its central Place des Armes represented the Conqueror's Style—carved out at the foot of the medina in Haussmannian fashion by army engineers. Mosques were destroyed or converted into barracks and churches. Materials from the most famous monuments were used to rebuild the French city. Travelers in search of the exotic lamented its French character. This was precisely the vision of the city held by many of its citizens; proposals existed to raze the old city entirely. During the course of the nineteenth century, Algerian cities and public buildings closely imitated the succession of Ecole des Beaux-Arts styles. Architects who won prize competitions in France were assigned state contracts in Algeria, much as they might have been in Bordeaux. The first stage of colonial urbanism in North Africa, then, was characterized by destruction of existing urban structures and the creation of urban spaces based on French principles.

Napoleon III's trip to Algiers in 1865, his celebration of the idea of an "Arab Kingdom," marked the end of wanton architectural destruction and the beginning of a politics of conservation of architectural monuments. Aesthetic appreciation of Arab art and urbanism began with the consolidation of the conquest of Algeria and Tunisia, and with the arrival of different groups of French proposing a more associative politics.66 Governor-General Charles Jonnart, the man who brought Lyautey to Algeria, guided the strategy of associating architectural style and colonial politics. Under Jonnart a systematic search for Arab forms began. In Tunisia the neoclassicism of public buildings gave way to a neo-Moorish style by the first decade of the century. This eclectic style was explicitly meant to symbolize the protectorate politics of association, the style of the protector who had already vanquished. Local French architects began a movement of redefinition, turning away from monumental form. In the early years of the twentieth century a range of texts treated vernacular architecture: V. Valensi's L'Habitation tunisienne, or R. Guy's L'Architecture moderne de style arabe. This work was important for its valorization of local construction techniques and its appreciation of local colors and geometric shapes. North African architecture, like North Afri-
can culture, was to be comprehended in its diverse forms of adaptation and beauty.

Lyautey preached a simplicity and sobriety of style. The forms embodied the norms he sought to impose. We are attached, he said, to the best characteristics of Arab architecture which "prides itself on fashioning its exteriors solely with simple contours and façades." The style of association consisted in simplicity of form, minimal decoration, and geometric spaces. Morocco's public buildings would present Moroccan forms in the service of modern norms of technology and administration. Lyautey and Prost brought the neo-Moorish style for individual buildings to its highest point of achievement. The administrative buildings (central post office, central bank, law courts, Hôtel de Ville, records offices, etc.) were formally distributed around the Beaux-Arts, symmetrical space. Prost drew the original plans in 1914-15, and they were executed beginning in 1922 by Joseph Marrast, who was responsible for the widely acclaimed architecture. The law courts offer a striking example of Beaux-Arts composition, geometric spaces, and elegant use of revivified artisanal work. The city hall was especially successful architecturally: three stories of offices surrounded a resplendent interior courtyard filled with fountains, basins, luxurious vegetation, and excellent artisanry. "The extension into the interior of the building of these landscaped spaces establishes a sort of marriage of traditions, between the urban European landscape and the Arab, terraced house."68 It seems fair to say that, however one evaluates the political project of the Protectorate, certain of its formal experiments were highly successful.

Arabisances: The New Medina

Prost has been frequently (and justly) criticized for neglecting Moroccan housing needs. At the very least, the strategy of separate types of cities, whatever its other complexities, reflected a tendency to do less for the Moroccans. The city's administrative and infrastructural needs were given the most immediate attention. More rigid control over European construction produced more and better housing in the European quarters. It is also important to underline the class bias of Prost's urbanism: Casablanca's large population of poor Europeans were given little consideration and mostly lived in substandard housing. The seigneurs of the Protectorate did not welcome their presence. Prost was not unaware of the situation. As early as 1917, following the principles of spatial separation, Prost proposed a new medina for the expanding Moroccan population, some two kilometers away from the old one (now completely surrounded by European constructions, the Place de France, and its associated arteries) and far from the initial European settlement, near the sultan's new palace and along a main circulation axis that would link it to commercial and industrial activity. However, typically speculation-motivated expansion as well as general indifference to the spatial separation of populations meant that Prost's neat compartments were soon obliterated.

In a combination of enlightened self-interest, political maneuvering, and traditional Moroccan largesse, Muslims, Europeans, and Jews all contributed to the birth of the new quarter. Protectorate paternalism was exemplified by the fact that the director of the habous was French. Consistent with this paternalism, the director foresaw the need for more housing for Muslims and proposed using lands owned by the habous for a new medina which would provide moderately-priced rental housing. The proposed area was extended by the gift from a wealthy Jewish merchant of an adjoining plot. Because of its religious nature the habous could not accept gifts from Jews, so the merchant offered the land to Sultan Moulay Youssef, who accepted the offer (keeping one-quarter of the plot for the construction of a palace), thereby rendering the project legitimate. On a second quarter, the sultan constructed housing for the palace staff, and his chamberlain built a small city on the third. Finally, the fourth quarter, enlarged by further purchases of adjacent land, was given over to what the French would refer to as the habous quarter.

Social Aesthetic

Prost assigned the task of designing the quarter to Albert La-prade (1885-1978), a Beaux-Arts architect wounded in the war and assigned to Morocco. Upon arriving in Morocco, La-prade...
enthusiastically filled his notebooks with a large number of
drawings of vernacular Moroccan architectural motifs, search-
ning for a vocabulary of social-spatial elements. French
architects pursued systematic inquiries into the Moroccan house,
quarter, and city as a total social environment which they hoped
to reconstitute. The task was to decompose the charm into its
architectural and urban elements and to learn how to recom-
pose them into new forms combining modern technology with
these socially rich stylistic elements. Laprade and his friends
hunted for revealing details—the habit of placing olive trees
next to white walls, vines against walls, and wells in the shade.
The aim was not only to recreate beauty, but to identify the
constituents of the sensibility these forms embodied. Laprade
sought "the values of ambiance."[69]

This was a self-consciously understated architecture, which
explored the interconnections of forms, social practices, and
historically sedimented values. For Laprade, architecture was
more than style; it was socially mediated nature, urbanity, a
whole way of life. Laprade wanted to reconstitute everyday life,
but a specific everyday life. From decoration and embellish-
ment to forms, sobriety, minor arts, and ordinary (social rather
than symbolic) life, Laprade and his friends sought the mor-
phological meetings through which Moroccan forms endowed
nature and culture with a particular unity. Architects of the
next generation would seek through similar experiments to
distill a pure form, a modern style; they would seek and claim
to have found universal forms matching the universal norms of
science. This was not Laprade's or Lyautney's project.

Laprade drew initial sketches for a new medina; however, his
work on the Residence in Rabat took precedence, and he
passed the project to two associates, Cadet and Brion. Building
on Laprade's observation of houses, public spaces, and social
practices, these two built a whole quarter in which a modern,
technical infrastructure was concealed beneath a neo-Moorish
façade. House exteriors were anonymous and lacking in any
indications of the status of the inhabitants; light, air, and pri-

New Medina Sprawl
One of the reasons for choosing the site of the new medina was
the existing commerce along the adjacent Marrakech Road. The
two main Moroccan quarters (the old and new medinas) were
linked by this road; the European quarters lay in between. In
1920 the administration acquired 10 hectares adjacent to the
new medina through expropriation, and the city rented out
parcels of this land for construction. In these new areas, plan-
ning was overrun by an influx of populations and insufficient
green space. Prost's zoning was ignored in other quarters as
well: villas were built in the industrial east, and some industry
was located in the residential west. Although planners and his-
torians constantly express disappointment with Casablanca,
their judgments can be contested. When one compares the his-
tory of Casablanca, with all of its problems and shortcomings, with other great metropolises of the third world (and certain of the first and second) it seems clear that it was fairly successful. Taking into consideration its mixing of different populations in relative peace, the fact that Casablanca was healthier in 1950 than was Paris, the variety of architectural styles and scales contained within a comprehensive circulation pattern, the restless energy of its people, its function as a world port and as the internal port of entry to the industrial world for generations of rural Moroccans, and its political role in resisting colonial as well as royal abuses—one concludes that the picture is far from negative.

New Technologies: Pétain

Lyautey's career in Morocco was ended by a rebellion, led by Abd el-Krim, in the Rif mountains of northern Morocco. Substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to deciding if his movement was the last of the traditional rebellions against foreign intruders, or the first of the modern movements for national independence. While the question is intriguing and important, the confrontation between Lyautey and Pétain over how to fight Abd el-Krim, while less ambiguous, is arguably of equal historical significance.

In the early 1920s, Lyautey was increasingly preoccupied with the growing influence of Abd el-Krim in the Spanish-administered zone of Morocco's Rif mountains, and with his calls for an independent Berber nation. In the French zone, the Berber tribes both in the Middle Atlas mountains and in the western areas of Morocco surrounding the city of Taza remained either un pacified or uncertain allies. The danger of the situation was compounded by the gradual reduction of French military forces in Morocco; occupation of the Rhine and Ruhr took precedence. Anticipating an attack by Abd el-Krim in French-controlled territory, Lyautey insistently called for reinforcements from France. The attack came on April 11, 1925, a month before it was expected and before the promised reinforcements had arrived from Algeria. A ministerial crisis in Paris that same week delayed concerted action. Lyautey, in his late sixties and recovering from a major operation, asked Paris to appoint a general to command the northern front, but was refused.

Politically, Lyautey, who had had good relations with Edouard Herriot, encountered opposition from his successor Paul Painlevé. Painlevé sent Pétain, head of the armed forces, to Morocco on an inspection mission. Pétain and Lyautey already knew each other, as Pétain had made a previous inspection visit to Morocco in 1922 and stopped in Casablanca in early 1925. In the course of returning to Paris with Lyautey's plan of battle, Pétain met the Spanish prime minister, Primo de Rivera, in the Spanish zone. Without informing Lyautey, the two drew up a new plan of attack. Pétain returned to Paris and convinced Painlevé of its worth. Pétain boasted at a Parisian dinner, "There is not enough room for both Lyautey and me in Morocco." Pétain returned to Morocco in full command of military operations. Fresh troops (refused to Lyautey) were dispatched from France. Lyautey, recognizing that his era was over and that his pacification approach could not be more foreign to Pétain, resigned on September 25, 1925.

Pétain commanded 100,000 troops and 40 generals. After the winter rains and unsuccessful negotiations, the offensive was unleashed. By the end of May, 1926, Abd el-Krim was beaten. Guided by a radically different conception of power, Pétain totally altered Lyautey's military strategy. Instead of small groups of mobile troops in contact with local tribal groups, Pétain substituted the tactics of modern European war: massive groupings of troops, heavy artillery, and the systematic occupation of territory following a fixed plan of attack. The conquest of territory, not political action with the tribes, dictated Pétain's plan of action. To limit French losses, Pétain relied heavily on massive artillery power to weaken the enemy. He also reinstituted Bugeaud's Algerian strategy of systematically destroying crops, supplies, and the economic infrastructure. Pétain's strategy was "based more upon spatial and temporal rationalization and the use of mass-produced war equipment than upon the manipulation of social structures." Abd el-Krim was to be crushed.

The Rif war was a laboratory of modernity in a number of senses. The Spanish army experimented with techniques it would soon use in Spain's civil war. Pétain's tactics became text-
book examples for a French army preparing for the next disaster: “Security, rather than speed, mobility, and efficiency, was responsible for the maintenance in 1939 of a style of mobilization which was total—involving men, resources, and firepower—but still very stationary in space and time.”75 This strategy was challenged only by the young De Gaulle. Although French aviation was used successfully in the Rif, Pétain failed to grasp its true importance; in Morocco Pétain’s aviation strategy and the lessons he drew from it were based on the lack of enemy aircraft.

Preparing for the major encounter with Abd el-Krim, Lyautey, in 1924, had assembled the Orientalists at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines (Lévy-Provencal, Terrasse, Colin, and Basset) to collect all available data on the Rif. On the first day of Abd el-Krim’s general offensive, Lyautey held a meeting of his native-affairs council, at which he predicted Morocco’s inevitable independence and argued for a politics which would lead to friendship between the two countries. Lyautey’s ultimate ability to negotiate Morocco toward independence is debatable, but Pétain certainly expressed no such sentiments. Pétain advocated more direct control by the French government over Moroccan policy, leading to more standard colonial policy throughout the empire. The destruction of rural social structures accelerated the population movement toward Morocco’s urban centers, forming a social base for future nationalist political movements. Finally, Abd el-Krim, it seems worth mentioning, dreamed of transforming his tiny capital of Adjir into another Ankara.

A 1931 Conference on Urbanism in the Colonies summed up the state of the art. The mood in Paris was confident, contrasting with a growing pessimism about the possibilities of urban planning in France itself, as well as Lyautey’s bitter realization that his colonial dream was over. There was general agreement among the participants, a complacent consensus on the basic principles of Musée Social—or more accurately by 1931, Moroccan—urbanism. There was also general agreement that Lyautey should be considered the greatest urbanist of modern times. The Congress agreed on twenty-one points. It called for

the mandatory institution of plans d’aménagement et d’extension for all agglomerations, requiring that these plans be approved by those competent to do so, that the designs respect the practices of the “races” involved but not exclude contact between them, that the cities be airy and well planted, that architectural pastiche be avoided, that local arts be used as much as possible in ornamenting these cities, that modern arts be used for modern necessities, that hygiene be the norm in all dimensions of the plan, that historical monuments be preserved, and that aerial photography be used in planning.76

The only awkward issue was the segregation of the new cities from the existing, indigenous ones. A central concern of the Congress was conceiving of and building cities where different races (as they were called) with different customs and practices cohabited. Whatever the limitations of the approach—and they were manifold—it is crucial to realize that this congress was the last major occasion at which cultural difference (which tacitly included class difference) was directly thematized for decades. Norms, in the future, would turn on a technocratic universalism potentially (but not inevitably) more democratic and certainly leading to greater homogenization. In such a scheme, difference, quite literally, had no place—except as a relation in a statistical continuum.
Notes to Chapter 9


32. Jean-Pierre Gaudin, "Prévision, aménagement et gestion locale," 155ff., for these and following details.


34. Ibid., 405.


36. Ibid., 389.


39. Agache et al., Comment reconstruire, 5.


42. Poète, the leading contemporary practitioner of urban history, emphasized neither the static nor the cyclical in urban change but rather sought to understand the mutation and evolution of urban forms.


44. Ibid., 28.

Chapter 9


3. For a full account not only of French tactics but of Moroccan resistance to them, see
Notes to Chapter 9


4. His *chef de cabinet* was the son of ex-Governor General Rousseau, who had replaced de Lanessan in Indochina.


11. For further discussion of this point see: Michel Foucault, interview with Paul Rabinow, ed. Paul Rabinow, 340–72.


13. Ibid., 325. For the invention of the "traditional" Moroccan government, the Makhzen, see Daniel Rivet, *Lyauté et l'institution du protectorat français au Maroc, 1912–1923*, Doctorat d'État en Histoire et Sciences Sociales, Université de Paris (Val-de-Marne), 1985; 214ff.


26. Ibid., 59.

27. Ibid., 63.


29. Hubert de la Casinière, *Les Municipalités marocaines, leur développement, leur législation* (Casablanca, 1924), 88.


31. Ibid.


37. Letter of December 5, 1913, ibid., 179.


41. Prost had been recommended to Lyauté by J.C.N. Forestier, the Conservateur des


55. Abu-Lughod fails to establish how much land was expropriated during this period but cites Knight as saying that it was only after Lyautey left that large chunks were grabbed.

56. Prost went on to do regional planning on the Côte d'Azur, and to devise the first regional circulation plan for the Parisian region before becoming the chief urban planner in Istanbul.

57. Urban planning was hardly unknown in pre-Protectorate Morocco: it is worth remembering that in the eighteenth century, the Moroccan sultan had commissioned a Portuguese architect to build the port-fortress city of Mogador. Henri Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc des origines à l'établissement du protectorat français, vol. 2 (Casablanca, 1950), 298.

58. Under Malekite Islamic law, the land in Casablanca belonged to the Makhzen; it fell into the category of land reconquered from the Christians. Louis Milliot, Introduction à l'étude du droit musulman (Paris, 1953), 491ff.


60. Hubert Lyautey, letter of August 20, 1919 to André Lazard, as cited in Le Réve- rend, Un Lyautey inconnu, 294.

61. See Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime (Paris, 1948), 435-44.

62. Maurice Zimmermann, Paysages et villes du Maroc (Lyons, 1923), 34.

63. There was a "Plan Agache" for Casa, reproduced in Michel Ecouchard, Casablanca: le roman d'une ville (Paris, 1955). Apparently Agache had merely cleaned up an army engineer's drawings. Personal communication, Jean-Louis Cohen.

64. Prost, "Développement de l'urbanisme," 78.


66. Jean-L. de Lanessan: saving a pagoda was worth twenty columns. Principes de colonisation (Paris, 1897), 62.


72. Lottman claims that Lyautey had hatched a plot, stopped by Pétain, to overthrow Herriot. Herbert R. Lottman, Pétain (Paris, 1984), 130. Lottmancuriously adds that Lyautey had spent all the war years in Morocco.

73. Ibid., 134.

74. Charnay, "Guerre du Rif," 58.

75. Ibid., 86.

76. For details see Henri Prost, "Rapport general," Royer, ed. Urbanisme dans les colonies.